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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY (in Italian) 
 
Con questa tesi si intende presentare una serie di nuovi risultati relativamente ad una grandezza 
a cui si è dedicata minore attenzione negli studi sull’Italia, ma che allo stesso tempo rappresenta 
l’ambiente nel quale quotidianamente vive e opera la maggior parte degli agenti economici: la città. Oggi 
più che in passato le città sono vive, vegete e in continua trasformazione. Sempre più, il benessere della 
nostra vita dipende dalla conoscenza di come funzionano e di come vanno gestite al meglio le aree 
urbane che abitiamo, per affrontare le crisi economiche, i conflitti sociali e la crescita culturale. Per 
questa ragione viene naturale chiedersi perché le città esistono, perché esse crescono o declinano, 
perché alcune città crescono più di altre. Queste sono le domande cui abbiamo cercato di rispondere 
nel presente lavoro il quale offre un’inedita storia economica delle aree urbane italiane nei primi 150 
anni di unità nazionale. La prospettiva storica insieme ai più recenti strumenti di analisi economica 
rappresenta un’alchimia essenziale per afferrare le debolezze presenti e i punti di forza delle città così 
come interpretarne i cambiamenti subiti e anticiparne l’evoluzione futura.  
La tesi è costituita da 3 papers.  
 Il primo lavoro “Humal Capital and the Growth of Cities: A Literature Review” è una 
rassegna della letteratura. Partendo da Romer (1986), il quale, inserendo all’interno dell’impianto teorico 
di crescita neoclassico l’idea di learning by doing e knowledge spillovers, riesce ad ottenere crescita 
perpetua e di conseguenza a spiegare la mancata convergenza tra le economie nazionali, si arriva a 
Lucas (1988) il quale enfatizza il ruolo delle città nel favorire il trasferimento di conoscenza tra agenti 
economici che operano a stretto contatto. Le idee si muovono più velocemente nelle aree urbane, dove 
individui inizialmente isolati si incontrano e scambiano idee. Quindi le esternalità cui la letteratura di 
crescita si riferisce è un carattere peculiare dell’ambiente urbano piuttosto che di sistemi economici 
aggregati e più dispersi. Nel processo di accumulazione di conoscenza, il ruolo e il peso delle città è 
quindi inevitabile.  
A questo punto, il problema diventa misurare tali esternalità. Segue uno sterminato numero di 
lavori. Il punto di partenza è Rauch (1991), il quale usando il modello di equilibrio spaziale teorizzato 
da Roback (1982), mostra che le aree metropolitane con un livello di capitale umano più elevato 
registrano anche costi degli immobili e salari maggiori. Glaeser and Saiz (2004), Shapiro (2006), Glaeser 
et al. (2011) e Simon e Nardinelli (2002) sono gli studi più significativi su questa linea di ricerca per le 
città americane. Per il caso italiano possiamo citare Paci e Usai  (2001),  Deidda et al. (2002), Dalmazzo 
e de Blasio (2005, 2011) e Di Addario e Patacchini (2008). 
Il secondo lavoro “Growth in Italian Cities” è di fatto il corpo della tesi. Oltre a fornire un 
excursus storico sull’evoluzione della popolazione e dell’occupazione nelle città italiane 
dall’Unificazione fino agli anni 2000 e a mostrare alcuni fatti stilizzati che saranno utilizzati come linee-
guida nel corso del lavoro, lo scopo principale è valutare il ruolo che il capitale umano ha assunto 
nell’incentivare la crescita occupazionale nelle aree urbane. In particolare, si testano due canali. Il primo 
sostiene che la connessione istruzione-crescita sia generata da incrementi di produttività. In città con 
una più alta concentrazione di capitale umano si crea più innovazione e quindi crescita. Una spiegazione 
alternativa è che gli spillovers del capitale umano siano cresciuti nel  corso del tempo. Queste due 
ipotesi sono empiricamente indistinguibili poiché entrambi prevedono uno spostamento del parametro 
tecnologico della funzione di produzione.  
Il secondo canale ipotizza che la relazione capitale umano-crescita derivi dalla capacità delle 
persone skilled di generare amenities (maggiori opportunità di shopping, miglior qualità del luogo di 
lavoro o ancora amenità culturali, quali teatri, musei e cosi via) e di migliorare la qualità della vita nelle 
città in cui risiedono e attraverso questo canale incentivare la crescita occupazionale. Infatti, poiché le 
imprese tendono a delocalizzare fuori dai confini urbani o addirittura nazionali, il successo delle città 
dipende sempre più dal loro ruolo quali centri di consumo più che di produzione.  
Utilizzando un modello di equilibrio spaziale à la Shapiro (2006), i risultati possono essere così 
riassunti: dal 1971 al 2001, le città con più capitale umano sono cresciute di più. Un incremento del 10 
percento nella quota iniziale di individui in possesso di una laurea è associato con un incremento 
dell’occupazione dello 0,8 percento. Questo risultato vale sia livello di Sistema Locale del Lavoro 
(LLM) che a livello di città.  La connessione capitale umano-crescita occupazionale è spiegata per la 
maggior parte dal canale “produttività” a livello di LLM, mentre le esternalità di consumo assumono un 
ruolo rilevante a livello di città. In questo ultimo caso la crescita nella qualità della vita spiega tra il 31 e 
il 43 percento della relazione istruzione-crescita occupazionale. 
 Sfruttando l’indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane (SHIW), si dimostra anche come il 
capitale umano permetta alle città di ristrutturare la loro economia nel caso in cui siano colpite da shock 
avversi, come nel caso del Nord-Ovest. Infine testiamo un’ipotesi di gentrificazione. Il punto è che, 
condizionatamente al nostro campione di città, il capitale umano predice la crescita occupazionale e il 
declino della popolazione. Inserendo nel modello preferenze eterogenee tra individui skilled e unskilled, 
emerge una prima evidenza che una sorta di gentrificazione a livello di città possa essere avvenuta tra il 
1970 e il 2000.  
L’innovazione rispetto a Dalmazzo e de Blasio (2005, 2011) e Di Addario e Patacchini (2008) 
sono molteplici: a) il presente lavoro indaga la crescita dell’occupazione e della popolazione non i loro 
livelli statici; b) si testano numerose ipotesi che emergono da fatti stilizzati che coprono 150 anni di 
storia; c) utilizziamo due livelli di analisi, LLM e città. 
 “Brain Gain in the Age of Mass Migration” è il terzo lavoro. Esso indaga sulle origini del 
capitale umano nelle città Italiane. In questo studio si mostra come l’emigrazione di massa che si è 
sperimentata in Italia nella prima decade del XX secolo abbia ridotto l’abbandono scolastico (misurato 
dal tasso di frequenza nella scuola elementare) aumentando il livello di  scolarizzazione in un Paese 
ancora poco industrializzato e a forte vocazione agricola quale appunto era l’Italia. Tre meccanismi 
sono alla base della relazione migrazione-scolarizzazione. Primo, la prospettiva migratoria o 
semplicemente l’emigrazione stessa potrebbero aver aumentato il rendimento atteso dell’istruzione e di 
conseguenza rendere l’investimento in istruzione più appetibile; secondo, la migrazione di ritorno 
avrebbe favorito la frequenza scolastica sia attraverso canali monetari (investimenti che effettuavano i 
migranti una volta tornati grazie ai risparmi accumulati all’estero) che non monetari (colui che ritornava 
era una persona trasformata dall’esperienza migratoria in grado di affrontare e valutare in modo diverso 
questioni sociali, culturali e politiche). Terzo, le rimesse avrebbero alleviato il vincolo di bilancio delle 
famiglie il quale rappresentava sicuramente un ostacolo all’investimento in istruzione.  
Basandoci su una robusta evidenza qualitativa, su un nuovo dataset a livello di città e sull’analisi 
cliometrica (IV and GMM), i nostri risultati supportano la tesi secondo la quale la frequenza scolastica 
sarebbe stata positivamente correlata con (e probabilmente causata da) l’emigrazione e l’emigrazione di 
ritorno!" Anche le rimesse sembrano essere positivamente associate con la scolarizzazione. Nello 
specifico, i nostri calcoli suggeriscono che ogni 100 persone in più che emigravano, riducevano il drop-
out da 3 a 5 individui, mentre ogni 100 ritorni lo riducevano da 5 a 9 individui. 
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Abstract 
This study summarizes the state of knowledge on the relationship between human capital and the 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last 20 years the new endogenous growth theory has increasingly influenced the 
economic growth literature. It emphasizes the role played by human capital accumulation in boosting 
growth through stimulating technological creation and invention, eventually leading to increased 
productivity. However, the empirical estimations of the impact of human capital on economic growth 
have achieved mixed results. 
Mainstream economics consists primarily of two levels of analysis— the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ 
level. The micro literature has produced several estimates of the monetary returns to education. One 
branch of literature focus on the Mincerian human capital model, according to which a change in a 
country’s average level of schooling is one of the key determinants of its income growth. However this 
literature emphasizes private monetary returns to education at the expense of social returns. In this 
study we focus on the  importance of physical proximity to the expansion of knowledge and as 
consequence the role of cities in growth must be considered. This led to the development of macro 
growth literature which has been motivated by the possible existence of positive social externalities of 
education which may exceed or fall short of private returns.  
There are two main debates in the macro growth literature: the traditional growth models of 
Solow and Swan (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) and the new endogenous growth theories. 
While the former disregards human capital, the later incorporates it. In the traditional growth models 
physical capital drives growth. They are based on the crucial assumption of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital, which leads the growth process of an economy to eventually arrive at the steady state 
where the rate of technological progress is exogenously given.  Whereas in the new endogenous growth 
models, human capital occupies a central role in spurring growth as knowledge spillovers and human 
capital externalities aid in delaying the tendency for diminishing returns to capital accumulation (Romer, 
1986, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
After a widely discussion on the macro and micro level debate of human capital and the role of  
cities in spurring knowledge, we deeply study the empirical evidence for the American and the Italian 
cases.   
 
 
2. Growth, human capital and the role of cities: the macro approach. 
 
According to current thinking and research in economics, geography and social science broadly, 
one of the most important driver of local economic development is highly skilled and educated people 
- what economists and social scientists frequently refer to as human capital. Places that have more of it 
thrive, while those with less stagnate or decline. As a consequence it is expected that if the stock of 
graduates in an area will increase then the region’s long-run growth rate will increase as well. This is the 
case at both national and sub-national levels. But, let's proceed in the right order. 
Since Solow (1956), it has seemed clear that the growth of economies does not involve the 
simple accumulation of capital and labor. A treatment of growth based entirely on capital and labor 
accumulation could not adequately explain why countries did not converge to a steady state over the 
long-run. Only by including an exogenous rate of technological change could economic models 
generate the perpetual growth that one seems to see in the developed countries, but putting growth in 
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an exogenous parameter does little to explain it. Empirically, the stunning range of cross-national 
experiences makes it clear that the forces driving growth are rich and varied. 
One solution to this problem was to move from the CRS production function employed in 
neoclassical growth theory (it generates diminishing returns to capital accumulation and, as 
consequence, convergence) to a production function that displays IRS (Romer, 1986). Increasing 
returns to scale eliminate any kind of convergence and allow for perpetual growth. The problem with 
IRS is that they are incompatible with perfect competition since marginal costs (or price in perfect 
competition) lie under the average costs, which means that firms are earning negative profits. 
Two assumptions about productivity growth allowed Romer to eliminate these two problem. First, an 
increase in a firm’s capital stock leads to a parallel increase in the stock of knowledge (learning by 
doing); second, firm’s knowledge is a public good that any other firm can access at zero costs. Hence, 
once discovered, a piece of knowledge spills over instantly across the whole economy (knowledge 
spillover). These hypotheses  allowed for social increasing returns in production, but made private 
production CRS. This was achieved by making capital investment have social benefits not reaped by 
private investors.  These externalities allowed for the conbination of competitive behavior and IRS that 
made growth possible in a model.  
For this model to be more than a mere technical curiosity, Romer needed to present convincing 
evidence that (1) there existed a form of investment that generated these massive spillovers; (2) this 
form of investment was important and becoming increasingly so; and (3) the real world resembled the 
predictions of his model. The form of investment Romer suggested was the accumulation of 
knowledge. 
The main message of Romer is that the generation of new knowledge was the key to economic 
progress and that understanding the conditions that allow knowledge to expand quickly was the key to 
economic growth. 
Lucas (1988) linked this generation of new ideas with cities. Two major points of this paper has 
to be distinguished. First, the biggest change with respect to Romer was that Lucas emphasized human 
capital investment as opposed to investment in a disembodied stock of knowledge. In a technical sense, 
the switch is fairly irrelevant; calling the driver of growth “human capital” or “disembodied knowledge” 
makes little difference to the workings of the model. Conceptually, however, there is a great difference. 
The argument behind the externalities of human capital are fairly plausible.  For example many people 
have experienced the positive aspects of having smarter colleagues as well as public investment in 
education is justified in part by the idea that there are benefits to society (such as a better qualified 
voter) from an educated individual that are not taken into account by that individual.   
The second point is his discussion of the role of cities in the trasfer of knowledge. Lucas followed 
Jacobs (1969) and argued that when one thinks about human capital, knowledge and growth, the role of 
cities is almost inescapable. Idea moves quickly in cities; unrelated agents come into contact and share 
ideas. The externalities that this growth literature discusses seem to be much more features of urban 
enviroments than of agents operating alone in the hinterland.  
Lucas (1988) brought to growth economics the idea that cities may be playing a major role in 
facilitating the accumulation of knowledge spillovers in the growth process. ! Barro (1991) is one of the first major empirical papers of the new growth literature. This paper 
looked at a sample of countries over the period 1960-1985 and investigated why and how they growth.!
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He simply regressed growth in per capita GDP (once investment and fertility were controlled for)  on 
various national initial characteristics, such as human capital or political variables. !
Two facts emerged from this paper.! First, the standard form for an empirical literature on cross-
country causes of growth. The advantages of this simple format are great, compared with the 
complexity of the other possible approaches to testing theories about national, regional or urban 
growth. Growth economists and regional ones, regularly regressed changes on changes, for example 
GDP growth on industrialized sector growth, or growth in a city on growth in a standard metropolitan 
statistical area (SMSA). Now, the changes on changes approach is correct only when the researcher is 
confident of not omitting any relevant variables (contemporaneous changes are more likely to be 
determined by omitted growth-causing variables than by a change in initial level). Moder empirical style 
is more likely to focus on the less dangerous (and less ambitious) simple regressions between later 
changes and earlier conditions than on the testing of a complex multiequation structural model.!
Second, Barro’s major findings stressed the importance of two forces: education and politics. Human 
capital variables were particularly important in determining growth. This result has been taken as strong 
evidence for the importance of skills accumulation in economic progress in the spirit of the 
knowledge/human capital view of growth emphasized by Romer and Lucas. The political results are 
also interesting. Barro found that the black market premium, which is an index of the degree of 
government distortion in the marketplace, is negatively correlated with later growth. Overall the 
consensus seems to be that national attributes which appear to be bad government, such as instability, 
dictatorship, corruption and so on, are all negatively correlated with growth, although it is difficult to 
determine which one matters most (Alesina and Perrotti, 1994). 
Krugman (1991) was interested in questions about when and why industry concentrates or 
disperses.  His results have certain basic themes that often interrelate with the urban literature. 
Krugman constructs a model of production and local IRS (he assumed a fixed cost of production 
borne by all firms).  He then assumed a simple transport cost and looked at th way production situated 
itself over space.  This model predicted multiple equilibria: one equilibrium existed with complete 
dispersion of activities, and two others with spatial concentration in one region or the other.  
Again, two points came to light. First, the model explains why regions develop the way that they 
do. Frequently one area may have a slight advantage in production, but production becomes 
concentrated there to an extent that seems far beyond the region’s comparative advantage. A multiple 
equilibria model explains this phenomenon: a slightly advantage might discourage dispersion and 
through the forces (transportation costs) that lead to spatial concentration, generate extremely high 
density in one area and low density in others. The force that Krugman used to explain the 
concentration was that of transportation costs. However the connection between these costs and the 
concentration is not monotonic. At low levels of costs, lower costs lead to more dispersion both across 
regions and in the spread to suburbs; at high levels of transport cots, higher costs also lead to more 
dispersion. The reason is that when trasport is too expensive it becomes more important to be near the 
nonmobile factor of production.  
The paper does not suggest that transport costs were driving most locational decisions, but what we 
have to learn is that transport costs were one of the forces behind agglomeration. His second 
contribution is the importance of coordination, expectations and history on regional development. 
Krugman’s work shows the conditions under which history can influence expectation and viceversa. 
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! Roback (1982) is the pioneer paper on cities’ literature.!It is worth to spend some rows on this 
work because embodies the underlying idea of the relationship between wage, rents (housing/land 
prices) and amenities which is the bulk of the following literature. Roback used a general equilibrium 
model where both the consumer side and the behavior of firms are taken into account (previous studies 
looked at consumer side only).!!
The study focuses on two questions. The first one is the role of wages and rents in allocating workers 
to locations with various quantities of amenities. Cities differ on the level of amenities which are 
distinguished from the point of view of firms in “unproductive” amenities and in “productive” ones.  
An example of an unproductive amenity is clean air because firms must spend sources to use a 
nonpolluting technology. An example of productive amenity is “the lack of severe snow storms” 
because blizzards may be as costly to the firm in inconvenience and lost production as they are 
unpleasant to consumers. The idea is the following: if workers require a higher wage to live in a big, 
dense, polluted or otherwise unpleasant city, the firms in that city must have some productivity 
advantage to be able to pay the higher wage. !!
Suppose cities with clean air (unproductive amenity) which are good for consumers but bad for firms. 
The spatial equilibrium of consumers predicts that:!
-given the price of land, nominal wages should be lower in these more amenable cities; i.e. workers are 
willing to accept lower wages to live in that cities;  
-given wages, prices should be higher in more pleasant city to allow people to be indifferent between 
locations. 
The spatial equilibrium of firms predicts that input-factor prices (rents and wage) must be lower in 
more amenable cities; i.e. firms must pay lower wages and rents because it must spend sources to use a 
nonpulliting technology. 
The result is that wage are lower in more pleasant cities while the sign of prices (rents) is uncertain. The 
reason is that worker equilibrium requires high rents in pleasant cities to choke off immigration while 
firm equilibrium requires lower rents in amenable cities to induce firm location.  
Suppose now cities with the lack of blizzards (productive amenity) which are good both to firms and 
consumers.  
The spatial equilibrium of consumers predicts that: 
-given the price of land, nominal wages should be lower in these more amenable cities; i.e. workers are 
willing to accept lower wages to live in that cities;  
-given wages, prices should be higher in more pleasant city to allow people to be indifferent between 
locations. 
The spatial equilibrium of firms predicts that input-factor prices (rents and wage) must be higher in 
these more amenable cities; i.e. firms can pay higher wages and rents because it is more productive. The 
result is that the change in wages would be ambiguous and the rents would rise. 
Empirical evidence suggests that in the case of productive amenities (the lack of blizzards, or for 
example the initial presence of human capital) nominal wages are higher in more pleasant cities (firms’ 
effect prevails). The study also shows that regional wage differences can be explained largely by these 
local attributes. In cities with good characteristics, the prices of land are higher. 
The second question the paper addresses is how to measure correctly the implicit price of cities’ 
characteristics.  The implicit price of a city attribute is given by the quantity of land and the quantity of 
the consumption good workers must forgo because of the lower wage and the change in rents; i.e. it is 
! &!
measured by the variation of real wage. Given wage, if rents rise then people are evaluating that amenity 
more and more or in other words consumers are willing to pay more to live in that location with that  
kind of amenity.  
Overall the factor prices are striking a balance between the conflicting locational preferences of  of the 
firms and the workers. 
Rauch (1993) is clearly a test of the Romer-Lucas human capital spillover framework and the 
general equilibrium model theorized by Roback (1982).! He starts with the assumption that human 
capital spillovers are local, that is limited within an SMSA. Given this assumption, human capital 
externalities can be treated like any other standard urban amenity as in Roback (1982). Rauch uses the 
Roback’s model, so as the latter predicts, wages in SMSA with higher levels of human capital should be 
higher than those in other SMSAs (Rauch, in a first moment, supposes that human capital increases 
productivity but has no amenity value. This implies, in the spirit of Roback, that human capital is a 
productive amenity that rises wages because the behavior of firms overcome that of the consumer. 
Then he discusses the conseguences of this hypothesis on his results. The conclusion is that the 
productive effects prevails, as in Roback.). However, so that everyone in the model does not move to 
the highest human capital SMSA, Rauch needed a balancing force and used the Roback urban restraint 
on growth, land rents. In highly productive cities, rents should be high to choke off immigration and 
moreover landowners are expected to charge more for the privilege of living where one can work near 
smarter people. !
Using data with both wages and rents, Rauch was able to test this theory and found that SMSA cities 
with high levels of human capital had both higher property costs and higher wages, holding individual 
and dwelling characteristics constant. Even more the magnitude of the spillovers that he found were 
very close to those found by Lucas (1988) using country data. Rauch’s paper presents the strongest 
evidence to date on the productivity-enhancing  advantages of living in cities with higher level of 
education. 
The only remaining problem in the Rauch’ s model was one of unobserved heterogeneity. Borjas, 
Bronars and Trejo (1992) was able to show that given two locations, one with higher rate of return to 
ability and one with lower rate of return to ability, then the expected value of ability is greater in the 
location with higher returns to ability. Now if the returns to ability are positively correlated with the 
average level of aducation in a certain location, then the positive coefficient of education in the wage 
equation reflects selection bias. In other terms is likely that higher quality workers will migrate to 
SMSAs with higher average education. 
Although Rauch tried to shed light on the evidence favoring the productivity (human capital) 
interpretation of the wage effect over the selection bias interpretation, his attempt was subject to 
criticism. 
Glaeser (1992) and Glaeser and Marè (2001) attempted to understand whether there is a real 
productivity difference between dense urban areas and other areas or whether dense urban areas just 
have higher wages because they have higher ability workers. To solve the problem they looked at 
migrants to cities with higher average levels of human capital and to cities in general.  
These papers begin with the stilyzed fact that there are wage differences across space: wage are higher 
in big metropolitan areas than outside metropolitan areas. If workers with the same skill are being paid 
higher nominal wages in cities, then there are two puzzles to explain. First, we must understand why 
workers do not flock to these higher higher wage. Second, we must understand why firms do not flee 
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these high-wage areas. The labor-supply question (why do workers not to come to high wage cities?) 
requires that real wages must be constant over space, i.e. prices are higher in large cities; that is the 
Roback’s idea must hold. The labor demand question implies that, firms to stay in high-wage areas, 
either workers in those areas must have higher ability levels or productivity must be higher in those 
areas. 
So, the question becomes why density increases urban productivity. There are different explanations: 
-firms in dense areas save on transportation costs (Krugman,1991); 
-firms acquiring ideas from their neighbors (Lucas, 1998; Rauch, 1993); 
Since the productivity of firms in cities will be higher, workers will be paid more. These theories also 
predict that recent migrants to cities will receive immediate wage gains and that migrants who leave 
cities will see their wage drop to the level of rural workers. 
Another possible explanation of urban productivity is that cities enhance the accumulation of human 
capital. Urban density can speed the rate of interactions with high-skill individuals who can be imitated 
or the rate at which agents have new experiences. Cities may also facilitate coordination and allow 
individuals to specialize, which may lead to higher wages only over time. Urban density may make it 
easier for workers to find the best jobs for themselves, and urban wages mat grow more quickly 
because of better coordination of labor markets. In contrast to the previous theories, the latter predict a 
wage growth effect.  
The wage growth and the wage level effect can be distinguished by examining migrants. If the wage 
growth effect is correct, workers who come to cities may not receive large wage gains and workers who 
leave cities will not experience wage losses. If so the higher wage premium in the cities is the result of a 
learning, improving-productivity process. The wage level-theories predict both wage gains and wage 
losses. 
The rrs found that wages did not rise immediately for migrants when they entered new cities, instead 
there seemed to be a slow increase over time. Furthermore there was evidence of a little loss when they 
leave the city. However the results were not robust. The conclusion was that the wage difference across 
space was caused both by a slow accumulation of productivity in cities with high levels of human 
capital and unobserved eterogeneity; i.e. the urban wage premium appears to be a combination of a 
wage growth effect and a wage level effect.  !
3. Growth, human capital and the role of cities: the micro approach.!
 
What we have learned until now is that knowledge was the key to economic progress and that 
understanding the conditions that allow knowledge to expand quickly is the key to economic growth. 
Human capital investment is the kind of knowledge that generates massive spillovers. Moreover, ideas 
move quickly in cities. This section details some of the theories about the ways that dense, urban areas 
should change the returns to skills. 
The microeconomic foundation of the external effects of human capital is the sharing of 
knowledge and skills between workers that occurs through both formal and informal interactions 
(Glaeser, 1994). The diffusion and growth of knowledge that takes place as a result of that interaction is 
modelled in a paper by Jovanovic and Rob (1989). In their model individuals augment their knowledge 
through pairwaise meetings at which they exchange ideas. In each time period each individual, seeking 
to augment his knowledge, meets an agent chosen randomly from a distribution of agents/ideas. It 
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seems clear that the higher the average level of human capital (knowledge) of the agents, the more luck 
the agents will have with their meetings and the more rapid will be the diffusion and growth of 
knoledge. If this knowledge concerns technological improvements, we have a microeconomic 
fundation not only for external effects of human capital on total factor productivity, but also for 
making those external effects dependent on the average level of human capital.  
Given the existence of human capital externalities, economically identcally workers will tend to 
earn higher wages in human capital rich than in human capital poor countries.  The problem with 
inferring that human capital externalities cause these wage differencial is that a  high average level of 
human capital is associated with a high level of economic development. A high level of economic 
development is in turn associated with other factors that tend to cause high wages such as a large and 
technologically current stock of physical capital per capita (from Solow, dw/dK>0). For this reason it 
would be very difficult to econometrically identify the effects of human capital externalities using cross-
country data. By looking at different regions within one country, however, one can identify these 
effects, since the cost of capital and the level of disembodied technological knowledge will presumably 
be the same within its boarder. Indeed Lucas (1988) argues that cities are the most appropriate units to 
examine when looking for the productivity-enhancing effects of human capital.  It seems reasonable to 
think that random meetings, as opposed to costly, prearranged ones, would take place within a limited 
spatial area rather than uniformly distributed over an entire country; i.e spatial proximity allows ideas to 
flow more freely.  
In what follows, we present some theories that highlight why cities spread ideas.  
(A) The Transfer of Knowledge. Marshall (1890) suggests that skills are often learned through 
imitation, and the imitative process is speeded up in cities. By comparison with nonurban workers, 
workers in cities learn their talents better and by observing errors more often, they can learn to avoid 
them. While the exposure to throngs of individuals and activities in cities might serve as an immediate 
jump to worker productivity, it also increases a worker’s human capital over time. These arguments, 
when applied to the learning of skills, suggest that wages in the cities should not be raised immediately 
but over time, as workers improve their human capital by observing others and gaining access to a wide 
variety of ideas and production techniques. In general wages should grow more quickly in larger cities, 
and perhaps more quickly among workers with more formal education, assuming they are the workers 
most likely to invest greater and cheaper effort in human capital. These kind of spillovers suggest a 
particular pattern of wage movements; however neither the presence of these movements nor their 
absence validates the theory of intellectual spillovers or invalidates the connection between intellectual 
transfers and cities, since there are many other ways in which transfers might operate.  
More traditional arguments about transfers and cities suggest that intellectual transfers increase the 
productivity in cities and might even increase the productivity of better trained workers to a greater 
extent, but that these effects should not work directly through facilitating human capital investment 
(Lucas, 1988; Rauch, 1993). These arguments are distinguishable from the former because they predicts 
a wage-level effect for new migrants (see the selection bias problem). ! (B) Coordination of Talent.  The literature on matching (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Jovanovic, 
1992) emphasize the importance of coordinating workers and jobs. The possibile role of spatial 
proximity in facilitating good matching has older roots. Marshall (1890) emphasized that industrial 
concentration mighy be important because it facilitates coordination of talents. Thus, if the structure of 
cities allowed workers to choose among firms and find the best possible match, an urban wage 
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premium would be created.  Workers would get a higher return on ther human capital by being 
matched to the right job. Again thies effetct would heighten returns only gradually, as workers were 
able to access the urban labor market and make a correct match.  ! (C) Specialization and the Extent of the Martket. A similar argument asserts that cities should 
allow workers to pursue particularly specialized tasks. Urban ares are especially hospitable to specialized 
tasks bacause thay have larger markets (Smith, 1975) and because coordination costs for the same 
number of people may be lower in urban setting (Becker and Murphy, 1992). If cities facilitate 
specialization, this phenomenon might have several effects on human capital. First, workers might only 
receive the wage benefits of cities when they have specilized further and it will take time to achieve 
their gains. Second, specialization might be complementarity to human capital, so that highly skilled 
workers in particular benefits from being in cities. Finally there is a counter-argument that specilization 
is actually a substitute for skill, in which case more highly skilled workers will not benefit from being in 
cities. ! (D) Risk, Urban Diversity, and Investment. Another conceivable way in which cities interact 
with human capital accumulation is that they might reduce the risk to workers in undertaking human 
capital investment. Following Marshall’s argument, according to which industries agglomerate ensures  
their workers will have another firm to move to, it should be true that workers will be more likely to 
invest in human capital if they are assured that one company’s collapse will not leave their investment 
valueless. Similarly the argument by Rotemberg and Saloner (1991) the industrial concentration saves 
the worker from the firm’s having axcessive bergaing power also works to increase the incentives for 
worker investment in human capital. Because workers know that they can play one firm off against 
another and will not be subject to ex post appropriation, after their human capital investment, they will 
be more willing to invest in skills. Again this argument suggets that the urban wage premium should 
show up over time. ! (E) Cities and the Provision of Education. Cities have a long tradition of providing public 
education. Because of political factors, increasing returns to scale in public education, or easier 
specialization in teaching, cities traditionally have own universities and frequently a great number of 
secondary schools. Public school education began in cities. It is often argued that migrants to large 
cities in less developed conutries are drawn by the prospect of better education for their children. 
Glaeser, Kallak, Scheinkman and Shielfer (1993) used urban data to test three possible forms of 
human capital spillovers.  First, MAR (Marshall-Arrow-Romer) increasing returns spillover. This view 
says that the concentration of an industry in a city helps knowledge spillover between firms, and 
therefore, the growth of that industry and of that city. Through spying, imitation, and rapid interfirm 
movement of highly skilled labor, ideas are quickly disseminated among neighboring firms. When idea 
transfers involve the latest new information, the benefits to extremely high density become much 
larger. For example, success on Wall Street often involves knowing new events minute before anyone 
else. In this environment, the informational advantages of extreme spatial proximity become very high. 
The possibility of seeing someone with knowledge while taking a coffee may lead to large financial 
returns. This difference between the need for lower frequency technological updates and high 
frequency news may explain why Silicon Valley works well at low density and Wall Street remains in a 
tiny physical area in the tip of Mahnattan. In both cases, however, the spatial concentration of 
economic actors increases productivity at the firm level by increasing the flow of ideas. Insofar as 
workers learn how to better perform their jobs through observation, the existence of learning-by-seeing 
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will favor the densest of workplace environments. This view of workers suggests that wages are higher 
in cites not because individual firms are more productive but rather because workers in cities have 
acquired more (unobservable) skills.1 The MAR theory also predicts, as Schumpeter (1942) does, that 
local monopoly is better for growth than local competition, because local monopoly restricts the flow 
of ideas to others and so allows externalities to be internalized by the innovator. 
Second, Porter (1990), like MAR, argues that knowledge spillovers in specialized, geographically 
concentrated industries stimulate growth. He insists, however, that local competition, as opposed to 
local monopoly, fosters the pursuit and rapid adoption of innovation. He gives examples of Italian 
ceramics and gold jewerly industries, in which hundreds of firms are located together and fiercely 
compete to innovate since the alternative to innovation is collapse. Porter’s externalities are maximized 
in cities with geographically specialized, competitive industries. 
Third, Jacobs (1969), unlike MAR and Porter, believes that the most important knowledge 
transfers come from outside the core industry. As a result, variety and diversity of geographically 
proximate industries rather than geographical specialization promote innovation and growth.  Thus the 
crucial externality in cities is cross-fertilization of ideas across different lines of work. New York grain 
and cotton merchants saw the need for national and international financial transactions, and so the 
financial services industry was born. Another example is the brasserie industry which spur dressmakers’ 
innovation rather than the lingerie industry. Moreover “the diversity of urban activities quite naturally 
encourages attempts to apply or adopt in one sector (or in one specific problem area) technological 
solutions adopted in another sector” (Bairoch, 1991; pag. 336). Jacobs also favors local competition 
because, like Portes, she believes that it speed up the adoption of technology. 
These theories are extremely appealing because they try to explain simultaneously how cities form and 
why they growth. Despite their differences, all these theories have implications for growth rates.   
The data used were 30-year employment patterns across SMSAs. The authors used two 
measures of initial scale as thei basic controls: overall employment and relative employment. These 
scale measures are supposed to reflect the Romer-style theories about the way pure size increases the 
ability to generate new ideas.  They found both initial measures negatively correlated with later growth 
and concluded that initial concentration does not seem to foster creativity; i.e. scale economies on the 
local-industry level do not really create growth. 
The second result was that urban diversity is positively related to later growth.  Using a 
concentration index, they found that city-industries in highly diversified cities grow much more quickly 
than city-industries in one-industry towns. This finding, supports Jacobs’ idea that growth is a function 
of cities combining unrelated activities and that the biggest innovations result from a combination of 
seemingly unrelated ideas. 
The third finding was that more competitive industries grow much more quickly. It can be interpreted 
as a statement that competition breeds growth, and can also be interpreted as evidence for the dynamic 
benefits of smaller firms over monopolies.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Urban density can also create a worker productivity premium even if technology isn’t changing. The idea is that the large 
number of employers within an urban area will enable workers to change jobs more easily. This provides an advantage to 
workers if their firms receives a negative productivity shock (workers in Chicago can always go to another firm in that city, 
but worker in Hershey, Pennsylvania may lack that luxury. This also makes it easier for younger workers to find the right 
career for themselves. In a large urban area, they can hop jobs and careers at much less cost than in a low density 
environment. These ideas do not imply that firms in cities will pay more, but they do imply that workers in cities are more 
likely to be better matched with their employers. 
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4. Evidences from the USA.  
 
4. 1 Some stylized facts about the recent growth of (the U.S.) Cities. !
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shelfier (1995) and Glaeser, Ponzetto and Tobio (2011) found that 
the following empirical facts have held for the US SMSA and counties across a long period of time. In 
this section, first of all we list this facts and then discuss how literarature has explained this stylized 
facts. 
(1) Income growth and population growth move together. A fundamental issue when thinking 
about urban growth is, how does one measure growth? Across countries, increases in per capita GDP 
seem to be a natural way to measure the economic growth of countries. Across cities, this choice is 
much less obvious. General equilibrium models a la Roback (1982) show that any real differences in 
income across cities should be quickly eliminated by migration, and any differences that remain reflect 
negative amenities, such as higher rents in the higher wage city. Employment or population growth is in 
fact the more natural way for looking at growth across States or cities with free migration.  
Alternative methods of measuring growth might include looking more closely at the housing and real 
estate markets. Increases in land prices and development of new real estate structure might prove to be 
an important, alternative index of the degree of expansion of a city. The relative preferability of one 
index of growth to another depends on the elasticity of supply of new structures. (Perfect elesticity of 
real estate supply means that growth will show up of new structure, not in prices. Perfect inelasticity of 
real estate supply means that prices alone will reflect growth).  
One of the interestings things about growth across U.S. cities in the period 1960-1990 is that 
the income and population move together, so that most things that predict per capita income growth 
predict population growth as well. There are three explanation for this fact. The first is that changes in 
urban population were labor demand driven. Certain cities experienced positive shocks to demand for 
their products and as a result both wages and employment rose. This explanation is plausible only if 
one believes that migration would not have eliminated the wage increases over time.  
The second explanation is that growing cities experienced an increase in the number of highly skilled 
workers. More highly skilled migrants might have been going to the more popular cities.  
A third explanation may that the popular cities had some attribute that was valued more over time, 
such as the initial skills distribution of the city. 
(2) Population growth persists.  The cities that grew from 1950 to 1970 also grew from 1970 to 
1990. In fact the best predictor of whether a city will grow over the next 20 years is whether or not it 
has grown over the past 20 years. There are several interpretation for this persistence/correlation.   
A simple one is that there are good cities and there are bad cities. The good cities just keep growing, 
and the bad cities keep declining. What makes a city good or bad depends on the specific case, but it 
seems easy to argue that there are profound city-specific effects that determine growth.  
Another interpretation is that growth generates growth despite the congestion problems. Models such 
as Krugman (1991) suggest that the presence of other people is one of a concentrated area’s biggest 
attactions. If such forces are at work, then one would expect a positive shock to a sector’s population 
in one period to be followed by a second shock in the second period.   
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A third interpretation is that the postwar period has simply featured remarkable continuity in demand 
and supply shocks to urban areas. The products that became more valuable from 1950 to 1970 also 
became more valuable over the later period. The urban attributes that rose most in their evaluation by 
residents during the earlier period also rose more in value over the later period. The demand story 
would focus on the postwar rise of services relative to manufacturing. In Table IV the paper, shows 
that: a) population of cities significantly involved in manufacturing grew much less than that of cities 
less involved in manufacturing; b) a high initial exposure to manufacturing has an adverse effect on the 
growth of more manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment in a city and non solo on the 
growth rate of population; c) manufacturing cities declined not only in terms of population but also in 
terms of per capita income. These results suggest that cities followed the fortunes of the industries that 
they were exposed initially. Non-manufacturing activities did not move into cities where manufacturing 
declined; rather, the population of these cities declined through emigration and incomes fell.   
Moreover, these results seem supportive of a vintage capital model, where cities that invested in 
older types of capital do not replace that capital as it becomes obsolete because a) exsisting capital 
represents a sunk investment and b) the pre-exisisting capital crowds out newer capital. This crowding 
may occur because scarce resources (available land) are used with older capital. As capital becomes 
more out-of-date the marginal product of labor, the wage rate (and eventually population) fall. The 
labor supply story would focus on the value of certain amenities such as weather rising perpetually over 
the period (on this point see Glaeser and Tobio, 2007). 
(3) Human capital generates growth.  This fact is consistent with Barro (1993) finding that 
schooling precedes the growth of a country’s GDP. Interpretations abound. Highly skilled individuals 
make cities good by generating ideas and productivity-enhancing innovations. These ideas and 
innovations then attract migrants and raise everyone’s wages at least in the short run. As skills became 
more valuable, the incomes in cities with highly educated workers rise because the workers were being 
paid more. Also, if the education of a community influences the education of the individual, a 
nationwide rise in returns to skills would create incentives for individuals to flock to places were there 
are highly skilled people from whom to learn.  
Another interpretation is that these results reflect government or politcal economy concerns. More 
highly educated people might have created better schools systems through increased spending on 
schooling and greater parental involvement. Better schools might have attracted more residents to the 
city. In general, education might have been linked to the quality or government, and governmental 
quality might be attracting capital and labor to the city. A final possibility is that low-skilled people 
might elect officials who support redistributional policies that deter capital and high human capital 
labor flows.  ! (4) Schooling Follows Schooling.  The connections means that cities which began with a high 
degree if schooling had the greatest increases in percentage of college-educated people. The well-
educated moved (or were born) in greater numbers where well-educated people were already located. 
One explanation may be that migrants tended to be better aducated members of the population, in part 
because they are younger. Because cities whose inhabitants have a higher average level of skills attracted 
more migrants, they had more well-educated people than other cities. Another interpretation is that 
more educated people benefit from being with others of similar aducational level. As time passes, 
people sort themselves out so that they can be near those whom they like best.  
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A final explanation is that this sorting occurred not because of complementaries among highly skilled 
individuals but because of the political economy. If governments have increased their activities as 
redistributors of incomes, then there is a greater incentive for sorting across cities. When cities 
redistribute income, it is more important for highly paid individuals to live among similar people who 
do no want redistrubutional policies.  ! (5) Schooling Becomes More Important Over Time. The importance and the accuracy with 
which education can explain population change, has risen over time. If skills have become increasingly 
valued by firms, it is not surprising that the ability of schooling to generate growth has risen as well. If 
being around skilled people is like having skills oneself, the nit is much more important to be around 
skilled people in the later period. The increased connection between schooling and population growth 
can therefore be explained because migrants have increasingly desidered to be around highly skilled 
people.  
An alternative explanation again emerge sas a political economy story. Between 1950 and 1970, cities 
were not yet involved in resistributional activities, so there was less of an incentives to flee cities with 
low levels of human capital. Between 1970 an d 1990 redistribution increased, so for those people who 
wanted to avoid it, being around people with high levels of human capital became more important. ! Summing up we can say that then measure of city growth is the growth of its population. Using 
employment growth provides qualitatively equivalent results (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shelfier, 1995; 
pag 10). Population growth might not be appropriate for a country because population is relatively 
immobile and differences in population growth mainly reflect differences in fertility.  Income growth is 
a natural measure of productivity growth across country because of the immobility of labor. 
With cities the situation is different: income growth captures some portion of productivity growth  
given labor, but also captures declines in quality of life (due to negative amenities such as higher rents) 
Then it is a less perfect measure of general urban success. 
The fact that income and population results are in similar direction suggests that either (1) movements 
in wages and population are generally determined by productivity changes not quality of life changes or 
(2) the same factors that cause increases in productivity cause decreses in quality of life. The second 
explanation is less plausible also because requires one to believe that unemployment has made cities a 
more pleasant place to live.!!
4.2 Testing the empirical facts. !
Between 1860 and 1920 the number of American cities with 10000 or more people increased 
from 93 in 1860 to 752 in 1920; the number with 100000 or more people increased from 9 to 68.  Not 
all cities, however, participated equally in the trasformation. Some cities experienced unprecendent 
population growth; other cities were nearly stagnant; and still others shrank.  
Simon and Nardinelli (2002) examines the determinants of city growth over the period 1900-
1990, in both the cross-sectional and time series regressions. Specifically employment growth 
regressions for city-aggregates for the period 1900-86 and for metropolitan areas (SMSA) over the 
period 1940-90 are carried out. What determined which cities rose and which fell?  
(A)- American cities with proportionately more individuals with high levels of human capital in 1900 
grew more rapidly over the next 86 years (in the long run) because knowledge spillovers are 
geographically limited to the city (see fact No. 3); 
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(B)- The effects of human capital is very persistent. This indicates that the distribution of human capital 
established in the first decade of the 20th played a role in current status of American cities. Moreover 
this suggests either that adjusting to the steady state is very lenghtly, or that shocks to growth are 
correlated with the presence of human capital (see fact No. 4); 
(C)- Human capital is less important today than in the past, perhaps reflecting the decline in the costs 
of trasportation and communication. This result is in contrast with the fact No. 5. but in line with 
Krugman (1991) who emphasizes the role of transportation costs, although he nothing says about 
human capital;  
(D)- The rise of the automobile industry appears to have overwhelmed the importance of human 
capital in cities dominated by manufacturing early on. That is human capital fails to explain growth in 
1900 and 1920 in those cities (see fact No. 2, third interpretation). 
Shapiro (2006) uses the Roback’s (1982) model to investigate the relationship between human 
capital and growth. A large body of literature confirms the positive correlation between human capital 
and local area employment (or population) growth. (Glaeser et al., 1995; Simon and Nardinelli, 2002. 
See fact No. 3). What are the underlying causes of this relationships? There are three possible 
explanations. First, omitted variables bias. If highly-educated individuals tend to concentrate in cities 
with better weather and city growth is affected by the weather, a correlation between human capital and 
employment growth could arise. Second, productivity growth. If human capital is associated with more 
rapid productivity growth (which implies rapid nominal income growth) then human capital will be 
positively correlated with subsequent employment growth. Third, growth in quality of life. Suppose that 
cities with higher concentrations of human capital experience faster growth in the quality of life then 
human capital and employment growth will covary positively.  
Conclusions: 
(A)- IV estimates suggest a causal effect of concentrations of college graduates on local area 
employment growth; 
(B)- Evidence from wages and rents regressions implies that while the majority of the employment 
growth effect of college graduates operates through changes in productivity (as in Glaeser et al., 1995) 
roughly one-third of the effect seems to come from more rapid improvement in the quality of life; 
(C)- In regards to improvement of quality of life, several direct measures of quality of life (number of 
restaurants per capita, crimes per capita, High-school dropout rate, air quality) indicate that the effect of 
college graduates may operate through “consumer city” amenities such as bars and restaurants rather 
than from politically mediated area attributes such as crime, schools and pollution. 
Shapiro’s (2006) model allows us to distinghish the channels through which human capital 
affects growth, namely through productivity or quality of life. However, the model does not explain the 
connection between human capital and productivity and between human capital and quality of life. 
Regarding the first channel the model is unable to distinguish between technological externalities (see 
above literature) and pecuniary externalities (Acemoglu, 1996). As for the second, one must explain 
why human capital is associated with better quality of life. One theory is that concentrations of skilled 
residents may encourage the growth of consumer services, such as the restaurants and bars, which then 
make an area more attractive to potential migrants. The following paper clarifies the connection 
between human capital and quality of life.  
Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) argue that the role of urban density in facilitating consumption 
is extremely important. As firms become more mobile (they leave cities for the suburbs), the success of 
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cities hinges more and more on cities’ role as centres of consumption. The paper argues that there are 
four particularly critical urban amenities: 
(A) the presence of a rich variety of services and consumer goods. Restaurants, theaters, and an 
attractive mix of social partners are hard to transport and are therefore local goods. Cities with more 
restaurants and live performance theaters per capita have grown more quickly over the period 1980-
2000 both in the US and France. Large urban markets increase the welfare of consumers because of 
goods which appear to have substantial scale economies. For example, baseball teams, opera 
companies, and comprehensive art museums all need large audience to be successful. For consumers, 
who want to be able to go to the opera regularly or to go live major league baseball games, living in 
large cities is a necessity. The advantages from scale economies and specialization are also clear in the 
restaurant business where large cities will have restaurants that specilize in a wide range of cuisines- 
scale ecomonies mean that specialized retail can only be supported in places large enough to have a 
critical mass of customers. Clearly not all consumer goods matter. Bowling alleys and cinemas (which 
are amenities appealing to less aducated workers) are both negetively associated with later population 
growth. Video games and Video machines have substituted bowling and cinemas. The important 
consumer amenities are more difficult to duplicate and cater to higher  human capital workers. 
(B) easthetics and physical setting.  There is little evidence o the role of architectural beauty in better 
performing cities. The consumption value of some cities may be a product of their possession od a 
valuable stock of buildings that are considered to be aesthetically pleasant.  Paris’ attraction as a 
consumer city comes in part from the adventages of its service sector (restaurants) and its products 
which rely on scale economies to function (The Louvre) but also from its large stock of buildings 
which are considered by many to be beautiful. An aesthetic edge can clearly come from stock of 
buildings, but more generally some people may actually prefer city living itself for aesthetic reasons. 
Moreover, weather is the single most important determinant of population or housing price growth at 
the county level in the US. Temperate climite, dryness, and proximity to the coast are strong predictors 
of local growth.. Physical attributes of a community that make life more pleasant appear to be 
increasingly valued by consumers; 
(C) good public services. Good schools and less crime are also linked with urban growth. Schools and 
low crime also appear to be important in attracting a highly educated workforce; 
(D) speed. In a sense the range of services (and jobs) available in ametropolitan area is a function of the 
ease with which individuals can move around. As time becomes more valuable, individuals will 
particularly avoids areas where transport cost are high. Indeed, the movements to edge cities and the 
decentralization of employment (firms) have increased communting distances but often decreased 
commuting times relative to treditional downtowns. Perhaps the most obvious facts pointing to the 
importance of consumer  cities is the rise of reverse commuting.  Reverse commuters live in central 
cities and worl in the suburbs. Since they are generally paying higher rents to live further from their 
place of work, the most natural explanation is the demand for the consumption value of central city. 
These changes reflect the relative rise in suburban employment, but they also reflect the rise of 
consumer city. 
The paper shows the relantionship between the log of population SMSA and the logs of both 
wages and housing prices in the US. In 1980 the elasticity of wages with respect to metropolitan 
population was 0.051. By 1990, the elasticity had risen to 0.082. Thus, if anything, the urban 
productivity edge appears to be rising. In 1980 the elasticity of housing prices with respect to 
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metropolitan population was 0.114. While this elesticity is already large, the elasticity has almost 
doubled by 1990 to 0. 225. It appear that the demand for cities is rising quicker than the urban wage 
premium. In cities with more educated populations, rents have gone up more quickly than wages since 
1970. The natural interpretation of this fact is that while productivity has risen in places with more 
educated workers, quality of life has risen faster. The future of cities increasingly depends on whether 
cities are attractive places for consumer to live. 
The Rise of the Skilled City by Glaeser and Saiz (2004) is an attemt to answer the following 
queation:  why have people increasly crowded around the most skilled? Why does education seem to be 
an increasingly important ingredient in agglomeration economies? Three disparate, but not 
incompatible, visions of the modern city offer different answers to these questions.  
(A)-The Consumer City view (Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz, 2001) tell us that skills predicts growth because 
skilled neighbors are an attractive consumption amenity; that is cities are increasingly oriented around 
consumption amenities, not productivity;  
(B)-The Information City view (Jacobs, 1969)tell us that we should expect cities to be increasingly oriented 
around the skilled because the skilled specialize in ideas; that is cities exist to facilitate the flows of 
ideas;  
(C)-The Reinvention City view (Glaeser, 2005: Reinventing Boston, 1630-2003) tell us that human capital 
predicts city growth because human capital enables people to adapt well to change; that is cities survive 
only by adapting their economies to new technologies.  
In this paper, the authors follow the framework in Shapiro (2006). As we saw, the framework 
tell us that production-led growth should increase nominal wage and housing prices, while 
comsumption-led growth should cause real wage to fall.  Rising nominal wages is a sufficient condition 
for productivity growth and declining real wages are necessary for the amenity story to be of relevance. 
     
The analysis is based on a sample of 318  metropolitan ares  and 723 cities in the year 1970, 
1980, 1990 and 2000. Specifically population growth regressions, income growth and rents growth 
regressions for metropolitan areas (SMSA) and cities are carried out. The paper shows that: 
- At the metropolitan area level, evidence shows that skills predict productivity growth and not an 
increase in amenity levels. Prices seem not to be rasing quickly enough to offeset the increasing in 
wage; in other terms the high skilled metropolitan areas are not seeing falling real wage [Table 8]. 
Economics reasoning tell us that this means that high skill levels are associated with decreasing 
relative levels of quality of life, perhaps because of increasing popolation levels. The fact that skills 
increase SMSA growth  through productivity increases, is compatible with both Information City and 
Reinvention City views.  
-At the city level (within a metropolitan area) there is some evidence that prices of skilled places have 
risen sharply. Given wages (within a metropolitan area) this suggests that skills increase amenities at 
city level. This result is in line with Shapiro (2005) who suggests that at the city level roughly one-third 
of the employment (population) growth seems to come from more rapid improvement in the quality 
of life. 
The next two papers are important first because allow us to understand how to study the 
development of a specific region within a country (think of the South in Italy or the North), second 
because help us to complete the story of the American cities’ development beyond (although 
inescapable)  the effect of human capital on growth. 
! *'!
In the period 1950-2000, population and incomes heve increased steadily throughout much of 
the Sunbelt.  Glaeser and Tobio (2007) assesses the relative contributions of rising productivity, rising 
demand for Southern amenities and increases in housing supply to the growth of warm areas, using 
data on income, housing price and population growth. The authors consider three different proxies for 
Sunbelt status: January temperature, July temperature and location in aone the states of the old 
Confederacy.  
There are three explanations for the population growth of the South since 1950. First,  the region may 
have become more economically productive. Many economists have offered different explanations for 
the rise in Southern income levels. Sala-i-Martin (1996) emphasizes the greater accumulation of capital 
in once-backward places. As late as 1940, the South was certainly still backward. Caselli and Coleman 
(2001) present a related story focused on the structural transformation out of agriculture into industry. 
Since the South was much more agricultural in 1940, it transformed more quickly. Another view is that 
the nothern productivity edge came from access to waterways and a dense railroad network which 
became increasingly irrelevent as transportation costs plummeted during the 20th century. Second, the 
region may have become a more attractive place to live. According to this view, Southern cities were 
relatively unpleasant places to live at the start of the 20th century. High levels of heat made summers 
oppressive and helped the spread of desease. The South also lagged the North in the provision of clean 
water. Improvements in public health and technological change, such as the introduction of air 
conditioning, heve made the South a far more attractive place to live. Southern cities, since they are 
newer, may also have an advantage at adapting to the automobile (Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz, 2003). Thus 
the possibility to use cars can be seen as a good amenity). It is also possible that as society got richer, 
people were willing to sacrifice more to live in more pleasant, sunnier climes. According to this view, 
the South’s growth has been driven by improved consumer amenities, not by productivity. Third,  the 
region might be particulary good at producing new housing. Increases in Southern population reflect 
neither increases in Southern productivity nor Southern amenities but rather a greater Southern 
tolerance for new construction. In an extreme version of this view, all of American experienced rising 
housing demand but the supply of housing was much more elestic in the South. Since housing supply 
was more flexible, more homes were built and more people came to live in the South. More elastic 
housing supply could come from a greater availability of landa o a more permissive regulatory 
enviroment. Southern cities might have more lando because they began with less density or because 
they have fewer natural barriers, like rivers, that limit development. Alternatively, the difference in 
permitting behavior could be the result of different regulatory environments. Stringent regulatory 
environments appear to have played a major role restricting growth in many areas outside the South. 
One view is that the political regime in the South favored new constructions. Note that a more elastic 
supply of housing means that a higher demand of housing is accompanied by a higher supply, not by a 
rise of price. 
The paper is based on the Roback framework that uses changes in population, income and 
housing prices to assess out the potential sources for Southern and Sunbelt growth. As we have seen 
the model predicts that rising productivity will cause population, nominal income and housing prices to 
rise. When productivity increases, income will rise faster than housing prices and real incomes will also 
surge. Rising amenity levels or an increasing willingness to pay for the amenities of a location will cause 
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population and housing prices to rise, but nominal and real wage incomes will fall.2 An increase in 
housing supply will cause population to rise, and both income and housing prices to fall. 
Using data on income, housing price and population growth for 135 SMSAs and over the 
period 1950-2000, the paper shows that before 1980, economic productivity increased significantly in 
warmer areas and drove the population growth in those places. Since 1980, productivity growth has 
been more modest, but housing supply growth has been enormous. The authors infer that new 
construction in warm regions represents a growth in supply, rather than demand, from the fact that 
prices are generally falling relative to the rest of the country. The relatively slow pace of housing price 
growth in the SunBelt, relative to the rest of the country and relative to income growth, also implies 
that the growth of the Sunbelt has litte to do with sun-related amenities. Real incomes appear to have 
been steadily rising, wich suggest that amenities flows are falling. However the results do not mean that 
air conditioning or clean water was irrelevant, but they suggest that amenity flows would have been far 
lower without them. Summing up we can conclude that over the period 1970-2000, faster housing 
supply growth in the South has been as big a factor as economic productivity in driving the rise of 
Sunbelt population.  
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, almost every Northeastern or Midwestern city more than 
500,000 people decreased in population size during each decade. In 1990s, a majority of such cities 
grew: New York City’s population grew by 9%, Chicago’s by 4%. Between 1950 and 1990 the share of 
Americans living in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants fell from 17% to 12%. In the 1990s, the 
share of the U.S. population living in these big cities finally increased.  
Does this mean that city living is back? Do the production and consumption benefits of density 
have finally acted to reverse the slide of America’s largest cities? Were the 1990s a radical break from 
the past, during which the demand for density has finally ended the push towards the sprawl and the 
South?3 Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) tried to answer these questions. 
The paper looks at the popolation growth rates of cities and SMSA in the 1980s and 1990s to 
see if the the 1990s represents a real break with the past. The general conclusion is that the 1990s were 
much more a period of continuity than of a change. Although the impact of density is less negative in 
the 1990s than it was in the 1980s, these growth rates provide no real evidence for a revival of dense 
cities. In the 1900s, as in previous post-war decades, urban growth was driven by the increasing 
importance of consumers and their tastes for cars, good weather, and skill base of the local community. 
In other terms, The empirical evidence suggests that the basic stylized facts about urban growth 
continue to hold. Car cities grow at the expense of public transportation cities. Dense cities decline. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  Remember that firms use labor and land as production inputs. Ceteris paribus, when land prices rise, the cost of 
production rises as well, therefore firms can reduce the cost of labor paying  lower wages. So rising amenity levels can cause 
both real wage to fall (as we known) but also nominal wage reductions. 
3 Il perché di queste domande si coglie molto bene se si fa riferimento al paper “ The Rise of the SunBelt” by Glaeser and 
Tobio (2007). La storia delle città Americane che ci raccontano Glaeser e compagni è che dal dopoguerra in poi, mentre le 
città tradizionali del Northeastern e del Midwestern sono declinate, si è assistito ad una crescita delle città del SunBelt; zona 
quest’ultima caratterizzata da ampi spazi e da un clima molto caldo. Nel paper “The Rise of the SunBelt” si sotiene che 
prima degli anni 80 c’è stato un incremento significativo di produttività in questa zona che ne ha favorito la crescita (in 
termini di popolazione e salari). Dal 1980 in poi la crescita nella produttività è diventata più modesta, ma l’offerta di case e 
nuove costruzioni (incentivata da ampi spazi e poca regolamentazione) è diventata enorme. Ora siccome le nuove 
costruzioni sono state guidate più da fattori di offerta che da quelli di domanda [ampi spazi e poca regolamentazione (fattori 
di offerta); preferenza per un clima caldo e possibilità di utilizzare di più l’automobile (fattori di domanda)] i prezzi delle case 
si sono ridotti anziché aumentare. Questo ha favorito la crescita del SunBelt.  !
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The weather drives a great deal of urban development: warm, dry places do well. Human capital 
continues to be important. 
So,  is city living back? The answer is NO! The authors reach this conclusion by focusing on 
three urban characteristics and their impact on city growth: (A) density; (B) weather and (C) human 
capital.  
(A) The main hypothesis is to test whether there has been an increased demand for large, dense cities in 
the 1990s; that is whether the impact of variables associated with such cities (density and public 
trasportation) has changed between the 1980s and 1990s.  If dense, walking cities are becoming more 
popular, we would expect to see measure of density positively predict growth in the 1990s, at least 
relative to previous years. Moreover, car use should negatively predict growth in the 1990s relative to 
previous years. Tables (4) and (5) in the paper show that: , the impact of density is negatively smaller in the 1990s than in the 1980s. This provide little evidence 
that density is not as bad for growth as it used to be;  , car use strongly predicts growth. There is no difference  between 1980s and 1990s; , public trasportation negatively predicts growth. There is no difference  between 1980s and 1990s. 
In total there is some evidence that the nagative effect of density has abated somewhat, but the other 
two results do not predict a reinassance of dense areas. 
(B) The second hypothesis is that the impact of weather has changed. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001), 
argued that the correlation between weather and growth is evidence of the growing importance of 
consumers relative to producers in determing the location of cites.  Thus the movement of people to 
warmer, drier cities suggests an increasing importance of consumer amenities relative to production 
facilities. The consumer city view would predict that weather variables are becoming more important in 
the 1990s. On the contrary, the view that city living is back might predict that weather variables are 
becoming less important in the 1990s. Tables (6) and (7) show that: , the impact of average January temperature (is an index of temperate climate) is significant but smaller 
in the 1990s; , the impact of average July temperature (is an index of warm, hot climate) is bigger in the 1990s w.r.t 
the 1980s and the connection between July temperature and growth is bigger than the connection 
between January temperature and growth; , the effect of rainfall in the 1990s is zero, while in the 1980s rain did significantly and negatively 
predict growth.  
Apart from the rainfall, there is little evidence in favour of the consumer city view also in the 1990s. 
(C) The third hypothesis is to test if the importance of city-level human capital is continuing to grow. 
The positive effect of human capital on city growth is evidence that cities grow if they provide 
opportunities for interacting with skilled people. Contact with the skilled may facilitate learning or the 
generation of new ideas. If this is the case, we would expect city-level human capital measure to 
become more important as well in predicting growth. Note also that Simon and Nardinelli (2002) have 
shown the positive impact of skilled on growth of cities throughout the 20th century. Tables (8) and (9) 
show that: 
-high school degree positively predicts growth. There is no difference  between 1980s and 1990s; 
-college degree positively predicts growth. There is no difference  between 1980s and 1990s; 
-the impact of wage (proxy of human capital) on growth is positive. There is no difference  between 
1980s and 1990s; 
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-the poverty rate impact is strongly negative in both the  1980s and the 1990s. There is no difference  
between the two decades.  
Summing up, the skill level city remains among the most reliable predictors of urban growth, but there 
is no evidence for either a pick-up or a slowdown of cities of this effect in the 1990s. !
5. Italian cities: the state of the art. 
 
This section discusses deeply some of the recent papers that focus on local growth in Italy. The 
first five works look at the long-run development of Italian cities and its determinats.  
Malanima (1998, 2005) provide an overview of Italian urbanization between 1000 and 2000, 
which may help in distinguishing the main phases of Italian economic history. In this millenium, three 
epochs can be singled out: (A) from 1000 to 1350; (B) from 1350 to 1870; (C) from 1870 to 2000. 
While the first phase is characterised by slow progress and the third by massive urbanisation, the 
intermediate phase saw declining urbanisation. A strong connection exists, in these periods, between 
urbanisation and the productivity of the Italian economic system. 
The first thing we learn from these articles is the right size of a settlement to be defined “city”, 
acccording to the period we are referring to. From an economic point of view, cities are stable 
settlements characterized by a prevalence of individuals involved in a secondary and tertiary 
occupations (such as manufacturing and trade, religious and military services and government). This 
was the case in the medieval cities of central and northern Italy, but not in the South, where the 
majority of the inhabitants of both large and small centres were often peasants. This was especially true 
of Sicily, where sparse settlement did not exist at all, and the population lived in large urban villages. If 
we consider these villages as towns, Sicily at the beginning of the nineteenth century would rank as the 
most urbanised region in Europe, and perhaps in the world, with an urban population of 66 per cent, 
that is to say, the same urban percentage as Italy in the late twentieth century.  
This fact suggests two things. First, it is always advisable to distinguish South and North.  Second the 
author suggests to use centers with over 5,000 inhabitans for the periods 1000-1350 and 1350-1870. 
For Italy between 1861 and 1971 geographers and demographers propose to use comuni with more than 
20,000 inhabitants and a predominance of secondary and tertiary activities. 
These studies intend to present an overview of Italian urbanization trends between 1000 and 
2000 and the causes of these trends in each of the three epochs decribed above. 
The first phase: 1000-1350. In all of Europe, from 1000 until1300, there was little if any 
increase in the urbanisation rate. In Italy, on the contrary, the rate doubled at least. Figures for Italian 
cities in 1300 suggest that the urban share was over 20 per cent. The urbanisation rate doubled or even 
trebled in 300 years. Insofar as we can trust Tuscan figures, urban growth was rapid during the 
thirteenth century, when new walls were built to encircle several expanding cities. In Tuscany, by the 
end of the century, there were twice or three times as many urban inhabitants as at the start of it, while 
the population of the Centre and North had increased by 50 per cent. A rise in Tuscan urbanisation 
from 10-11 per cent in 1200-1300 to 26.3 per cent by the end of the thirteenth century has been 
suggested.  
During the late Middle Ages new centres sprang up or increased in population to become major cities. 
The best-known example is Venice, but major developing cities, founded after the decline of the 
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Western Roman Empire, were Amalfi, Ferrara, Alessandria, Udine, Cuneo, Viterbo, L’Aquila, Fabriano, 
Macerata, Foggia, Molfetta, Lecce and Catanzaro. 
 At the same time, a slow change was taking place in the balance between the South on the one hand, 
and Centre-North on the other. Towns in the South and the Islands, already flourishing during the 
Arab period, continued to develop. The rate of urban growth in the North, and particularly in the 
Centre, began to outweigh that of the rest of the peninsula and that of Sicily too. Although it is hard to 
compare the North and the South, we nevertheless know that in 1300 the urbanisation rate was already 
higher in the Centre- North than in the South and the Islands (21.4 against 18.6 per cent). Three cities 
(Florence, Venice, and Milan), forming a triangle in northern and central Italy, were the dominant 
nodes, surrounded by many smaller centres. 
The second phase: 1350-1870. In this phase the central and northern Italina urbanisation rate 
diminished from more than 21 about 16 per cent.  
No meaningful change in urban hierarchy occurred in the period from 1300 to 1800, as the rank-size 
distribution shows. The main changes were the relative growth of a few cities, primarily Turin; and 
(most importantly) the relative decrease of urbanisation in central Italy. While in 1300 some 40 percent 
of the urban population of North-Central Italy lived in Umbria, Marche and Tuscany, and the 
remaining 60 per cent in the North, in 1861 the ratios were, respectively, 21.5 and 78.5 per cent. The 
balance of urbanisation had shifted towards the North. 
It was only in this second phase of its urbanisation that Italy began to lose ground vis à vis North-West 
European regions. If we consider centres with more than 10000 inhabitants, urbanisation nearly 
doubled in Western Europe between 1500 and 1800 and a sharp acceleration took place between 1800 
and 1850.  In Italy, urbanisation declined during these centuries and this decline did not stop with the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Before 1900, three regions played a decisive role in the European 
economy, each gaining dominance in succession: Central-Nothern Italy, the Netherlands and England. 
 The third phase: 1870-2000. From 1861 to 1961, the population of North-Central Italy doubled, 
and its urban population multiplied by 6.5. Every decade, from 1880 onwards, more than one million 
people moved to the cities; this figure rose to 3.2 million between 1951 and 1961, when the migration 
towards the cities reached its peak; and stayed at 2.3 million between 1961 and 1971.  Between 1861 
and 1971, 16 million people migrated from the countryside to the most industrialised cities. This flow 
slowed down from the late 1970s on, and ceased altogether in the1980s, by which time almost 70 per 
cent of the total population lived in cities.  
A long period of demographic growth and urbanisation, which had begun some ten centuries before, 
was coming to an end.  
The next question is: what were the causes of these trends? First of all we need to distinguish 
between a rural and an urban sector, respectively characterised by the production of food and raw 
materials, and of secondary goods and services. As regard the first sector, two models linking agrarian 
productivity to urbanisation in the premodern world have been development. The first was worked out 
by Wringley (1986), the second by Persson (1991). In Wringley’s model, agricultural productivity is 
related to the ratio of urban to rural population. Persson later generalised the same model by taking 
into account the urban-rural wage premium and the marginal propensity to consume rural goods. 
Persson estimated that, given a marginal urban propensity to consume rural goods of 0.5, a ten percent 
increase in urbanisation, accompanied by a rise in  the wage premium, implies a doubling of labor 
productivity in the countryside. According to both models, increases in urbanisation make heavy 
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demands on the rural sector. Because of this link between agricultural productivity and urbanisation, 
the latter can only occur under one of  two conditions. Suppose that either agricultural manpower and 
capital are underemployed. First, given capital, if the underemployment of manpower is reduced, then 
actual production move towards the production possibility frontier. Second, given labor, if capital 
formation or technical progress allow for a rise in productivity, again this same curve moves outward. 
Suppose now that agricultural production has already reached its maximum potential level and there is 
no possibility for technical progress. In this case the only result can be an increase in the relative prices 
of food and raw materials in the cities, and an halt to the urbanisation process. This is what happened 
in many rural economies whose increasing urbanisation was not supported by agricultural productivity 
rises.  
Clearly in both models, it is possible to include the relationship of the economy with external markets, 
in cases when exports and imports are significant. After all, when agricultural inputs for urban 
expansion are lacking in neighbouring regions, it is always possible to import materials. In premodern 
era an advantage was that Italian towns could be provisioned in food and raw materials by sea, and at 
lower cost. For several centuries, northern Italian cities consumed cereals imported from southern Italy 
and raw materials from all over the Mediterranean. Another advantage was the Italian cities’ relatively 
modest per capita consumption of firewood. Thanks to their climate, they needed no more than 1.5 kg 
per person per day, against the 5 kg of central and nothern European cities. 
A low labour productivity in the rural area surrounding a town could be a constraint on urban 
expansion. A major change has come about recently with the rise of trade in agricultural goods on a 
global scale. Today, since cities no longer depend solely on the produce of their rural surroundings, 
urbanisation can coexist with low agricultural productivity growth. For this reason it is important today 
to look at the secondary and the tertiary sectors. Since a differential in labour income is what leads to 
migration towards the cities, the rise in productivity must be stronger in the cities than in the 
countryside. The higher the differential, the higher the immigration. In modern era, the urban–rural 
differential in wage levels still continues to attract population towards the cities, although the actual 
wages often turn out to be lower than expected, and the hoped-for jobs exist only in certain informal 
economic sectors. To sum up, we could say that urbanisation requires faster productivity growth in the 
cities, as the Rosen-Roback framework requires as well. 
Malanima (1998, 2005) shows that the three phases of Italian urbanisation outlined above 
reflect quite accurately the movement of labour productivity, which rose from the tenth to the 
fourteenth centuries, and even more between 1870 and 1980, but diminished in the intermediate phase, 
both in the urban and in the rural sector. Following we focus on the third phase.  
A rapid shift in the production possibility curve took place in Italy only at the end of the nineteenth 
century, with the so-called Second Industrial Revolution. Population increased rapidly, at a time when 
productivity was rising. Wage differentials were also increasing in favour of the cities, encouraging 
migration from rural to urban areas. Structural change was taking place. In 1861 the secondary and 
tertiary sectors accounted for less than 45 per cent of GDP. Their share had risen to about 55 per cent 
by 1911, and was more than 70 per cent just before the World War II. 
At the same time, agricultural productivity also increased, but less than industrial productivity. In1861, 
output per worker was the same in the primary and secondary sectors, amounting to 552-1911 Italian 
lire in industry as against 526 lire in agriculture. In1936, while agricultural productivity had not yet 
doubled compared to 1861, industrial productivity had trebled. In1971, productivity levels amounted, 
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respectively, to 10 and 14 times the levels of 1861. Migration was now possible from agriculture 
towards employment in industry and services. Differentials in productivity, which also imply 
differentials in incomes, were pushing people from the countryside towards the centres of industry and 
trade. Urban attraction intensified after World War II, especially during the so-called ‘Italian Industrial 
Miracle’, from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the1960s. Between 1951 and 1964, while 
agricultural wages (which were already 60 per cent lower than industrial ones) rose from 100 to 167, 
industrial wages rose from 100 to 223; (1951=100). Between 1861 to 1961, while agricultural wages 
rose from 100 to 439, industrial wages rose from 100 to 658 (Malanima, 2005 pag. 117; Fenoaltea, 
2001). 
Bosker, Brakman, Garretsen, de Jong, and Schramm (2008) studies the evolution of  Italian 
cities over the period 1300-1861, using the dataset assembled by Malanima (1998, 2005). Unit of 
analysis are cities with at least 10,000 inhabitants. Panel data analysis (RE-GLS) is the choice to analyze 
the development of Italy’s cities. The dependent variable is the log of population (city size). The 
explanatory variables are: Market access (capatured by urban potential; see pag. 13); physical geography 
dummies: location in a mountainous area (more than 800 above sea level), location along a navigable 
waterway, location along a major Roman road; roman road crossing in the city (hub city); 
political/institutional dummies: location in the South or in the North, Capital city of an Italian state; 
Dummy variables for present-day provinces are also included to control for unobserved city-specific 
variable (i.e. weather, soil quality, provinces specific institution). 
Why do cities differ and how do they develop over time?  The general conclusion of the paper 
is that the main determinants of Italy’s city growth are physical geography and political predominance. 
Specifically the authors emphasize the following results: 
(A)- physical geography matters. Transport over water is an important factor determining Italy’s city 
growth. Being a city with a seaport gave a city a big advantage as the bulk of international trade took 
(and takes) place between the main seaports. Navigable river systems provided cities located on these 
rivers with a cheap means of trasportation, opening up larger hinterland to these cities that allowed 
them to engage in international finanze and commerce and to diversify their industries as in Jacobs’ 
(1969) theory. 
(B)- political variables matter. Being a capital city has a positive effect on city size. Being a capital city 
atttracts people as public expenditure is likely to be biased towards the capital city hereby creating jobs 
and bussiness opportunities alike.  The capital city acts as so-called ‘parasite’ city attracting both capital 
(in the form of taxes) and people. The impact of the capital city variable on city size is much stronger 
for Southern cities; 
(C)- Urban foreign potential (a city access to other cities’ markets) is not significant.  
Percoco (2013) differs from Bosker et al. (2007) in its specification of the institutional variables. 
Percoco (2010) relies on Putnam’s (1993) hypothesis: the level of social capital in Italian regions was 
higher if the main cities in the region had a communal past. Percoco codes institutions in terms of 
experience of being a free city state in the Early Middle Ages and the presence of a university as a sign 
of proto-liberalism in governance of the city. He also controls for the quality of regional institutions.  
Unit of analysis are cities with at least 10,000 inhabitants from Malanima (1998; 2005) dataset. Panel 
data analysis (RE-GLS and FE) is the choice to analyze the development of Italy’s cities. The 
dependent variable is the log of population (city size) and centennial population growth.  
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The general conclusion of the paper is that geography and institutions were crucial in shaping urban 
development in Italy and in the making of modern cities. In particular the accessibility and the presence 
of a seaport are important determinants of city growth. The presence of a university has been found to 
be a key factor in the making of moder cities although this variable should be not considered to 
measure the presence of human capital, but rather that of a liberal institution.  
The explanatory variable, the author use are: (1) geographical variables. Transport costs are the key 
determinant of city size. Percoco (2010) proxied transport costs with altitude (more than 500 above sea 
level), road and waterway accessibility (1 if the city was on the Roman road network and 0 otherwise; 1 
if the city was on a navigable river and 0 otherwise), and the presence of a port in the city.  Market 
potential is one of the determinants of trade flows. (2) institutional variables. Institutional quality at 
regional level (see appendix 2 ) is measured  as:  Comune (1 if the city was a Repubblica Comunale and 
0 otherwise); University (1 if the city had a university in century t and 0 otherwise). As we noted above, 
medieval universities should be considered liberal institutons because teaching was relatively free, as 
well as the internal organizations of both students and professors cultural activities.  As a consequence 
the presence of a university in pre-modern cities should be considered, not as a proxy for human 
capital, but rather as an institution improving urban governance. 
Albanese and de Blasio (2014) gauge the role of informal norms (civicness) in Italy’s 
development process during the second half of the 20th century (from 1950 to 2000). By using a 
dataset at the municipality level and the voter turnout, as a proxy of the “civicness”, the authors argue 
that, during the period analyzed, there was a causal relationship between voter turnout and Italy’s 
economic performance going from the former to the latter. The link with civicness is indirect: voter 
turnout increases social capital and through this channel economic performance.  
Unit of analysis are cities with at least 5,000 inhabitants in 1951; that is about 2,000 municipalities for 6 
consecutive Census dates. The authors use three estimators: pooled LS, the between group (BE) and 
the fixed effect (FE) estimators. The dependent variables they use are measures of economic 
development are employment rate (employment over population), employment density (employment 
over squared kms) and plant density (plants over squared kms). The most important explanatory 
variable, other than geographical variables, is the voter turnout, as a proxy of the “civicness”.  
The conclusions of the paper can be easily summarized. First,  over a half a century, voter 
turnout has been steadily correlated with measures os economic development. Second, the correlation 
is likely to reflect some causality going from civic capital to economic performance. Third, the role of 
civical capital was stronger in the period after the WWII, and decreased gradually in the following 
decades. 
The identification problem, due to mainly to reverse causality, is solved by using past voter 
turnout as instrument. They take the 1913 voter turnout, that is participation at the polls of the first 
election with universal manhood suffrage in Italy. This strategy makes sense if (i) there is some 
persistence in the spatial distribution of the variable of interest; (ii) the local drivers of economic 
performance totally differ from those of a long-gone past. As for persistency, the instrument relies on 
Putnam’s (1993) conjecture according to which the endowments of civic capital across Italian territories 
have been highly persistent over the centuries. In particular, it was the local political regimes in place in 
the Middle Ages that shaped the degree of local civic commitment that persisted through more than 
600 years. As matter of fact, the instrument– voter turnout in 1913 - is suggested by Putnam (1993) 
himself as one of the possible good quantitative measure of past civic capital. Empirically, the authors 
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show that voter turnout in 1913 is a significant determinant of the observed voter turnout over the 
second half of the 1900 (this relationship represents the first stage in the IV approach). With regard to 
requirement (ii), which technically is referred as the condition of orthogonality of the instrument to the 
(second stage) error term, and that is basically non testable in the exactly identified case a few aspects 
have to be noted. First, long-lagged values of civic capital clearly remove any simultaneity bias caused 
by local shocks that occurred in the second half of the XX century. For such simultaneity to remain we 
would need these shocks to be expected in 1913 (and have affected voter turnout at the time). 
However, the Italian economy at the beginning of 1900 was very different from that it was in the 
second half of the century. This seems to be safe, as major events – such as the two world wars and 
twenty years of dictatorship under Mussolini – contributed to change abruptly the structure of Italy’s 
economy and society (Zamagni, 1993). Second, the condition might be violated if some missing 
permanent city characteristic drives both past civicness and XX century economic performance. 
However, as the authors emphasize, they directly control in the regressions for the most relevant 
geographic characteristics. Moreover, they also control for population size, which differentiate away 
potential source of violation of (ii) related to agglomeration. ! Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007) is one of the most representative paper for the Italian case that 
deal with human capital externalities at the local level. The authors use a general equilibrium model 
based on Roback (1982) where both wages and rents are simultaneously determined. Their study 
focuses on  the effect of local human capital on household-level rents and individual- level wages for a 
sample of Italian local labour markets. By collecting data from the Bank of Italy’s survey on household 
income and wealth (SHIW) and censuses data, their results show a positive and robust effect of human 
capital on rents. This unambiguously demonstrates that the concentration of human capital at the local 
level generates positive externalities. Specifically, wage equation estimates suggest that the impact of 
productivity externalities is similar to the impact of consumption externalities. This finding implies that 
human capital generates relevant externalities on firms’ productivity. The main message of the paper is 
that human capital spillovers matter.  
  Yet, it is worth to consider two other papers which are quite similar each other. Di Addario 
and Patacchini (2008) analyze the impact of urban agglomeration on Italian wages. Using a unique dataset 
of more than 22,000 employees distributed in 242 randomly drawn local labor markets from the SHIW 
for the four available years between 1995 and 2002, they find that in Italy earnings rise by just 0.1 
percent for every 100,000-inhabitant increase in the local labor market. The paper shows also that this 
effect decays very rapidly with distance, losing significance beyond 12 kilometers. Dalmazzo and de 
Blasio (2011) examine the impact of agglomeration on both production (wages) and consumption. The 
paper show that urban agglomeration is a source of positive amenities for residents. In particular, 
agglomeration has a stronger impact on rents rather than wages. Their empirical findings are consistent 
with the view that the more educated value urban amenities more than the less educated. Indeed, 
highly-educated people are willing to pay high rents and accept relatively larger wage discounts to live in 
cities. Again they exploit the Bank of Italy’s survey of household income and wealth dataset. 
 Spatial externalities and local economic growth in Italy have been studied by Paci and Usai 
(2001) and Deidda et al. (2002).  Paci and Usai (2001) identify the factors that determine technology in 
the local industry and consequently influences local economic growth. The underlying hypothesis is 
that technology is not completely exogenous and freely available in the whole economy but it is 
spatially bounded (Jaffe et al., 1993; Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). Using the average annual growth rate 
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of employment for each 97 3-digit manufacturing industries in 784 LLMs over the period from 1991 to 
1996 as proxy of local growth, thier results can be easily summarized. First, specialisation externalities 
have a negative influence on labour dynamics at the local industry level, especially for the Southern 
regions. In contrast they find a positive role of the diversity externalities. The presence in a certain 
location of a production system characterised by a wide range of other firms operating in different 
sectors produces positive effects on labour dynamics since it favours inter-industries cross fertilisation. 
Second, a negative impact on labour dynamics is found for low education and crime rate, while a 
positive one is detected for university education, cooperation propensity, infrastructures. Third, spatial 
dynamic analysis shows that at the local industrial level there are polarisation phenomena at work and 
that positive externalities are self-contained within the boundaries of local labour systems. Similar 
results are achieved also when the service sector in included in the analysis (Deidda el at., 2002).  
 Following suggestions from the literature on agglomeration and on social returns to education, 
Croce and Ghignoni (2012) verify whether training provided by the employers is affected by local 
knowledge spillovers in Italian LLMs. Their results show that the stock of local human capital, as 
measured by different schooling variables, has a positive and significant impact on the probability of 
receiving training from the employer. Moreover, by allowing interactions of local human capital with 
individual education, it is found that human capital in the area increases the probability of training of 
workers with an upper secondary degree, while it does not affect those with a tertiary education 
 
6. Conclusion 
A science of cities has taken a long time coming but there is now considerable momentum in 
developing formal ideas about how cities are ordered and structured which are part of the rapidly 
expanding sciences of complexity. Life in city is exiciting, less grueling, better paid, mobile. City makes 
us free, people enjoy the vibrant urban life and they are constantly upgrading, but education is the main 
event that can happen in cities. The strong association between human capital and city growth has been 
noted for some time (Glaeser et al., 1995; Simon and Nardinelli, 2002; Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Shapiro, 
2006; Dalmazzo and de Blasio, 2007; Glaeser at al., 2011; Duranton and Puga, 2013). In contrast, 
empirical and theoretical literature concerning the essential topic of what drivers city growth is 
surprisingly scarce in Italy. We applaude the pioneering efforts that a small group of scholar has already 
made in this regard (Malanima, 2005; Bosker et al., 2008; Percoco, 2013; Albanese and de Blasio, 2014). 
We hope our review on human capital, growth and the role of cities in spurring knowledge will 
stimulate readers as much as it has stimulated us.  
Modern urban environments are the  driving force of progress and civilization. Today, more 
than half of the world's population live in cities. In the developed world, it is about 78 percent. More 
than three out of four people live in cities today. So, cities are where the action is, cities are us. 
Identifying the factors conditioning growth in cities and examine the existence and the magnitude of 
spatial spillover generated by human capital, can help us to better understanding the working of local 
economies and propose public policies for city planners as well. 
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1. Introduction1 !
People tend to crowd together in urban areas. Between 1920 and 2010, the population of the 
U.S. metropolitan areas grew on average by 17.9% per decade overcoming the aggregate growth rate by 
5.3 percentage points. In the same time span, in Spain, the urban areas grew by 18.1% per decade 
exceeding the aggregate growth rate by 9.2 percentage points. In France, cities grew by 7.7% per decade 
from 1937 to 2007; 2 percentage points higher than the national mean. From this point of view, Italy is 
not an exceptional country. Italian cities grew on average by 8.7% per decade between 1921 and 2001. 
This figure of 8.7% exceeds aggregate population growth by 3.5%.2 In 1971, more than 25% of Italian 
population was concentrated in the thirty largest cities, which occupied the two percent of the national 
territory.  
During the period 1921-2001, the standard deviation of the population growth rate of Italian 
cities was 11.5%, that is larger than the corresponding mean. If we look at larger cities (those with more 
than 50,000 inhabitants in 2001), mean and standard deviation are of the same magnitude, respectively 
12.1% and 11.8%. From 1951 to 2001, the ten-year growth rate of employment of 442 Italian cities was 
on average 39% with a standard deviation of 25% (40% and 22% for the largest ones). These figures 
suggest that although cities grow over time, they do not grow uniformly at the same rate. Specifically 
some cities grow and some decline and some cities grow faster than others.  
 Why do cities grow in population and employment? Which cities grow faster and why? Are there 
universal laws of urban population growth that hold over centuries, or do time-specific shifts in tastes 
and technology drive the dynamics of population and employment over space? Inspired by the works 
by Shapiro (2006), Glaeser and Saiz (2004), Glaeser et al. (2011) and Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011), 
this paper represents a first attempt to answer all these questions for the Italian case.  After all, cities are 
much more than human habitats; they are crucial and advanced components of the national and global 
economy, acting as engines of economic development and agents for social change. The role and 
weight of cities in shaping the Italian fortune has been the object of debates and discussions for a long 
time. So, it would be a gross mistake to neglect the causes of the size of cities considering that it is a 
primary aspect of the picture when national economy, politics, society and culture are examined. For 
these reasons, it is natural to ask why cities exist and how cities change people’s lives. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present some stylized facts about our 
sample of cities. The primary purpose of this paragraph is descriptive: to understand the dynamics of 
population and employment over a long time horizon and across space, since both these variable are 
used by urban economists as measures of city size.3 In addition, our focus is also on human capital and 
manufacturing which are extremely important determinants of city growth. The secondary aim is to use 
the key facts as a guideline for the subsequent analysis. For example, the fact that Gibrat’s law is broken 
over the period 1971-2001 suggests that after 1971 population converged across cities and less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We are grateful to Maurizio Franzini, Michele Raitano, Giuseppe Croce, Francesco Nucci, Massimiliano Tancioni, Marina 
Capparucci, Paolo Naticchioni, Enrico Marchetti, Sara Pinoli and the members of the Interuniversity Research Center on 
the Welfare State (CRISS) for comments and support. 
2 Data for the U.S., France and Spain are from Duranton and Puga (2013). Data for Italy come from our computations on 
census data. Italian cities we focus on, are 442 and they are those listed in the Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. For confidentiality reasons city codes are made available only to the staff of the 
Bank of Italy. 
3 Our starting point is the first year for which data are available: Unification for population and 1911 for employment. The 
first Industrial Census was carried out in 1911. 
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populous urban areas grew more quicky. Then it is possible that urban changes reflect individual 
responses to changing preferences and technologies rather than follow empirical regularities that hold 
over centuries. Yet, the fact that the Industrial Triangle declined after 1971 may indicate that 
globalization has facilitated the relocation of many manufacturing plants elsewhere and technological 
progress had reduced the importance of logistical advantage conferred by this area and, in general, the 
prominence of the North-West in towing Italian economy. Such initial evidences motivate our more 
detailed analysis of city growth.  
In section 3 we use a spatial equilibrium model to explain city growth. Specifically, we exploit 
the methodology in Shapiro (2006) and in Glaeser and Saiz (2004) to understand why human capital 
correlates with employment growth. The hypothesis is that skilled people generate growth because of 
their ability to innovate and create new technologies and ideas. An alternative, productivity-based, 
explanation is that human capital spillovers have increased in importance over time. Since both of these 
theories predict that education-growth connection arises from the increase in the productivity shifter in 
the production function, they are empirically indistinguishable. Moreover, it is also possible skilled 
people generate growth in endogenous amenity, such as shopping possibilities and cultural 
consumption opportunities, and through this channel have a positive impact on employment growth.4 
To distinguish between these two mechanisms, we need to interpret heterogeneity in (housing) prices 
growth and income growth across cities. The idea is that prices and wages adjust to make agents 
indifferent across locations. If so, production-led growth requires nominal wages and housing prices to 
raise, while consumption-led growth requires real wages to fall.5 Surprisingly, and to our knowledge, 
this popular methodology has never been applied to Italian data, so the lack of studies on the impact of 
human capital on urban growth represents one more appealing reason to investigate along this line of 
research. 
Section 4 presents our empirical results. We divide this section in two subsections: in the first 
one we focus on the relationship between human capital and employment growth in the period 1971-
2001 and test its robustness. Once assured that a link between skills and growth exists, in the second 
part we measure the extent to which the connection between skills and growth strems from 
productivity or consumption effects. Our attention is on both local labour markets (LLMs) and cities. 
LLMs are self-contained labour markets, since by definition they are characterized by a very high 
overlap between the residing and the working population. As a consequence, labor mobility between 
LLMs is very low as required by the spatial equilibrium concept. Cities within them are smaller and a 
better unit of analysis for understanding either amenities or real estate prices. Assembling a unique 
dataset from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and from census data, we 
find the following results.  First, from 1971 to 2001, a 10 percent increase in the initial share of college-
educated residents is associated with an increase in the subsequent employment growth rate of roughly 
0.8 percent. This result holds both at LLM level and at city level. Second, given our calibration of the 
model, our findings suggest that at LLM level, the connection between human capital and growth is 
due mostly to the productivity effect. In contrast, at the city level, consumption-related effects seem to 
play a more important role in driving growth. 
Section 5 focuses on the North-West case. Our estimates highlight that in the period 1971-
2001, this region performed worse than the other macro-areas in terms of population and employment 
growth. What are the causes behind this (relative) decline? We believe that the answer should be sought !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Glaeser et al. (2001) argue that as firms become more mobile, the success of cities hinges more and more on cities’ role as 
centres of consumption. From this point of view, Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011) is a good example for the Italian case. 
5 See section 3 for a detailed explanation on how the model works and how interpreting its predictions. 
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in the theory of Jacobs (1969) according to which cities need to costantly reinvent themselves. After the 
golden years of the ‘economic miracle’ in the aftermath of the WWII, when low-skilled labour intensive 
manufacturing represented the lion’s share of the local economy, the North-West experienced a spell of 
crisis and restructuring. A necessary condition for the reinvention story to be of relevance is that 
human capital should only matter among those cities that have hit by adverse shocks (Glaeser and Saiz, 
2004). To test this assumption we use a cross-check strategy.  
First, we look at the cross effect between education and manufacturing. Many authors have argued that 
manufacturing’s impact on growth is positive in earlier periods but not necessarily over the long run, 
particularly in the last decades of XX century. Accordingly Glaeser et al. (1995) suggest that cities 
followed the fortunes of the industries they are involved. The typical industry’s growth follows an S-
shaped pattern: rapid growth, followed by slower growth and then decline. If so, we expect that cities 
with high levels of education and significant manufacturing in earlier periods switched from 
manufacturing to other industries faster than high-manufacturing areas with less human capital. In 
other terms, this means that education matters in potentially declining places and helps them to adapt 
to new circumstances. We find that in the period 1951-2001, the growth in the share of workers in 
manufacturing declined in those areas that began with high levels of education and significant 
manufacturing. The Industrial Triangle and, more generally, the North-West were undoubtedly areas 
with these characteristics.  
The other side of the coin is to look at those areas that have experienced positive shocks. Interregional 
migration has been one of the most important source of employment (population) growth in the last 
decades of XX century in areas such as the North-East, the Center and the South. By using data from 
the Popolazione e Movimento Anagrafico dei Comuni published by the ISTAT, our findings suggest that 
human capital does not matter much in immigrant cities, which in turn validate the reinvention 
assumption. 
 Section 6 is devoted to the puzzle highlighted by the empirical fact #7: education predicts 
employment growth but population decline in our sample of cities in the period 1971-2001. We 
postulate that highly-educated people have stronger preferences for urban amenities than less-educated.  
If so, the more educated will be ready to accept some wage discount and pay high rents to live in more 
amenable cities. In contrast, since the less educated are relatively less keen to live in that places, high 
rents must be compensated by higher wage otherwise a process of “gentrification” activates and as a 
consequence unskilled people will be found in less pleasant cities or in the suburbs. By exploiting the 
1993 and the 1995 special sections on the local quality of life and job satisfaction of the SHIW, our 
estimations give a very preliminary evidence about the existence of this phenomenon.  
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Basic evidences about Italian cities 
 
This paragraph is closely related to the work of Glaeser et al. (2011). Our choice is essentially 
motivated by three reasons. First, taking into account the availibity of the data, we would like to create 
a  link with current urban literature and use the latter for comparison. Second, that approach allows us 
to investigate the demographic structure of cities over the long run, from Unification to today, 
establishing in this way a sort of continuity with previous studies which focus on Italian urbanism 
(Malanima, 1998; Bosker et al., 2008 and Percoco, 2013). Third, the historical perspective together with 
econometrics represent an essential alchemy to grasp the weaknesses and strengths of cities as well as 
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to interpret and anticipate the changes about future evolution. Yet, the methodology enables to bring 
out evidences that it is worth using as a guideline in the following pages.  
Our cities’ database come from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth. 
Specifically we extract from the SHIW the municipalities listed in three waves (1986, 1991 and 2000). 
The LLMs’ dataset is obtained by matching each city with the local labor market to which that city 
belongs. As a result we have 442 cities associated with 277 LLMs (40 percent of the total). The 
distribution of the sampled cities and LLMs on Italian territory is reported in the data appendix. We 
combine both the datasets with census data (population, employment, number of workers in 
manufacturing and number of people with a college degree).6 Next we start with a discussion of key 
facts about our sample of cities. 
 
Fact #1: Population patterns have been persistent over long time periods. 
 
A well-known fact in the analysis of systems of cities is the empirical regularity in the size of  
distribution. There are laws that are supposed to hold universally and over centuries, such as the 
Gibrat’s law, which claims that population growth rates are indipendent of initials levels, and the Zipf’s 
law, the claim that the second largest city is half the size of the largest one, the third largest city is one-
third of the size of the the largest one, and so forth (Gabaix and Ioannides 2004, Rossi-Hansberg and 
Wright, 2007).7 When it comes to these laws, Italy is not an exceptional country. Bosker et al. (2008) 
and Percoco (2013), by using a large sample of cities over the period 1300-1861, demonstrate that the 
Gibrat’s law, and as a consequence the Zipf’s law, is very likely to hold only for larger cities.  
 The first fact we want to show about our sample of cities is the similarity of population patterns 
in 1860 and in 2001 as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Log (pop in 2001) =  1.204 + 0.979 log (pop in 1861) 
         (0.403)  (0.041) 
 
 
There are 369 observations and the R2 is! 0.660, which corresponds to a 81 percent correlation. Some 
persistence is naturally to be expected because of housing durability, 8  but our finding implies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) obtains LLMs on the basis od the daily commuting flows from place of 
residence to place of work (ISTAT, 1997). The condition determining their boundaries requires both that at least three 
quarters of the LLM residents are employed there and that at least three quarter of the LLM employees reside there. Data at 
LLM level are available from 1971 onward. 
7 Put differently the Zipf’s law states that the size distribution of cities is well approximated by a Pareto distribution in the 
upper tail of the size distribution. The Zipf’s law has at its core the Gibrat’s law through increases of fixed size that occur 
proportionately to population (Duranton and Puga, 2013 pag. 48). Gabaix (1999b) shows that if city growth rates obey 
Gibrat’s law (i.e. growth rates are indipendent of current size), then Zipf’s law emerges as the limiting size distribution (as 
long as a lower bound on how far cities can diminish in size is imposed). As growth is scale invariant, so too is the final 
distribution.  The empirical counterpart of Zipf’s law reveals that if the total population of a country or region were 
clustered in one single large city the coefficient on log city size uquals zero, if all cities are of equal size the coefficient would 
equal minus infinity and finally for Zipf’s law to hold the coefficient should be equal 1. 
8 The durability of housing has important implications for city growth since people can muove out of a city whereas houses 
cannot. When a city experiences a positive shock, more workers are attracted to it and additional housing is built. On the 
other hand, when a city experiences a negative shock and some workers leave, exisisting housing is not destroyed. More 
specifically, if housing is durable, its supply will be imperfect- with a steep slope below its current equilibrium level and a 
flatter slope above this level. This suggests an asymmetry between city growth and city decline. When cities grow, they 
experience moderate house price increseases and large population changes. When cities contract, they experience large 
house price drops and small population changes (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Duranton and Puga, 2013).  
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furthemore that, over this long time horizon, Gibrat’s law operates: the change in population is 
unrelated to the initial popultaion level as shown by the following regression:  
 
 
log (pop in 2001/pop in 1861) = 1.204 - 0.020 log (pop in 1861) 
(0.402)    (0.041) 
  
The coefficient on the initial population is not statistically significant (as Gibrat’s law requires), however 
there is a slightly negative correlation between initial population levels and the rate of subsequent 
population growth, suggesting a tendency towards sprawl.  
 
Fact #2: Population growth persists.  
  
 Table 1 shows another important fact about urban growth of Italian cities. The permanence of 
population levels is accompanied by a permanence of population growth rates over decades. The first 
two columns of Table 1 show the correlation of population growth rates, measured as the log change 
of population and the lagged value of that variable. The first column shows results for our entire 
sample. The second column shows results when we restrict the sample to only those cities that have at 
least 50,000 people at the start of the lagged decade. Numbers in brackets denote the number of 
observations.  
 Column 1 shows that cities that grew in the previous decade also grew in the next decade except 
for the decade 1981-1991. Indeed the best predictor of whether a city will grow over the next 10 years 
is whether or not it has grown over the past 10 years. During the Liberal Age, the correlation 
coefficients range from 0.08 to 0.36. Then, in the decade of WWI the correlation falls, but from the 
1920s the pattern resumes again and the correlation has been even higher: the coefficients lie between 
0.14 (the first decade of the Fascist Era) and 0.64 except for the unusual 1980s.  The pattern of 
persistence for larget cities is even stronger. The correlation coefficient is always higher for more 
populous cities than for smaller one, apart from the decades of the WWI, the 1970s and the 1980s.  
Glaeser (1994) lists at least three possibile explanations for these correlations. The first is that 
there are good cities and there are bad cities. The good cities just keep growing and the bad cities keep 
declining. Specifically, there are profound city-specific effects that determine growth. Second, the 
presence of other people is one of a concentrated area’s biggest attractions despite the congenstion 
problems. Third, the urban attributes that rose most in their valuation by residents during the past years 
also rose in value over the next period.  
 Next, we test if population growth persists over longer time horizons than decades. We regress 
the log change of population between 1951 and 2001 on the log change of that variable between 1861 
and 1951. The result is: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Housing is during but not permanent. It depreciates slowly over time. This suggests another step to the argument above. 
After a negative shock, some households leave, and housing prices decline, which induces many to stay. Then, over time, 
the housing stock depreciates and housing supply declines. Since house prices, that is, the market values,  of properties may 
be well below their construction costs, houses that depreciate are not likely to be refurbished. Households will thus slowly 
leave the city as the housing stock slowly depreciates. Put differently, housing decline is expected to be persistent. Indeed, 
urban decline one decade is a strong predictor of urban decline the following decade whereas city growth one decade is a 
less strong predictor of city growth for the following decade (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).  
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) also argue that those who stay in declining cities because of low housing prices are likely to be 
those with the lowest labor market opportunities in case of out-migration. They provide evidence that declines in population 
are associated with declines in human capital in their sample of cities. 
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log (pop in 2001/pop in 1951) = 0.036 + 0.321 log(pop in 1951/pop in 1861) 
     (0.069)   (0.099) 
 
There are 369 observations and the R2 is 0.101 which corresponds to a 31 percent correlation. 
Although the number of observations is low, the correlation became slightly negative for cities that 
began with more 50,000 inhabitants in 1861 and the persistence vanishes for cities that had more than 
30,000 people in 1861 as Figure 2 and in Figure 3 show. Given that decadal persistence is stronger for 
larger cities, these facts are surprising and suggest that different cites were growing during different 
epochs, perhaps, because city-specific forces were at work.  
 
Fact #3: Gibrat’s law is broken over the period 1971-2001 
 
Fact #1 states that Gibrat’s law holds in our sample over sufficiently long time period, from 
Unification to today. But Gibrat’s law doesn’t hold for many decades within our sample. Column 3 of 
Table 1 shows the correlation between the initial logarithm of population and the subsequent 
population growth over the next decade. Column 4 shows the correlation for more populous cities, 
those with at least 50,000 people at the start of each decade.  
During the first two decades of the Liberal Age, although population growth seems negatively 
associated with initial population levels, the correlation is not significant at all. This period is marked by 
Gibrat’s law according to which population growth is unrelated with initial levels. During the same 
period (with the exception of the first decade in the aftermath of Unification) there is a positive and 
significant correlation between initial population levels and later growth in larger cities, suggesting 
increased concentration. History helps us to explain these patterns. The development of manufacturing 
activities, usually classified as 'Industrial Revolution', occurred in Italy with a considerable delay 
compared to other European countries and the US. Economic historians agree in fixing its beginning 
around 1870 when there was an increase in the size of Italian firms, an increase in engineering, 
shipbuilding and construction production and the advent of large chemical industry and energy 
hydropower. The protectionist policy, adopted by the government in 1887, fostered the development 
of the textile industry and the steel production. The strong localization of these industries in the North 
(West), specifically in large cities, favored a cumulative process towards large industrial centers and 
deepened the gap between industry and agriculture. In fact, the agricultural sector, despite the 
protection of wheat, suffered a serious crisis. A clear proof of this situation, was the sudden increase in 
the overseas emigration from the central and southern regions and the abandonment of the countryside 
in favor of the urban centers.  
 The process of centralized city growth continues until 1971 (with the exception of the first 
decade of Fascim Era), and  becomes stronger through the Italian ‘economic miracle’.  
 From 1971 to 2001, the correlation between initial population and later growth is negative. The 
correlation is negatively stronger for the largest cities. This period is not marked by Gibrat’s law at all, 
in contrast it is marked by mean reversion (convergence) as Italians spread out towards less populated 
cities. This evidence is in line with Glaeser et al. (2011) who use a dataset of 1124 U.S. counties but in 
contrast with many studies of the post-war growth of cities and metropolitan areas in the U.S. and 
elsewhere (Glaeser et. al, 1995; Eaton and Eckstein, 1997; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).  
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Our model below formalizes the channels through which human capital may have influenced the 
flexibility of the urban structure in Italy. The impact of the industrial orientation of cities is examined as 
well.  
 
Fact #4: Urban sprawl occurs within the North West in the period 1971-2001. 
 
In the Italian case and since Unification, the North-West has represented a laboratory, a 
cutting-edge area, whose structural changes (rapid industrialization in the early twentieth century and 
sudden de-industrialization at the end of the century) have anticipated those of the rest of the country. 
Now, we focus on this area. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the correlation between the initial logarithm of 
population and population growth over the subsequent decade.  
 From 1861 to the eve of the Fascist epoch, there is a positive, but insignificant correlation 
between initial population levels and later growth. This early period was characterized by rapid 
structural changes and reflects the ongoing consolidation of the region; as expected Gibrat’s law holds.  
 After the anomalous thirty years period of Fascist dictatorship and WWII, the North-West 
behaves similarly to the whole sample (Column 3, Table 1), but we can distinguish two well-marked 
population patterns. We have centralization during the ‘economic miracle’ and strong urban sprawl 
from 1971 to 2001. In the latter period the correlation is strongly negative, ranging from -0.22 during 
the 1970s to -0.43 during the 1980s.  
 
Fact #5: The Industrial Triangle grows until the 1970s.  
 
The Industrial Triangle is the area between Turin, Milan and Genoa. Since Industrial 
Revolution, particulary after WWII, it has been the backbone of the Italian economy; an area of intense 
industrial and machinery production. We calculate the distance between the centroid of the Industrial 
Triangle and the centroid of each city in the sample. We then define proximity to Industrial Triangle as 
the maximum of 100 kilometers.9 
Columns 2 of Table 2 shows the correlation between decennial population growth and our 
measure of proximity to Italy's golden triangle. Between 1871 and 1951, the cities of Industrial Triangle 
grew uniformly with the correlation ranging from 0.15 during the decade following the Unification to 
0.29 in the period 1931-1951. Roads and rail tunnels provided good links through the Alps to 
European markets. The port of Genoa represented a key commercial hub for inputs and outputs as 
well. Figure 4 shows the 0.40 correlation for cities within 100 kms of the center of the Industrial 
Triangle. 
The area strongly grows during the economic miracle. The correlation between population 
growth and the cities belonging to the Industrial Triangle is 0.43 and 0.24 during the 1950s and 1960s 
rispectively. In those years there was an exceptional wave of immigration. Between 1958 and 1963, in 
the Industrial Triangle, the residing population soared from 69,000 individuals to about 200,000 
individuals.  In the same period, in Milan, moved about the 30 percent of southern migrants. In Genoa, 
population increased by 15 percent in the 1950s. In the period 1960-1963, Turin hosted about 300,000 
immigrants from the rest of Italy. Castronovo (1977) writes:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 We use ISTAT spatial data and the software R for the calculation.  
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No Italian city, in the post-WWII period, experienced so deep transformations as Turin did [...] it became a sort of 
Detroit characterized by futuristic and shapeless profiles, an advanced industrial society dominated by the 
automobile monocultur and, at the same time, the third “southern” city of the peninsula. It became a new and 
incandescent community, animated by the most massive immigration in our history. 
 
The region decline after 1970. The relationship between proximity to Industrial Triangle and 
population growth disappears in the 1970s, then it becomes negative. There are many explanations in 
the literature that can help us to shed light on the decline of the golden triangle.!
This can be attributable to the impact of massive regional and local policies which forced mobile 
resources to go to the South. The 4th Siderurgical Center in Taranto, the Alfasud car plant in 
Pomigliano d’Arco (NA) and the Fiat plant in Termini Imerese (PA) were established in the 1970s 
(Felice, 2011; Cerrito, 2010). Furthermore, globalization has certainly facilitated the relocation of many 
manufacturing plants elsewhere and technological progress had reduced the importance of logistical 
advantage conferred by the Industrial Triangle.  
Table 3 presents the basic results on population growth as a function of geographical variables 
for six different sub-periods. In Part A we regress population growth on the proximity to Industrial 
Triangle. In Part B we focus on macro-area dummies and exclude proximity to Industrial Triangle. In 
both cases we control for initial population conditions. Coerently with the facts pointed out by Table 1, 
from Unification to 1971 cities were getting bigger. The impact of initial level of population is positive 
and concentration occurred, particularly to cities within the Industial Triangle, in the period 1881-1921. 
Regressions suggest that (the omitted) North-West grew the fastest during the periods 1901-1921 and 
1951-1971. Belonging to the Industrial Triangle or being in the proximity of it had a positive effect on 
population growth. The explanatory power of the North-West and the Industrial Triangle soared 
during the 1950s and the 1960s. After 1971, the North-West performed worse than the other macro-
areas and the coefficient on proximity to the golden triangle reduces by 80 percent. This presumably 
reflects the growth of sprawl and the fact that people moved South whose coefficient is the highest. 
Table 4 repeats the basic specifications, but now the dependent variable is the employment 
growth. We collected data from Industrial and Commercial Censuses.10 The results approximatively 
mirror those of Table 3. Again, we confirm the fact that the North-West performed worse than the 
other macro-areas in the period 1971-2001. The estimated coefficients on the regional dummy variables 
indicate that the fastest growing cities were in the South and in the Islands.  
 
Fact #6: Manufacturing predicts the decline of cities. 
 
Many papers have estimated that a high initial exposure to manufacturing has an adverse effect 
on the growth of cities and metropolitan areas (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shielfer, 1995; Glaeser and 
Saiz, 2004; Simon and Nardinelli, 2002). In contrast, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Tobio (2011) noted that 
this negative correlation does not appear in county data.  
Figure 5.1 shows that as the share of a city’s workers in manufacturing in 1951 rises by 1 
percent, subsequent population growth rises by 0.15 log points. This positive correlation remains 
robust if we control for initial population. If we restrict our sample to cities with at least 50,000 people 
in 1950, the correlation becomes negative. We do the same job for employment growth, as shown in 
Figure 5.2. A ten percent point increase in the share of manufacturing in 1951 decreases the long period !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The first Industrial Census was carried out in 1911, the second one in 1927 and the third one in 1937. The latter reports 
data only on provincial capitals. Since 1951 the Industrial and Commercial Census has been carried out every ten years.  
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employment growth by 0.3 percent. The effect becomes 0.12 percent if we control for initial 
employment.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 examine the relationship between decadal city population and 
employment growth and initial manufacturing share respectively.  In the postbellum twenty-year period 
there is a strongly positive correlation between growth and manufacturing. However and overall, a high 
initial exposure to manufacturing is negatively associated with population growth as well as 
employment growth.   
We have data on LLMs starting in 1971. Columns 3 and 4 show the correlations between the 
share of workers in manufacturing and later growth in the LLMs.  Column 3 shows a weak 0.06 
correlation between manufacturing share in 1971 and population growth in the period 1971-2001. The 
correlation is strongly negative if we look at employment growth. Column 4 indicates that a 1 percent 
rise in the share of manufacturing in the 1971 is associated with a 0.25 percent fall in employment 
growth between 1971-2001. The relationship remains quite robust if we control for initial level of 
employment and restrict the sample to the LLMs with at least 100,000 people in 1971.  
These results suggest that manufacturing left cities and cities that were more exposed to 
manufacturing decline.11 While these correlation are interesting, they have been studied largely by 
international literature, so we refer to the authors cited above for further details.  
 Next, our focus is on the relationship between education and growth. 
 
Fact #7: Education predicts employment growth and population decline in the post-war period.  
 
The strong association between human capital and city or metropolitan area population growth 
has been noted for some time. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shielfer (1995) show that population growth is 
positively related to initial human capital where human capital is measured using a wide range of 
education variables. In a thorough investigation of that relationship between 1970 and 2000, Glaeser 
and Saiz (2004) conclude that, for an average city, a one percent point higher share of university 
graduates is associated with 0.5 percent population growth over the subsequent decade. Shapiro (2006), 
uses the  growth as measure of city growth rather than the population growth. He, like Glaeser and Saiz 
(2004), finds that instrumenting city human capital by the presence of land grant colleges strongly 
suggests that the effect of education on city growth is causal. Simon and Nardinelli (2002) propose that 
cities that start out with proportionately more knowledgeable people grow faster in terms of 
employment either in the long run and in the short run.12 We now ask whether this positive correlations 
also hold in our sample of Italian cities.  Table 6 shows the correlation between the share of the adult 
population with college degrees and subsequent population and employment growth.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Many authors have argued that a strong manufacturing sector is a key ingredient for the success of cities. Krugman (1991) 
noted that firms are not randomly distributed over space, but they tend to be located next to each other. As a consequence a 
successful manufacturing sector may attract satellite firms for the production of inputs and services and in this way spurring 
growth. However as Simon and Nardinelli (2002) demonstrate, manufacturing’s impact is positive in earlier periods but not 
necessarily over the long run, particularly in the last decades of XX century. The typical industry’s growth follows an S-
shaped pattern: rapid growth, followed by slower growth and then decline. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shielfer (1995) suggest 
that cities followed the fortunes of the industries they are involved. “Non-manufacturing activities did not move into cities where 
manufacturing declined; rather, the population of these cities itself (relatively) declined trhough emigration, and income fell. […] Cities that invested 
in older types of capital do not replace that capital as it becomes obsolete because (1) existing capital represent a sunk investment and (2) the pre-
existing capital “crowds out” newer capital due to the scarcity of land” .  $%!The main exception is Glaeser, Ponzetto and Tobio (2011). They fail to find a positive association between human capital 
and subsequent county population growth in the Eastern and Central United States for a few decades in the last two 
hundred years.!
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 Column 1 part A, shows that there is no association between human capital and population 
growth. In the long run (1951-2001), as the share of population with college degrees increases by 10 
percent in 1951, population growth rises by 0.4 percent, but the coefficient is not statistically significant 
at all. This is certainly due to the strong heterogeneity of population patterns over decades. In the more 
homogeneous period 1971-2001 the correlation is negative. A 10 percent rise in the share of graduates 
in 1971 is associated with a 0.81 percent fall in population growth. This negative effect may be due to 
mean reversion in population from 1971 onwards. Once we control for initial population, the 
coefficient on human capital increases to 0.99 and the relationship remains significantly negative (at 1% 
level). Over shorter periods, there is a positive association between college attainment and population 
growth during the decades of economic miracle. Then the sign of correlation reverts and it holds in 
every decades after the 1970s (except for the 1980s) also when we account for the tendency of 
population to converge to the mean. However, also in the period 1981-1991 the positive correlation 
disappears if we control for initial population.  
 Column 2 part A, shows the results for employment growth. In our sample there is a positive 
correlation between initial education and subsequent employment growth. From 1951 to 2001, by 
controlling for initial log employment, as the share of population with college degrees increases by 10 
percent in 1951, employment growth increases by 0.02 percent (1 percent in the period 1971-2001). 
Looking at the single decades and controlling for initial conditions, the estimated coefficients for initial 
university graduates are always positive ranging from 0.011 during the 1990s to 0.10 during the 1970s.  
 Glaeser and Resseger (2010) suggest that skills have more impact in larger cities. Column 1 part 
B, focus on the population growth of those cities that begin the decade with at least 50,000 people. 
Numbers in brackets denote the number of observations. In the long run the estimated coefficients are 
0.238 in the period 1951-2001 and -0.092 in the sub-period 1971-2001. In the first case the coefficient 
is indistinguishable from zero while in the second one it is statistically significant at 1%. Then, the 
negative association between population growth and human capital remains also if we restrict the 
sample to more densely inhabited cities. Column 2 part B, looks at the employment growth. From 1951 
to 2001, a 10 percent rise in the share of graduates in 1951 is associated with a 1.1 percent rise in 
employment growth (2.3 percent in the period 1971-2001). When we come to employment, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is larger than those of the entire sample as suggested by the theory.   
During the decades 1950s and 1990s the raw correlation is slightly negative, but the negative sign 
disappears once we include the initial log employment. These results seem to confim the fact that 
educated people at the top of the education distribution spur employment growth but have an adverse 
effect on density also in more populous cities. 
 The simultaneous negative correlation between education and population growth and positive 
correlation between education and employment growth is consistent with the view according to which 
areas with more educated population experience more rapid growth in the quality of life. If skilled 
individuals are willing to accept some wage discount and pay high rents to live in better cities, then less 
educated leave cities and move to suburbs or neighboring municipalities to avoid the higher houses’ 
prices. Specifically a process of gentrification may activate.  
Now, we presents some preliminary evidence supporting gentrification hypothesis. Column 3, 
part A, of Table 6 examines the relationship between decadal population growth and the initial share of 
the adult population with college degrees in LLMs. If the gentrification process story holds, then we 
expect that education is positively -or negatively weaker than the case of cities- correlated with 
population growth. This is particularly true if we consider that LLMs are natural labor markets and 
cities within them are better units of analysis for understanding either amenities or real estate prices. 
! &#!
Column 3 shows that at higher frequencies there is a negative association between college 
attainment and population growth (with the exception of the 1970s). In the period 1971-2001, a 10 
percent rise in the share of graduates in 1971 is associated with a 0.6 percent fall in population growth 
at the LLM level. Although the correlation is negative, the coefficient is 40 percent lower than the 
coefficient estimated at city level (0.99). Column 3 part B, focus on the population growth of those 
LLMs that begin the decade with at least 100,000 people. For those LLMs as the share of population 
with college degrees increases by 10 percent in 1971, population growth declines by 0.7 percent in the 
subsequent thirty-year period. At the city level the effect is 0.92 percent. The effects of education on 
population growth are negatively weaker for LLMs than cities. We interpret this fact as our first indication 
of the possibity that less skilled population leave smart cities because of increasing rents. Moreover we will 
try to investigate futher on this point in section 6 of the paper. In the next subsection we sum up all the 
empirical facts and discuss their implications.  
 
2.1 Interpretation of the stylized facts 
 
One approach to urban areas emphasizes the existence of certain immutable relantionships, 
such as Zipf’s or Gibrat’s laws. Bosker et al. (2008) and Percoco (2013) are two examples of this 
approach applied to Italian cities. Bosker et al. (2008) argue that the main determinants of Italy’s city 
growth are physical geography and political predominance. Percoco (2013) focus on quality of 
institutions. According to these studies and as Fact #1 shows, the long-run persistence of cities level 
population implies that Gibrat’s law holds in the long run. Duranton and Puga (2004) and Gaeser et al. 
(2011) note that Gibrat’s law holds over sufficiently long time periods because of the accidental 
balancing of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Our results suggest that centripetal forces dominated 
during the Liberal age and during the economic miracle, periods characterized by the expansion of 
industrial cities that formed around earlier commercial hubs (Fact #2 and Fact #3). The North West 
and the Industrial Triangle grew very quickly in these periods thanks to a strong manufacturing sector 
that attracted labor force from the rest of Italy (Fact #4, Fact #5 and Fact #6). Centrifugal forces 
prevailed in the last decades of XX century. Since 1971, Italians have spread out towards less populated 
cities, the Industrial Triangle has declined and the North West have performed worse than the other 
macro-areas either in terms of population growth and employment growth (Table  3 and Table  4). 
But Gibrat’s law does not hold for population (employment) growth at higher frequencies. Our 
results suggest that after 1971 population converge across cities and less populous urban areas grew 
more quicky. Then an alternative approach is that urban changes reflect individual responses to 
changing tastes and technologies. Among others and focusing on the U.S. case, Glaeser and Saiz 
(2004), Shapiro (2006), Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) and Glaeser et al. (2011) follow this view. 
Education predicts employment growth and population decline in our sample of cities. This evidence is 
particularly true in the period 1971-2001 (Fact #6). Although it is in contrast to much of the U.S. 
literature (schooling generates population and employment growth) it is compatible with the view 
according to which areas with more educated population experience more rapid growth in the quality 
of life. This might occur because more educated individuals spur the growth of consumption amenities 
in cities in which they reside. For instance, services such as opera and restaurants, physical attraction 
such as architecture, good schools and hospitals may be available in larger and more skilled cities but 
not elsewhere. Moreover, skilled cities may allow for the provision of better public goods thanks to the 
influence of educated people on the political process.  
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Now, amenities (or disamenities) can be evaluated differently on the level of individual 
education. More educated people are likely to care more about the quality of life aspects of the place 
they live: skilled individuals seem to enjoy some urban amenities more than the unskilled ones 
(Adamson et al. 2004, Glaeser et al. 2001). This idea has found strong empirical support in the Italian 
case (Dalmazzo and de Blasio, 2011). When the more educated evaluate more the consumption 
possibilities associated with city size, then an additional implications must hold: skilled individuals have 
to be willing to accept some wage discount and pay high rents to live in better cities.13 By contrast, since 
the less educated are relatively less keen to live in those places, high rents must be compensated by 
higher wages, otherwise a process of gentrification activates. Column 3 in Table 6, gives us a 
preliminary indication according to which a process of gentrification activated in Italy during the period 
1971-2001.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
  
 In this paragraph we exploit a spatial equilibrium model to explain why human capital correlates 
with city growth. We follow the methodology used in Shapiro (2006) and Glaeser and Saiz (2004). This 
approach allows us to disentangle the mechanisms through which skills generate employment growth, 
as Fact #7 emphasizes. Specifically the questions we are interested in, are: is Italian cities growth a 
consumption-led growth or a production-led growth? If amenities drive the employment growth, what 
is the percentage of growth due to the quality of life?14 
 
3.1 Unraveling between production-led growth and consumption led-growth 
 
Suppose an economy partitioned in I non overlapping areas, indexed by i = 1, 2,…., I. Each 
area is endowed with a specific productivity factor which enters the production function (!!!) and 
quality of life which enters the utility function (!!!). Firms are identical and assumed to be perfectly 
mobile across locations. Representative firm use a Cobb-Douglas technology and produce a 
homogeneous tradable good at the numeraire price of 1 by using land and labor. The production 
function in location i is !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! ,  where !! denotes the quantity of land used in production 
and  ! denotes the quantity of labor. Profit maximization and spatial equilibrium imply that the 
following condition must hold for all i : 
 
     !!!!!!!!!!!! ! !                                                                    (1) 
 
where ! ! !!!!!!! !!!!! . Because of constant returns to scale, firms make zero profit in 
equilibrium and equation 1 can be interpreted as a free-entry condition in the good market.  
 Consumers are identical and choose among a set of locations. They have Cobb-Douglas utility 
over the freely-tradable homogeneous good and land which is the non-traded good. Utility function in 
area i is given by !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  and it is maximized under the budget constraint ! ! ! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) find that returns to college in Italy are negatively correlated with the population size of 
the LLMs.  
14 Note that throughout the paper we use consumption growth, amenities growth and quality of life growth as synonymous.  
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!!!!!!!! . Here !! denotes the quantity of land consumed. Spatial equilibrium requires that the indirect 
utility funcion must be constant across areas, therefore we have for all i and some constant ! : 
 
                                                              !!!!!!!!!! ! !                                                       (2)   
 
where ! ! !!!!!! !!!!! .  
 Equations (1) and (2) determine the equilibrium values of wages and rents as function of (!!!) 
and (!!!). They show how the factor prices adjust to make both firms and individuals indifferent 
between locations. Equation (1) represents the isocost of a typical firm in location i and it is a 
downward-sloping curve in the rent-wage space. Equation (2) is the iso-utility of a typical resident in 
location i and it is a upward-sloping line in the rent-wage space. Given !!!!!an increase in the 
productivity term (!!!) yields an increase in both wages and rents to compensate the otherwise cost 
reduction that firms will get. Then, on the one hand more productive firms will pay higher wages; on 
the other hand, rents rise to equalize utility across space since workers are receiving higher wages. 
When also the quality of life parameter (!!!) increases, the iso-utility curve shifts yielding a further 
increase in rents but not in wages, therefore land will be more expensive in more amenable places.  
 Area size, defined as the number of local workers, is endogenous. We assume a fixed local 
supply of land !! which must be equal to the total demand for land. The latter is  given by the sum of 
land demanded by firms plus the land demanded by workers, that is !! ! ! !! ! !!! !! ! !!!!!!!!!!! !! . Solving the model, we get the third equilibrium condition: 
 
                                                            !! ! ! !!!!!!                                                      (3) 
 
where ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!! . Equation (3) links positively rents and employment: given that the local supply 
of land is fixed, when the number of workers in an area raises, the price of land increases as well. 
 Equations (1), (2) and (3) determine simultaneously !! ,  !! and ! !!. Our focus is on changes in 
the productivity level !!! and quality of life level !!!and these are the only area-specific attributes that 
we allow  to change over time. By totally differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to time and after some 
manipulations we arrive at the following expressions for the changes in land prices and wages: 
 !!!"#!!!!!!" ! !!!! !"! ! !!!"#!!!!!!" ! !! !!!"#!!!!!!"  
    (4) !!!!"#!!!!!!" ! ! !!!!!!!!!"! !!!!"#!!!!!!" ! ! !!!!!!!!!"! !!!!"#!!!!!!"    
 
Given the form of the production function and utility function, ! and !! !  represent the share of 
labor and land in the firm’s cost function respectively, and !!! !) is the share of land in the 
household’s budget. Moreover, we assumed that !! !" ! !. From equation (3) and by using (4), 
employment growth can be written as: 
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 !!!"#!!!!!!" ! !! !!!!!"! ! !!!"#!!!!!!" ! !! !! !"#!!!!!"                                     (5) 
 
Equations (4) and (5) must hold for all areas i and they yield standard results in the urban literature. 
First, increases in urban productivity will raise prices, wages and employment; second, increases in the 
quality of life or consumption amenities will increase employment and rents, but reduce wages.   
 Let !!!!!denotes the share of human capital in the area i at time t and let !!!! be a vector of 
measurable exogenous area characteristics. Assume that 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!  
                                                (6)      
 !"# !!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!  
 
where !!!!!!!  for ! ! !!! ! is an error term which has zero mean and is orthogonal to !!!!!and !!!!. 
From (4) and (5) and by substituting (6) we get  
 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!!! !! !!!!!"!!! ! !!!!!"!!! !!!! ! ! !!!!!"! !! ! !!!!!"! !! !!!! ! !!!!!!! !                (7) 
 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!"!!! ! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!! ! ! !!!!!!!!!"!!! ! ! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!         (8) 
 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!!! !! ! !!!!!"!!! ! !!!!!"!!! !!!! ! ! !!!!!"! !! ! !!!!!"! !! !!!! ! !!!!!!!!        (9) 
 
 
where !!!!!!!  for ! ! !! !!! is an error term which has zero mean and is orthogonal to !!!!!and !!!! 
because it is a linear combination of !!!!!!! . According to Shapiro (2006), expression (7) shows that a 
positive correlation between human capital and later employment growth can emerge because of some 
omitted variable of  !!!! which itself generates employment growth, because of productivity growth !!! ! !! or quality of life growth !!! ! !!. Given data on employment growth,  changes in housing 
prices and wages for a panel of cities,  equations (7), (8) and (9) show us how to use the differences in 
the coefficients from employment, wage and price growth regressions to determine the value of !!and !! !and how to evaluate the importance of productity and consumption amenities in genereting local 
growth. The idea is that if a variable (i.e. human capital)  is increasing employment and prices, more 
than wages, this implies that the variable is increasing consumption amenities and therefore 
! &&!
consumption-led growth prevails. If a variable is correlated with increasing employment and wages 
more than with prices, then this implies that the variable is increasing productivity rather than quality of 
life. Put differently, production-led growth requires nominal wages and housing prices to raise, while 
consumption-led growth requires real wages to fall. 
 Let be !!"# , !!!"#$ !and !!"#$% the coefficients on human capital in employment growth, wage 
growth and housing price growth regressions respectively; then we have: 
 !!"# ! ! !!!!" !! ! !!!!" !!  
 !!"#$ ! ! !!!!!!" !! ! !!!!!!" !!           (10) 
 !!"#$% ! ! !!!!" !! ! !!!!" !!  
 
The system of equations (10) allows us to calculate the parameters  !!!and !! as functions of !!"#, !!"#$ and !!"#$% .15 After some manipulations we arrive at the following relationships: 
 !! ! !!!"#$% ! !!!!"# ! !! ! !!"# ! !!!"#$                  (11) 
 !! ! !!!"# ! !!!!"#$% ! !! ! !!"# ! !!!"#$                  (12) 
 
On the one hand this approach allows us to use formulas (11) and (12) to disentangle the 
productivity effect from consumption effect in the association between employment growth and 
human capital; on the other hand the model hides the mechanisms through which human capital raises 
productivity growth and/or consumer amenities as shown by equations (6). For example, skills may 
generate growth through innovation and the creation of new technologies. Alternatively, human capital 
may drive growth because of increasing spillovers. Both these theories predict that education-growth 
connection arises from the increase in the parameter !! , so they are empirically indistinguishable.16 Yet, 
since urban amenities may to do with a variety of factors, ranging from workplace conditions to job 
satisfaction, from traffic congestion to shopping possibilities, it is very hard to understand a priori 
which aspects people value and as a consequence it is difficult to make clear how the quality of life 
channel works. However, we try to shed light on these points throughout the paper. 
 
4. Results 
 
 Empirical results are presented in two blocks. In the first one we stress on the relationship 
between human capital and employment growth and test its robustness. Once assured that a link !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Note that system (10) is overdefined because there are 3 equations and 2 unknows. In fact  !!"#$% = !!"# ! !!!"#$ . 
16 Glaeser, Ponzetto and Tobio (2011) present a model of regional growth, where education increases the level of 
entrepreneurship. They argue that human capital spillover occur at the city level because skilled workers produce more 
product varieties and thereby increase labor demand. Glaeser and Saiz (2004), by using patent data, suggest that human 
capital may matter because it makes people more creative. 
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between skills and growth exists, in the second block we measure the extent to which this connection 
stems from productivity or consumption effects.  
 
4.1 Employment growth-education relationship 
 
We focus on the period 1971-2001 and our meausure of city growth is the log change of 
employment between census waves. Our territorial unit of analysis are both LLMs and cities. As 
highlighted above, LLMs are self-contained labor markets and therefore labor mobility is very low, as 
required by spatial equilibrium concept. Because of this reason, LLMs are increasingly used as the 
standard unit of analysis in the urban literarure (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Di Addario and 
Patacchini, 2008; Croce and Morettini, 2011). On the other side, cities within them are a better unit of 
analysis for understanding either amenities or real estate prices. We obtain a balanced panel for 1971, 
1981, 1991 and 2001 for 442 cities by combining the SHIW database with census data. We chose the 
LLMs that constitute our dataset by associating each city to the LLM that city belongs. As a result we 
have 442 cities associated with 277 LLMs (40 percent of the total). Data on population and 
employment at LLM level are collected from the Atlante Statistico dei Comuni . The Data Appendix 
describes the sources of all variables.  
Table 7 and Table 8 report estimates of equation (7) for LLMs and cities respectively over three 
periods (the 70s, the 80s and the 90s). We focus on the coefficient on the log of the percent college 
graduates, which should therefore be interpreted as the elasticity of the employment growth on this 
measure of human capital. All regressions include decade-specific fixed effects and allow each 
geographic unit’s standard errors to be correlated over time.  
Regression 1 shows the impact of education on growth in a random effects  panel estimation 
which controls for initial employment and time dummies. In the case of LLM-level regressions, a 10 
percent increase in the share of college-educated residents is associated with an increase in the 
employment growth rate of roughly 0.9 percent. In the city-level regressions (Table 8), the effect of 
college education is smaller. A 10 percent increase in college graduates increases the expected growth 
rate by 0.6 percent. Initial employment is negatively related to later growth, suggesting mean reversion.  
In regression 2 we control for a wide set of urban features, i.e. region fixed effects, sector specialization 
and age-distribution. Firstly, regional dummies should capture all-time invariant geographic variables as 
well as those regional policies that change slowly over time. Such variables are particularly relevant 
within the Italian sample, whose economic development is strongly dependent on historical political 
fragmentation in region-wide states. Secondly, we keep into account for sector specialization, by 
controlling for the share of workers in manufacturing, services and trade17: such controls enable us to 
take into account for industrial orientation of the area which, as already previously shown in our 
descriptive evidences, is a strong predictor of urban dynamics within the time-span under analysis. 
Finally we control for age-distribution by adding the initial share of population in the following cohorts: 
0-19, 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64.! The latter variables are useful in order to identify whether the 
impact of education on growth simply reflects the larger presence of younger people which attained 
higher education level or, symmetrically whether lower education stemmed from a larger share of 
elderly residents. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$)!In our sample these occupational catagories represent roughly 60% of total LLM employment and 70% of total city 
employment in 1991. !
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By including these variables, the coefficient on the college educated remains strongly significant, 
but decreases by around 20 percent in the LLM-level regression; in contrast the coefficient remains 
stable at the city-level. LLMs with substantial shares of services and trade grow more quickly. At the 
city-level, the share of workers occupied in services seems to be negatively correlated with later growth, 
although this relantionship is never statistically significant. This occurs because, within the city, the 
share of skilled individuals and the share of workers in services are strongly correlated. In our sample 
the correlation between these two variables is 0.80. In fact, when we exclude human capital from the 
regressions, the impact of services on empoyment growth becomes positive. For both cities and LLMs, 
panel regressions suggest that manufacturing increases employment growth in contrast with the 
empirical fact #6. To solve this puzzle, in regression 3, we allow the coefficient on manufacturing to 
differ over time. As such, differences in our estimated coefficients on the interaction of manufacturing 
and decade should be interpreted as the extent to which the coefficient on average manufacturing has 
decreased over time. At LLM (city) level, our results show that the importance of manufacturing in 
driving employment reduced by 0.10 (0.06) between 1981 and 2001. Column 3 confirms another 
important fact: between 1971-2001 the North-West grew slower than the other macro-areas, as seen in 
Table 4.18 
 Regression 4 shows that the effect of education on growth becomes statistically insignificant 
when we control for city or LLM fixed effects. These dummies address the possibility that skilled 
individuals are just proxying for omitted time-invariant characteristics that spur area growth. As Glaeser 
and Saiz (2004) point out, including fixed effects is asking a great deal of the data because the estimated 
coefficient comes from changes in the share of college educated over time within the city or LLM. 
Since the correlation coefficient in the share of graduated in 1971 and 1991 is 92 percent across cities 
and 93.3 percent across LLMs, we are not surprised by the zero impact of education on later growth. 
Moreover, we note that, although fixed effects eliminate most of the variation in skills across space, the 
coefficient on human capital for LLMs remains positive.  
In regression 5, we keep fixed effects up but now we look at those LLMs that begin the decade 
with at least 100,000 people and those cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Glaeser and Ressenger 
(2010) argue that skills have more impact in more populous areas. Human capital externalities are most 
likely manifested in cities with the densest concentrantion of people. The coefficient on human capital 
are estimated as 0.124 for the LLMs and 0.108 for the cities, in both case statistical significant at 1 
percent and well higher with respect to the first three specifications.  
In Column 6 we use as measure of human capital the share of college graduates in 1951. This 
choice aims at reducing the upward bias of the effect of education on employment growth that may 
arise from reverse casuality. In fact, one concern is that the distribution of colleges across cities may 
reflect expected changes in the local economy. Suppose for example that in 1971 people were able to 
correctly forecast which cities will experience the fastest economic growth in the subsequent decade. 
To the extent that highly educated people are more willing to move than unskilled, it is possible that the 
concentration of colleges in a given area in the initial year, may reflect their expectations about future 
growth. Clearly this hypothesis is less likely to hold by using the share of educated in the aftermath of 
WWII. If so, a 10 percent increase in the share of colleges in 1951 is associated with an increase in the 
LLMs’ decadal employment growth of 0.3 log points (0.8 in cities). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$*!In column 3 the time varying manufacturing share control is associated with macro-region dummies. Nevetheless its major 
findings are confirmed also with region dummies.!
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Although our attempts to address endogeneity issues, it is still possible that the distribution of 
graduates in 1951 is itself endogenous and then correlated with the error term. Most studies in regional 
science and urban growth suggest that predetermined variables such as the presence of colleges prior to 
WWII may be exogenous to recent events (see Moretti, 2004a). Unfortunately, population censuses do 
not report data on education attainment before 1951. We obtain data on the number of students 
enrolled in a high school in 1931 for 161 large cities from the tapes of the Annuario delle Città Italiane 
and we use the share of the percent share of high school enrollment as our proxy of human capital 
before that year. Column 7 (available only for cities) presents the results by using this measure of 
human capital as right-hand-side regressor.19 Magnitude and significance of the coefficient on education 
remains undisputed.  
Finally, in Column 8, we follow Moretti (2004a) and use our proxy of human capital in 1931 as 
instrument for the share of college graduates. If we believe that the share of high school enrollment in 
1931 is orthogonal to the error term, then a 10 percent point increase in the high school enrollment per 
capita increases the decadal employment growth by, approximately, 1.2 percent.20  
On the basis of the findings presented above we conclude that the concentration of highly-
educated people in a given urban area is a strong predictor of future employment growth. This 
relationship is robust controlling for a wide set of regional, demographic and sector characteristics. 
When taking into account for full-observation fixed effect, i.e. excluding any variation across different 
areas, this relationship is still consistent for areas above a minimum dimension threshold. Finally, we 
instrument for education levels which date back to 40 years before our analysis time-span: this is 
expected to rule out biases due to causality and strongly mitigate the case for remaining omitted 
variables. The residual sources of endogeneity in the estimation of the causality between education and 
growth could be only due to long-term historical features which have impacted on long-term education 
patterns and employment growth in the last decades of the twentieth century but are orthogonal with 
initial employment level, regional characteristics, demographic-age structure and industrial 
specialization, which we regard as relatively negligile. Therefore our interpretation is that significant 
causality channels  stemming from education to growth exist within our sample of Italian urban areas. 
 
4.1.1 Employment growth-education relationship: Robustness checks 
  
 In this subsection, we examine the robustness of the human capital-growth association to a 
number of alternative specifications. We begin with cities and then we focus on LLMs. Our main 
comparison are  the random effect specification including regional and age-coorts controls (col. 2 of 
Table 7-8) and the fixed effects specification  for areas above the population threshold (col. 5 of Table 
7-8). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 In order to obtain the share of college educated at the LLM level in 1951, we aggregated the data for cities into their 
respective local labour markets. In contrast, we are not able to calculate that variable prior WWII, so columns 7 and 8 are 
missing in Table 7. %#!In the first-stage estimates, the effect of human capital in 1931 on the share of colleges in 1971, 1981 and 1991 is 0.261 
with a standard error of 0.025 suggesting that education prior WWII is a strong predictor of the distribution of the 
graduated across cities in the most recent years. When we regress the log of the percent share of college educated on the log 
of the percent share of high school enrollment in 1931, the coefficient becomes 0.375 with a standard error of 0.033. The F-
statistic is 127.47 and the F-test reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient in the model is zero with a significance of 1 
percent. According to the thresholds of Stock and Yogo (2005), we can be assured that weak instruments issues do not 
apply. Note, moreover, that in the specification 8 we do not include fixed effects because our instrument would be absorbed 
by those effects. 
! &*!
Column 1 of Table A.1-A.2 in the appendix A repeats the random effects specification by including 
additional controls. Most studies of local area growth in the post WWII period have found that city 
amenities such as restaurants and hotels, number of museums and recreational service establishments 
are likely to be provided in high human capital areas and as a conseguence this may encourage 
employment growth in those areas. We also include the number of membership organizations as a 
proxy of social capital. By focusing their attention on Italian cities, Albanese and de Blasio (2014) 
present evidences that social capital (proxied by the voter turnout) is steadily correlated with 
employment rate and that this reflects some causality running from the former to the latter. If more 
educated people foster growth by increasing social capital, then it becomes a potential confounding 
factor in the education-growth relantionship.21 Specification 1 shows that after adding these controls, 
the impact of human capital remains robust. In addition to membership organization, in column 2 of 
Tables A.1-A.2 we consider electoral participation as an alternative measure of social capital.  Even if 
electoral participation might be correlated with factors like political patronage which are actually 
negatively correlated with civism, still empirical literature have confirmed it as a relevant proxy for 
social capital. As in the previous regression, while controlling for social capital indicators does not 
improve the predictive power of the specification, it does not affect the robustness of the impact of 
human capital. As a third robustness checks we control for the interactions between year and regional 
dummies: this would remove any potential endogeneity resulting from time shock affecting areas 
belonging to the same region, like changes in regional policies or shock affecting sectors in which a 
region is specialized in.  Results in col. 3 of Tables A.1-A.2 show that the education-growth relationship 
is still robust to  year-regions controls. As a fourth robustness check (col. 4), we choose to take into 
account for local labor market conditions by controlling for the logarithm of population levels: as we 
already control for the logarithm of employees, this specification would be basically equivalent to a one 
which controls for both occupation rates and levels. Even in this case, the estimation of education 
coefficients is basically unaffected.   
We now move to control for the robustness of the fixed effects specification: we verified that 
graduates levels across time yields a significant impact for areas above a given size-threshold. 
Nevertheless, as the choice of 50.000 (100.000) inhabitants as a minimum city (LLM) level could be 
considered as arbitrary: therefore we conducted a sensitivity analysis applying different levels of cut-off, 
to test whether the same relationship persists. In col. 5-6 of Table A.1 (A.2) we applied 45.000-55.000 
(90.000-110.000) cut-off levels: both in cities and in LLMs our main results persists. Generally speaking, 
lowering the cut-off level would let in the sample smaller and smaller areas, while raising would shrink 
the sample rendering it less and less statistically relevant. Nevertheless, we still found that the 
education-growth relationship keeps statistically significant at 5 percent level in the 40.000-100.000 cut-
off interval for cities and in the 70.000-130.000 for LLMs (results are not reported in tables).  
Applying a population cut-off  would make the panel unbalanced, as an area might be below it 
at first available year but overcome it in the last one: in order to check it we choose to apply it to the 
population level in 1981 as a unique cut-off level for all the years, by selecting cities (LLMs) which in 
that year had over 50.000 (100.000) inhabitants: as shown in column 7 of both robustness tables, while 
the LLMs coefficient is pretty stable w.r.t. the one estimated in col.5 of the main table,  the cities goes 
up to 0.152.  As a final check, we run the instrumental variable estimation adding the controls of age-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%$ Note that the other proxies of social capital suggested by Putnam (1993) are: membership in mutual aid society; membership in 
cooperatives; strength of mass parties; and the longevity of local associations. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) use the number of 
membership organizations as a measure of social capital in MSAs.!
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coorts, still finding a significant coefficient for the causal estimation of the education-growth 
relationship (Table A.1 col. 8).  
In the end, all performed robustness analysis support the view that the correlation between 
education and future city growth is attributable to a causality stemming from the former to the latter. 
 
4.1.2 Heterogeneity in employment growth-education relationship.  
 
Until this point, our empirical estimates implicitly assumed that the human capital’s predictive 
power on city growth was homogenous across both time and space. In this sub-chapter, we relax this 
assumption, in order to detect whether the expected impact of human capital might differ within our 
panel-sample. 
Firstly, we try to investigate about time-heterogeneity, i.e. whether the impact of human capital 
has changed throughout the years. Therefore, we generate interactions between graduates share with 
year dummies, within the framework of the first two specifications in Table 7-8: results have been 
shown in Table 9-10, col 1-2 for both LLM and cities. It is quite straightforward to notice in all the 
specification that the employment growth-education relationships is increasing across time, the 
strongest effect corresponding to the employment variation between 1991 and 2001 (whose dummy-
interaction is omitted). This is consistent with both our prior related literature, which underline the 
increasing role of knowledge esternalities connected with technological development: as Moretti (2013) 
points out, in the last decades of the XX century human capital has progressively substituted physical 
capital as the best predictor of future urban economic growth. Furthermore, the fact the time-
heterogeneity is stronger for cities might be a hint about the increasing role for consumption channel 
growth, i.e. that the demand for location-amenities has increased throughout the years, causing stronger 
growth in highly educated municipalities rather than local labor markets.  
A second potential source of heterogeneity could concern geographic location: Italy is among the 
European countries which show the strongest regional heterogeneity in terms of economic 
development, a fact which stems from different long-run patterns of political division. We would like to 
investigate whether such differences might affect the relationship between human capital and 
employment growth, with a specific focus on the long-standing North-South divide. In order to do so, 
we interact human capital coefficient with a dummy for cities/LLMs belonging to Southern regions22, 
reporting both the specification with yearly and with full-areas controls (col. 3-4 in Table 9-10).  In all 
the specifications this interaction result to be significantly negative, suggesting that the education-
growth relationship is much weaker in Southern Italy urban areas. There are several potential 
explanations to such fact. Firstly, we may think about measurement error of the dependent variable, 
given that Southern Italy is characterized by a larger share of underground economy, i.e workers, or 
that the quality. Secondly, productivity spillover might not work properly: in our theoretical framework, 
education spurs growth by increasing productivity which in turn raises up wages and therefore attracts 
new workers. As high public sector presence have worked as safety net in poorer regions like Southern 
Italy, we suspect that public employment and policies might concentrate in areas characterized by lower 
productivity, thus being a confounding factor in the productivity-wage relationship.! 
 
4.2 Production-led growth or Consumption led-growth? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The “South” dummy encompasses cites/LLMs belonging to the following regions: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, 
Puglia,Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna. 
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At this point, we can conclude that a correlation between human capital and growth exists. We 
now use the theoretical framework to measure the extent to which the connection between skill and 
growth strems from productivity or amenity effects. The model suggests that if human capital is 
increasing employment and prices, more than wages, this implies that the variable is increasing 
consumption amenities and therefore consumption-led growth prevails. If human capital is correlated 
with increasing employment and wages more than with prices, then this implies that the variable is 
increasing productivity rather than quality of life.  In the Italian case, Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011) 
use individual-level data to analyze the impact of agglomeration on both production and consumption. 
They find evidence of a substantial urban rent premium, while they do not find support for an urban 
wage premium. As a conquence they conclude that urban agglomeration is predominantly a source of 
positive amenities for residents rather than productivity advantages. Di Addario and Patacchini (2008), 
by using micro-data from the SHIW, test whether wages vary with urban scale. One of the result they 
find is that college graduates living in the largest LLMs are subject to a 0.4-0.8 percent wage reduction 
and conclude that this apparent paradox can be explained in a quality-of-life framework.  
Differently to these studies, our focus is on changes over time, not on the level effects. So to 
address these changes we need to look at housing price growth and at wages growth at the LLM and at 
city level. In order to measure hourly wage series and house value series we follow the methodology 
used by Shapiro (2006) and by Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004). We estimate both the house value and the 
rental price of houses since is not clear a priori which market is preferable as a means of measuring 
differences in the implicit price of land.  
To construct the house value series, we extract from the SHIW the value of all real estate in the 
years 1986, 1991 ad 2000. The SHIW reports city codes only from 1986 onwards, so we are limited to 
use 1986 as starting point. We restrict our sample to only dwellings and it was trimmed at the 1st and 
99th percentile of the distribution of dwelling value. Then we regress the log of reported dwelling 
values on dummies for cities and as well as a set of controls for dwelling characteristics.23 The controls 
we use are surface in square meters, an indicator variable equal to one if two or more bathrooms are 
available, an indicator variable equal to one if an heating system is available, the year built, dummies for 
dwelling location, dummies for dwelling category and dummies for use status. We run these regressions 
separately for each year, so we end up with three house value cross-section series for the years 1986, 
1991 and 2000.  For each year, we extract the coefficients on cities to be used as estimates of local 
differences in house values.  
In order to obtain rents in cities in 1986, 1991 and 2000, we regress the log of annual rent of all 
dwellings in the sample in each year on dummies for cities and the set of controls described above.  
To measure local productivity, we construct the hourly wage series as follows. We extract from 
SHIW all workers of age between 15 and 65 in the years 1987, 1991 and 2000.24 Hourly wages are 
calculated by dividing the annual earnings by the total amount of hours worked in a year. The sample is 
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of hourly wages. We then regress the log of 
the hourly wage for each individual on dummies for each city, age and its square, dummies for civil 
status, educational attainment, sector of economic activity and occupational category. Observations 
with missing values of the controls were dropped. We estimate separated regressions for each year, so 
we ended up with three wage series for the years 1987, 1991 and 2000. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Appendix B.1 reports additional details about the controls used.  
24 In the case of wages, we use 1987 as starting point because the variable “hours worked” is not available for 1986. 
Appendix B.2 reports a detailed description on how we get wage series. 
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Relative house value, rents and hourly wage levels in LLMs are obtained by performing the 
same procedure used in the case of cities. The only difference is that we employ dummies for LLMs 
rather than for cities.  
 Table 11 lists the 5 highest and lowest house price and wage city-fixed effects in 1986, 1991 and 
2000.25 Naturally, we understand that these coefficients will be biased if there are some omitted 
characteristics of the workers or the dwellings in the sample. To show that our estimates of local 
differences in house values, rents and wages are not a mere artifact and as a check on the potential of 
such a bias we exploit different sources of data. Il Reddito nei Comuni Italiani from 1981 to 1987 
published every two years by the Banco di Santo Spirito contains the per capita income of all Italian 
cities. We collect data for the year 1987. For 269 cities for which the estimated wage coefficient is 
available, the correlation between these two measures is 0.63 in 1987 (statistically significant at the 1 
percent level).26  
 Table12 and Table 13 report coefficients from regressions of house value, rental price and 
hourly wage growth on the log of the percent college graduates for LLMs and cities respectively. 
Growth is measured as the log change in LLM and city fixed effects. We standardize this to be a ten-
year growth rate in the 1981-2001 period, so we end up with a panel over two-periods (the 80s and the 
90s). Dummies for time period are included in all specification and standar errors are adjusted for 
correlation of errors within LLMs and cities. 
 Regressions 1-3 of Panel A and B in Table 12 show the impact that initial human capital has on 
later housing value and rental price appreciation at the LLM level. The magnitude of the effect remains 
robust between regression 1 and regression 2; in the latter, regional dummies and the variables we used 
in Table 7 are included. Regression 2 suggests that a 10 percent increase in the share of college-
educated at the LLM level is associated with an increase in the housing value of 1.34 percent over the 
next decade (3.6 percent in the case of rental price). The strong negative coefficients on both the lagged 
house value and rental price highlight that there is a large amount of mean reversion across LLMs: high 
price areas tend to come back to their historical mean. In regression 3 we add LLM fixed effects. The 
impact of human capital lose is significance on house value growth; in contrast the effect on rental 
price growth remains statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
 Specification 4 looks at LLMs with at least 100,000 residents in the initial year and in regression 
5 we use the share of colleges in 1951 as measure of human capital. Education enters significantly and 
its coefficients remains stable. 
Panels A and B in Table 13 look at cities and the results essentially reproduce those we find for 
LLMs with the exception of the rental price regressions which show smaller coefficients. 
 Panel C in Table 12 examines the connection between wage growth and human capital. At the 
LLM level, we fail to find a systematic and significant relationship between initial human capital levels 
and later growth in wage. Furthermore, we note that the association between the percent share of 
college-educated and wage growth becomes negative when we control for LLM fixed effects, in line 
with the results in Di Addario and Patacchini (2008). The point estimate remains negative also when we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Results for LLMs are available upon request.  
26 The modest correlation between wage and income may be due to the differences between the two measures. Wages are 
remuneration for work and are thus a good proxy for local labor productivity. Income is a composite measure that includes 
wages plus capital gains, rents, transfers and self-employment income and might have little to do with local productivity, in 
the sense that income is less geographically dependent. In fact a lot of people, although live in one city, make their money 
elsewhere.  
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focus on more densely inabitated LLMs (with more 100,000 residents) although the impact is not 
statistically significant as shown by Column 4. 
 Panel C in Table 13 reproduces panel C in Table 12. Growth in wage tends to be higher in cities 
with greater concentration of college-educated residents: a 10 percent increase in the share of college 
graduates corresponds to a roughly 0.3-0.5 percent increase in wage growth. The coefficient on 
schooling becomes not statistically significant when we include city fixed effects. Just in the case of 
housing prices, there is a substantial mean reversion in income. This means that, during the 1980s and 
1990s, income growth was lower in cities that started with higher income levels.  
 Summing up, Table 12 and Table 13 reveal two notable facts. First, growth in house values, 
rents and wages tends to be higher in cities with higher share of skilled individuals. Our findings seem 
to make it clear that higher level of education increase both the employment of cities and LLMs and the 
price that these workers is paying for living near others of similar educational level. Second and the 
most important for our purposes, the impact of human capital on the housing price measures is four 
time as large as the impact on growth in wages. This result supports the view according to which 
education is a source of positive amenities and as a consequence growth in quality of life may be 
playing an important role in the association between human capital and employment growth. 
 
4.2.1 Calibration of the model 
  
 Next, we will try to quantify to what extent the employment growth-education relationship is 
due to productivity-led growth or amenity-led growth. In order to achieve this goal we need to calculate 
the value of the parameters  !! and  !! which capture the impact of human capital on growth in wage 
and quality of life. As shown by equations (11) and (12), this procedure requires to set  !!"#,  either  !!"#$% or  !!"#$ and two other parameters: the labor’s share of output !   and the share of spending 
on housing in the consumer budget! !! ! . 
We begin with LLMs and then we focus on cities. In Table 7, the coefficient of human capital 
on employment growth ranges from 0.03 to 0.12. We choose the midpoint 0.08 as value of !!"#. Panel 
A in the Table 12 shows that !!"#$% oscillates between 0.05 and 0.15, as such we fix it to 0.1. The 
estimates of !!"#$ range from -0.25 to 0.03 (Panel C, Table 12). We focus on the positive values of  !!"#$ and therefore we set it to 0.03. Note that this calibration is in line with the prediction of the 
model according to which !!"#$% = !!!"# ! !!!"#$ .27 
While the growth literature agrees to set the parameter ! = 0.75  -that is a labor’s total share of 
output that includes the return to human capital-  more debatable is the value of the parameter (!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 In order to set the parameter !!"#$% , theoretically, we may refer to both the rental price regressions and house value 
regressions. Despite this, we chose to fix this parameter by using the estimates where the dependent variable is the house 
value (Panel A) for two reasons. First, in the SHIW, rents depend on the subjective evaluation of the interviewed. In fact, in 
the case the latter is the property owner but the dwelling is not rented or it is the family residence, SHIW reports the 
interviewed’s best estimate for the rent she could charge (see appendix B.1 for details). Second, Glaeser (2008) argues that 
the problem with rents is that renters tend to be quite special and they live in housing stock that is often quite very 
unrepresentative of the city as a whole. Renters live overwhelmingly in multi-unit dwellings while owners live in single-
family dwellings. This means that they live in very different parts of the city on average. On account of these considerations, 
we believe that the house value is a more reliable variable than the rent. 
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!).28 Given the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function, the expenditure function is !! !!! !! !!!!!!!! .  Taking logs and differentiating w.r.t. !! yields:   
 
 ! !"# !!!!!!! !! !!!!!"#!!!!! ! !! !                             (13) 
       
where we assumed that !! remains constant. Equation (13) suggests two ways to estimates the share of 
spending on housing. First, we can use the data in the SHIW and regress the log of the consumption 
expenditure on the log of housing price. By using this strategy for the year 2000, we estimate that the 
elasticity of the housing price on overall expenditure ranges from 0.31 to 0.36 percent. The model we 
have used above assumes that all goods other than land (housing) are traded on a national market; 
actually the parameter !! !  represents the impact on the consumer budget of all goods that are 
produced using land as an input. Therefore those elasticities can be seen as a lower bound. In the 
second strategy, we regress the log of the FOI price index on the log of the rental price. Here, the idea 
is that price indices are supposed to measure the amount of money needed to equilibrate utility levels 
across cities; as a consequences they can be interpreted  as expenditure functions. Our results suggest 
that, in this case, the elasticity ranges from 0.33 to 0.43. Overall, different attempts to infer the share of 
spending on non-traded goods confirm that this measure lies between 0.31 and 0.43.29 
 !!"#$ ,  !!"#  and !!"#$%  range in a relative narrow band so we chose to focus on point 
estimates over the extremes; in contrast our results seem sensibile to the choice of the value of !! ! , 
therefore we report our findings by using both the values of this parameter. As we said above, !! and !! capture the impact of human capital on growth in productivity and quality of life, respectively. 
Equation (7) shows that the total impact of human capital on employment growth is !!!!!"! !!! !!!!!!, as a consequence the fraction of the employment growth effect that is due to quality of life 
growth is !!!!!!!!!! . 
Table 14 presents the results of this exercise. When !! !  is 0.31 and we use !!"#$ , the 
connection between human capital and employment growth is explained by only 10 percent by quality 
of life growth. This percentage increases to 37 percent when the share of spending on housing in the 
consumer budget is at its upper bound of 0.43. These percentages are rispectively 27% and 41% when !!"#$% !is used for the calculations.30 Overall, our findings indicate that the bulk of the skill-growth 
connection at the local labor market level comes from the fact that human capital predicts productivity 
growth rather than spurring amenities consumption.31  
What is the underlying mechanism that links education and productivity? Marshall (1980) and 
Jacobs (1969) argue that productivity gains may be generated by the transfer of knowledge arising from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Raitano (2014) estimates that the share of spending on housing oscillates from 10 to 43 percent according to the income 
decile we are referring to. He suggests that these figures hold if mortgage payments, utilities and maintenance expenses are 
taking into account. Shapiro (2006) estimates that the share of spending on housing ranges from 0.22 to 0.32. Glaeser and 
Saiz (2004) find that this parameter oscillates between 0.21 and 0.29 and choose to fix it to 0.25.  
29 See appendix B.3 for details. 
30 Theoretically, the values of !! and !! should not change when either !!"#$ or !!"#$% are used to determine their values 
(see equations (11) and 12)). Empirically this occurs because our calibration does not satisfies perfectly the relationship  !!"#$% = !!!"# ! !!!"#$ .  
31 This result is in line with Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2005). Based on 238 LLMs, they show that human capital generates 
relevant externalities on firms’ productivity.  
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the greater intensity of communication between agents, which generates knowledge spillovers favoring 
innovation (technological spillover) and increasing the speed of learning (intellectual spillovers). In this 
context, Porter (1990) argues that knowledge spillovers in specialized, geographically concentrated 
industries stimulate growth by fostering the pursuit and rapid adoption of innovation. He gives 
examples of Italian ceramics and gold jewerly industries, in which hundreds of firms are located 
together and fiercely compete to innovate since the alternative to innovation is collapse. We can test 
this channel by using data on patents at LLM level. Specifically, we expect that in those LLMs with 
more highly educated people, rapid interfirm movement of highly skilled labor which allows ideas to be 
quickly disseminated among neighboring firms as well as the sharing of knowledge and skills between 
workers that occurs through both formal and informal interactions lead to faster techlogical innovation 
and this explains the connection between LLM growth and human capital.   
Now, we focus on cities. Cities within LLMs are smaller and a better unit of analysis for 
understanding either amenities or real estate prices, but they are part of the same labor market. If we 
assume that wages are the same across cities belonging to the same labor market, then according to the 
model used above and as argued by Glaeser and Saiz (2004), the spatial equilibrium condition for 
consumers (2) becomes !!!!!!!!!! ! !"#$%. This expression states that, given wages, rents must adjust 
to equalize utility in all occupied cities within a given labor market. In other words, the price of housing 
will be higher in more amenable places. Solving the model, this assumption yields: 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!!! !! !!!"! ! !!!!!!!! !!!! ! ! !!!!!! !! !!!! ! !!!!!!!                   (7)’ 
 
 !"# !!!!!!!!!!! !! !!!"! ! !!!!!!!! !!!! ! ! !!!!!! !! !!!! ! !!!!!!!         (9)’ 
 
 where !!!"!  and !!!"!  are LLMs  dummies in the employment growth and price growth 
regressions respectively. Given the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function, equations (7)’ and (9)’ 
predict that the impact of schooling on employment growth and on rents growth should be the same. 
 Table 15 reports coefficients from regressions of house value, rental price and employment 
growth on the log of the percent college graduates for cities controlling for the average growth rate of 
the local labor market and the industrial orientation of the city. The first thing to note is that, in 
contrast to the theoretical prediction, the impact of human capital on the housing price measures is 
about four time as large as the impact on growth in employment. Second, if we follow the same line of 
reasoning as in the case of LLMs, then we have that !!"#! =!!!"#$%! ! ! !!!!!!! .  This means that the 
effect of the quality of life on employment (price) growth in cities within the same labor market is equal 
to !!! !!, that is to the share of money individuals spend on housing. Specifically, according to value 
of !! ! ! we have that quality of life explains either 31 or 43  percent of employment growth at the 
city level.  
 Overall, we can conclude that although productivity-led growth dominates at both LLM and 
city level, our findings support the view according to which consumption externalities play an 
important role in driving the association between human capital and subsequent employment growth in 
cities. Indeed, when !!! !! is set to 0.31, the consumption-led growth explains only the 10 percent of 
the connection education-employment growth at LLM-level; in contrast quality of life growth 
! ''!
represents the 31 percent at the city level.  If  !!! !! is fixed to 0.43 the percentages are respectively 
41 and 43.  
 
5. The North-West case: testing the reinvention hypothesis 
  
Since Unification, the North-West has represented a laboratory, a cutting-edge area, whose 
structural changes (rapid industrialization in the early twentieth century and sudden de-industrialization 
at the end of the century) have anticipated those of the rest of the country. A good part of Italy’s 
secular convergence toward more advanced countries occurred between 1950 and 1973. In this period, 
went down in history as ‘economic miracle’, Italian GDP per person income rose from 38 to 64 and 
from 50 to 88 percent of, respectively, that of the United States and United Kingdom. In that process 
of catching-up, there is little doubt that North-West economy had the leading role. This phase of great 
prosperity began to wane since the ‘70s.  
Specifically, During the Liberal age and during the decades of the economic miracle, the North-
West and the Industrial Triangle grew faster than the rest of Italy both in terms of employment and 
population (Table 3 and Table 4). The high concentration of manufacturing industries and the 
proximity to the European markets!made it possible for this region to prosper and attract workforce 
from all over Italy. But in the period 1971-2001 something changed. The empirical fact #5 suggests 
that employment grew much more sharply in the rest of Italy than in the North-West. Regression 3 in 
Table 8 indicates that during this thirty-year period, the North-East, the Center, the South and the 
Islands grew 10%, 9%, 6% and 7% more than the North-West respectively.  
How to explain this fact? Jacobs (1969) argues that cities need to costantly reinvent themselves. 
Specialization in one area may yield brief success but eventually the area decreases, or the area’s 
comparative advantage decays, and reinvention is necessary. Similarly, Glaeser et al. (1995) suggest that 
cities followed the fortunes of the industries they are involved. The typical industry’s growth follows an 
S-shaped pattern: rapid growth, followed by slower growth and then decline. In particular, the 
reinvention-city hypothesis states that schooling predicts city growth because human capital enables 
people to adapt well to structural changes and then cities survive only by adapting their economies to 
new technologies (Glaeser, 2005). This means that skills should only matter among those cities that 
have received negative shocks. 
One way to check the validity of the reinvention hypothesis for the North-West is to see 
whether skilled places shifted out of manufacturing more quicky. Then, if we will find that cities with 
high levels of education and significant manufacturing, suppose, in 1951 switched from manufacturing 
to other industries faster than high-manufacturing areas with less human capital then we will conclude 
that reinvention holds. Table 16, Panel (A), shows empirically what we have just explained above: in the 
period 1951-2001, the growth in the share of workers in manufacturing declined in those areas that 
began with high levels of education and significant manufacturing. The Industrial Triangle and, more 
generally, the North-West were surely areas with these characteristics. Panel (A) also shows that the 
employment growth is lower in those areas that started with higher level of employment and skills, 
although the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically different from zero.  
An alternative strategy to test the reinvention hypothesis is to look at the internal migration. 
The internal migration has played a crucial role in the history of Italy. Italian migration flows from the 
backward regions of South to the North were large and persistent during the 1950s and 1960s, but they 
subsequently declined. In the aftermath of WWII, Southerners and people from the, at that time, 
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underdeveloped North-East were mainly directed towards the Industrial Triangle. In that decades, huge 
masses of workers and their families moved on to the North-West in search of the best work 
opportunities and fostering the urbanization process. Between 1958 and 1963, in Milan moved about 
30 percent of southern migrants. In Genoa, population increased by 15 percent in the 1950s. In the 
period 1960-1963, Turin hosted about 300,000 immigrants from the rest of Italy (Castronovo, 1977).  
The South-North (West) migration decreased progressively from the 70's, particularly after the 
crisis of 1973. Between 1975 and 1983 the net migration flow in the North-West was negative, in 
contrast population increased in the South because of returnees and new residents. In the period 1984-
2000, mainly after 1994, migration flows from the South and the Islands resumed. These new waves of 
migrants moved towards the North-East and the Center attracted by the industrial districts, the service 
sector and by the public administration sector in Rome (Basile and Causi, 2007; Piras, 2007).32 Overall, 
the dinamics of internal migration suggests that, in the period 1970-2000, immigration was one the 
most important determinant of population and employment growth, particularly in those cities and 
LLMs outside the North-West allowing, in this way, convergence across Italian cities as shown by 
stylized facts #3 and #5.  
If we interpret immigration as a positive shock and take into account that reivention hypothesis 
requires that human capital should only matter among those areas that have received negative shocks, 
then we expect education does not matter much in immigrant cities. In other words, adaptation is not 
necessary in those areas with positive exogenous shocks, which in turn supports the reivention 
hypothesis.   
 Table 14, Panel (B) presents the results of this exercise. We collect data on the number of 
immigrants from the Popolazione e Movimento Anagrafico dei Comuni published by the ISTAT for the years 
1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001. Employment growth regression suggests that the impact of human capital 
on employment is reduced in those cities that begin tha decade with a large share of immigrants 
(interaction between education and the share of immigrants).  
 
6. Skills and Preferences: testing the gentrification hypothesis 
 
The empirical fact #7 shows that education predicts employment growth but population 
decline in our sample of cities in the period 1971-2001. Although such as evidence might seem 
puzzling, it is compatible with our findings according to which cities with more educated population 
experience more rapid growth in the quality of life. Gentrification is a shift in an urban community 
toward wealthier residents and/or businesses and increasing property values. Gentrification is typically 
the result of investment in a community by local government, community activists, or business groups, 
and can often spur economic development, attract business, lower crime rates, and have other benefits 
to a community. In addition to these potential benefits, it has been suggested that urban gentrification 
can lead to population migration, which may involve poorer and less skilled residents being displaced 
by wealthier and more educated newcomers.  
According to Ley (1978, 1980), in contemporary post-industrial cities, where white-collar 
service occupations supersede blue-collar productive occupations, emphasis is on consumption and 
amenity, not work. Patterns of consumption come to dictate patterns of production: “the values of 
consumption rather than production guide central city land use decisions ”. Gentrification is explained as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 For further details on the internal migration literature in Italy see also Brunello, Lupi and Ordine (2001), Faini et al. (1997), 
Attanasio and Padoa-Schioppa (1991) and Cannari, Nucci and Sestito (2000). 
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consequence of this new emphasis on consumption. It represents a new urban geography for a new 
social regime of consumption. 
In order to test gentrification hypothesis we need to modify the model used in section 3 and 
introduce a preference bias towards quality of life. Assume, then, that highly-educated people have 
stronger preferences for urban amenities than less-educated. 33  Given this assumption, the more 
educated will be ready to accept some wage discount and pay high rents to live in more amenable cities; 
that is they are willing to accept a (relative) lower real wage. In contrast, since the less educated are 
relatively less keen to live in that places, high rents must be compensated by higher wage otherwise a 
process of gentrification activates and as a consequence they will be found in less pleasant cities or in 
the suburbs.  
Suppose that there are two types of individuals, high skill and low skill, who receive different 
wages in the city i denoted by !!!!and  !!! !respectively. Let be the utility of a low-skilled individual 
who lives in cities i given by: 
  
     !!!! ! !!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!     (14) 
 
where ! ! !!!The utility of a highly-educated individual living in the city i will be: 
 
     !!! ! !!! !!! !!!! !!!!!!!!!     (15) 
 
 where the shifter term !!!  formalizes our assumtion according to which quality of life can 
have a differential effect on the utility of a skilled agent and then ! ! ! must hold. The spatial 
equilibrium hypothesis requires that both types of workers must be indifferent across space. Thus, 
maximization of utilities (14) and (15) together with free-mobility imply that the reservation utility for 
low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers have the following form: 
 
      
!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!      (16) 
 
     
      !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !!      (17) 
   
where ! ! !!!!!! !!!!! . Taking logs and differentiating, the spatial equilibrium conditions 
(16) and (17) imply that: 
 !"#$! !!! ! !! ! !!!!"#$!! ! ! !! ! !!"#$!! ! !!!!!  
              (18) !"#$! !! ! !! ! ! ! ! !!"#$!! ! ! !! ! !!"#$!! ! !!!  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 A similar approach is used in Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011), Glaeser et al. (2001) and Carlino and Saiz (2008).  
! '*!
where !!  and !! are specific intercepts in the wage regressions for unskilled and skilled 
individuals respectively. Given prices in the area i , equations (18) tell us that, when ! ! ! ,  
gentrification hypothesis holds if two conditions are satisfied. First, the effect of the quality of life on 
the skilled wages must be negatively stronger than the impact on unskilles wages; that is 
!"#$! !!!"#$!! !!!"#$! !!!!"#$!! . In other words, if we accept the results in section 4 according to which cities with more 
educated population experience more rapid growth in the quality of life, then high quality of life is 
expected to produce larger wage increases among the less educated.34 Second, these larger wage 
increases which low-skilled individuals receive should be low enough so as not to compensate the 
higher prices in more amenable cities. If so, less educated persons move towards suburbs and the 
gentrification process activates. 
In order to estimate equations (18), once again we exploit the SHIW. In the 1993 wave, 
intervieweds were asked to provide their own evaluation about several quality of life indicators which 
are reported in Table 17. Specifically, the household head was required, taking into account also her 
family members’ experience, to give a score from 1 (lowest satisfaction) to 10 (highest satisfaction) on 
some direct measures of quality of life  in the municipality of residence. Yet, since it is very difficult to 
identify the urban attributes that rise most in their valuation by individuals, we also use the 1995 wave, 
where intervieweds were asked to provide a judgment on their job satisfaction ranging from 1 (lowest) 
to 5 (highest). Specifically, employed individuals were required to assess the overall satisfaction and 
other aspects of their job which are reported in Table 18.35 
 Table 17 and Table 18 show the impact of the cities’ attributes and job satisfaction on the wage 
respectively.  For each quality-of-life measure we regress the log of the wage on that measure and an 
interaction term between the latter and human capital variables. If skilled individuals (college graduated 
and postgraduated) evaluate more the quality of life and as a consequence are willing to accept some 
wage discount to live in better cities or be occupied in better workplaces these interaction terms should 
be able to capture most of its essence. Our findings point out mixed results. First of all, as predicted by 
the theory and shown by the first row of Table 17, the impact of quality of life on the wage is negative. 
This is particularly true for attributes such as public transportation (column 1), local bureaucracy 
(column 3), traffic congestion (column 4), quality of schools (column 7), street cleaning (column 8), 
crime control (column 10), shopping possibilities (11) and leisure activities (column 12). Second, it 
seems that the more educated (post-graduated) are willing to accept wage cuts to avoid crime and 
traffic congestion and to live in places with a good public transportation network, good health services, 
an efficient bureaucracy and with cultural amenities such as theatres and museums. The interaction 
term on air quality and the availability of green areas also enter significantly. However, as shown by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Note that once multiple skill levels are introduced, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that, in a world of 
perfect mobility, differences in productivity across areas depend exclusively on the different quantities of skilled people , not 
on different returns to skilled people across space. This means that when ! ! !, then there should be no heterogeneity in 
the skill premium across space. In contrast, when ! ! !, as in the case here, then there will be heterogeneity in the skill 
premium across areas, but that heterogeneity will be driven by differences in the amenity shifter in the utility of individuals, 
not by differences in city-specific factors which impact the productivity of highly educated people. Therefore, under Cobb-
Douglas technology and if we accept the idea that the more educated will be ready to accept some wage discount and pay 
high rents to live in more amenable cities, this model of consumer welfare predicts that places with lower skill premia are 
not places where skilled people are less productive, but rather places where the quality of life is higher since wages are 
negatively associated with consumption amenities (Glaeser, 2008 pag. 85-86). 
35 The 1993 and 1995 special data were first used by Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2011). !
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Table 17, our results hold only at the top of education distribution and not also for the college 
graduated.  
In contrast, individuals with an university degree seem to be particularly sensitive to the quality of their 
job. Table 18 shows that skilled workers are willing to substitute their wage for better enviromental 
conditions (column 2), for a more interesting job (column 5) and for jobs that enjoy a good reputation 
(column 6). Note that all individuals are willing to accept a lower salary to avoid risks to life and health  
and to reduce the probability of being unemployed. Finally, the positive but not significant coefficients 
on the high school education may suggest that less skilled individuals are not compensated enough to 
pay the higher housing prices to live in more pleasant places.  
 The major caveat of this exercise is the lack of suitable data. Testing the gentrification 
hypothesis would require data at the neighborhood-level within the city rather than aggregate data at 
the city-level. However our interpretation is that these results represent a very preliminary evidence that 
a process of gentrification may have occurred. We believe that disaggregated data and additional 
research is required to better clarify this point.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 Our research has examined the role of human capital in shaping the urban structure in Italy. 
The concentration of graduates is positively related to the employment growth in the local labour 
markets and cities.  At the mean and all else equal, the employment growth is about 0.8 percent greater 
in a LLM that starts the decade with a 10 percent more of college-educated with respect to another 
LLM. We distinguished between two channels of local development, production-led growth and quality 
of life-led growth. Human capital -or education- operates mainly by increasing local productivity; 
however consumption externalities play an important role in driving the success of cities. From a public 
policy standpoint, as human beings are increasingly keen towards physical environment and as the 
demand for living in cities goes beyond urban wage, it seems that local administrators should foster 
quality of life of their economies. Consumption opportunities and a better working environment will 
become more and more critical in determining the attractiveness of urban areas.  
 Our results inform other two findings. First, we find that human capital help cities to absorb 
adverse shocks and reinvent themselves. The case of the North-West is striking. The growth in the 
share of workers in manufacturing declined in those areas that began with high levels of education and 
significant manufacturing.  
Second, we also indicate that a process of gentrification may have been activated in Italy in the 
period 1971-2001. Introducing preferences heterogeneity towards quality of life, we assume that highly-
educated people have stronger preferences for urban amenities than less-educated. As a consequence 
the more educated will be ready to accept some wage discount and pay high rents to live in more 
pleasant cities.  In contrast, since the less educated have weaker preferences to live in that places, high 
rents must be compensated by higher wage otherwise a process of gentrification activates. This paper 
argues that public transportation, local bureaucracy, traffic congestion, quality of schools, street 
cleaning, crime control and leisure activities are particularly critical urban amenities. Interesting jobs and  
jobs that enjoy a good reputation also appear to important in attracting a highly educated workforce. 
Although some points need further discussion, we hope our research draws more attention and 
interest in investigate the role of urban areas on our well-being since our life hinges more and more on 
the knowledge of how they work and how they should be managed.  
! (#!
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Growth in Italian Cities 
 
Figures and Tables. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure shows 369 cities out of 442 (our entire sample) which belonged to the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. Therefore are excluded those cities 
that belonged to the Papal State and the region of ‘Triveneto’; the latter at the time under the control of the Austrian Empire. Sources: 
Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT.  
 
 
Table 1. 
Population Growth Correlations. 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4) 
            Correlation    
  Correlation  with lagged   Correlation  Correlation  
with lagged  population   with initial  with initial 
population  change    log    log pop 
  Decades change   (50,000+)   population  (50,000+) 
1861-1871        -0.0151  0.0512 
1871-1881 0.0830   0.1823 (18)   -0.0281  0.4127 
1881-1901 0.3690   0.8396 (25)   0.0308   0.5463 
1901-1911 0.3539   0.5971 (28)   0.0252               0.2582 
1911-1921  0.0632             -0.5831 (37)   0.1893   0.2827 
1921-1931 0.1464   0.2278 (46)   -0.0520  0.2235 
1931-1951 0.2808   0.2820 (60)   0.0306   0.2772 
1951-1961 0.3713   0.4772 (61)   0.1971   -0.0497 
1961-1971 0.6404   0.1787 (82)   0.2899              -0.0946 
1971-1981 0.2499   -0.0061 (95)   -0.0053             -0.1780 
1981-1991 -0.3528  -0.8624 (110)   -0.0994             -0.4469 
1991-2001 0.2590   0.6053 (128)   -0.0893             -0.1546 
The Population Censuses in 1891 and in 1941 were not carried out because of financial difficulties in the first case and WWII in the 
second one. Numbers in brackets denote the number of observations, that is those cities that had al least 50,000 inhabitants at the start of 
the lagged decade. Sources: Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Figure shows the slightly negative correlation of population growth for those cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 1861. The 
number of observations is 18. Sources: Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure shows the correlation of population growth for those cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in 1861. The number of observations 
is 44. Sources: Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. 
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Table 2. 
Population Growth and Geography. 
    (1)     (2)     
    Correlation  with      Correlation with   
    Initial log population   proximity to    
Decades    in the North-West   Industrial Triangle          
1861-1871   0.0608     0.0511     
1871-1881   0.0792     0.1564    
1881-1901   0.0851     0.1918     
1901-1911   0.0561      0.2853     
1911-1921    0.0212     0.1631      
1921-1931   0.0502     0.2303    
1931-1951   -0.0554    0.2939   
1951-1961   0.1086     0.4342     
1961-1971   0.1761     0.2371               
1971-1981   -0.2223    0.0106     
1981-1991   -0.4296    -0.1372    
1991-2001   -0.4090    -0.0250    
Sources: Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure shows the cities that are within 100 kilometers of the Industrial Triangle centroid. Sources: Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. 
Georeferenced data are from ISTAT. We use the software R for the calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
! ""!
Table 3. 
Growth Population Regressions and Geography. 
A.       Population growth     
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  1861-1881 1881-1901 1901-1921 1921-1951 1951-1971 1971-2001 
 
Ind. Tria. 0.0004  0.002  0.003  0.006  0.008  0.001 
  (0.0005) (0.0006)** (0.0007)*** (0.0013)*** (0.002)*** (0.0006)* 
Log pop 1861 0.021   
  (0.011)*   
Log pop 1881   0.046 
    (0.010)*** 
Log pop 1901     0.040 
      (0.014)*** 
Log pop 1921       0.011 
        (0.022) 
Log pop 1951         0.010 
          (0.035) 
Log pop 1971           -0.050 
            (0.013)*** 
 
Obs  69  70  70  70  70  70 
R-squared 0.057  0.125  0.170  0.198  0.103  0.268 
 
B. 
 
Log pop 1861 0.002   
  (0.006)   
Log pop 1881   0.004 
    (0.007) 
Log pop 1901     0.016 
      (0.006)** 
Log pop 1921       -0.006 
        (0.018) 
Log pop 1951         0.074 
          (0.014)*** 
Log pop 1971           -0.019 
            (0.009)** 
Constant 0.128  0.107  0.037  0.336  -0.285  0.185 
  (0.053)** (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.177)*  (0.160)*  (0.095)* 
North-East -0.067  -0.038  0.024  -0.093  -0.322  0.053 
  (0.017)*** (0.019)** (0.022)  (0.034)*** (0.054)*** (0.028)* 
Center  -0&014  0.027  -0.026  0.004  -0.285  0.103 
  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.051)  (0.061)*** (0.027)*** 
South   0.018  0.011  -0.044  0.063  -0.327  0.148 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)** (0.040)  (0.056)*** (0.030)*** 
Islands  0.065  0.061  -0.004  -0.053  -0.326  0.124 
  (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.028)  (0.061)  (0.057)*** (0.034)*** 
 
Obs  369  425  425  442  422  442 
R-squared 0.060  0.043  0.045  0.028  0.160  0.072 
Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: 
Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. Georeferenced data are from ISTAT.  
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Table 4. 
Growth Employment Regressions and Geography. 
A.       Employment growth     
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
   1911-1927  1927-1951  1951-1971  1971-2001 
 
Ind. Tria.  0.001   0.001   0.006   0.002 
   (0.0005)**  (0.0018)  (0.003)**  (0.0005)*** 
Log emp 1911  -0.070     
   (0.063)    
Log emp 1927     0.035   
      (0.022)   
Log emp 1951        -0.124 
         (0.056)* * 
Log emp 1971           -0.038 
            (0.012)*** 
 
Obs   28   28   70   70  
R-squared  0.051   0.057   0.115   0.233  
 
B. 
 
Log emp 1911  -0.170     
   (0.050)***    
Log emp 1927     -0.050   
      (0.023)**  
Log emp 1951        -0.025 
         (0.017) 
Log emp 1971           -0.031 
            (0.013)** 
Constant  2.422   0.720   0.820   0.633 
              (0.463)***  (0.229)***  (0.178)***  (0.122)*** 
Nort-East  -0.065   0.004   -0.014   0.256 
   (0.094)   (0.066)   (0.088)   (0.044)*** 
Center   -0.156   -0.110   0.055   0.330 
   (0.101)   (0.066)*   (0.091)   (0.040)*** 
South   -0.078   -0.042   -0.110   0.475 
   (0.134)   (0.064)   (0.088)   (0.045)*** 
Islands   -0.035   -0.095   -0.157   0.445 
   (0.174)   (0.070)   (0.097)   (0.056)*** 
 
Obs   219   228   442   422  
R-squared  0.200   0.056   0.020   0.256 
Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: 
Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1911-2001, ISTAT. Georeferenced data are from ISTAT. 
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Figure 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Population Censuses 1951-2001 and Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1951-2001, ISTAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2  
 
Sources: Population Censuses 1951-2001 and Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1951-2001, ISTAT. 
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Table 5. 
Growth and Manufacturing. 
   Cities        LLMs   
 
  (1)   (2)    (3)   (4) 
  Pop growth  Emp growth   Pop growth  Emp growth 
  Correlation  Correlation   Correlation  Correlation  
With share  With share   With share  With share 
 In manufct  In manufct   In manufct  In manufac 
  Decades In 1951  In 1951   In 1971  In 1971 
A. 
1951-1961 0.1627   0.0479     
1961-1971 0.4509   0.0141                
1971-1981 0.0393             -0.3109    -0.0178  -0.5112 
1981-1991      -0.1000                        -0.1421    -0.0742  -0.2955 
1991-2001 0.0030   0.0468     0.2862     0.1933      
The LLMs’ boundaries are those defined by the ISTAT in 1997. Data at LLM level are available from 1971 onward. Sources: Population 
Censuses 1951-2001 and Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1951-2001, ISTAT.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. 
Growth and Education. 
   Cities        LLMs   
 
  (1)   (2)      (3)   
  Pop growth  Emp growth     Pop growth          
  Correlation  Correlation     Correlation          
With   With      With   
lagged   lagged      lagged    
  Decades grads share  grads share     grads share          
A. 
1951-1961 0.2330   0.0773  
1961-1971 0.0957              -0.0518 
1971-1981      -0.1801   0.0390      0.0102   
1981-1991 0.5950   0.0313      -0.1419  
1991-2001      -0.2915   0.1321      -0.0806     
B.  (50, 000+)  (50, 000+)      (100,000+)          
 
1951-1961 0.3376 (81)            -0.0930     
1961-1971 0.0574 (94)  0.0822    
1971-1981      -0.2251 (110)  0.1509      -0.2030 (106)  
1981-1991      -0.3881 (128)  0.0537      -0.3869 (108)   
1991-2001      -0.3045 (135)  -0.1643     -0.1766 (113)   
The LLMs’ boundaries are those defined by ISTAT in 1997. Data at LLM level are available from 1971 onward. Numbers in brackets 
denote the number of observations, that is those cities (LLMs) that had al least 50,000 (100,000) inhabitants in the initial year. Sources: 
Population Censuses 1951-2001 and Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1951-2001, ISTAT.  
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Table 7. 
! ! ! ! ! !LLM Growth and Human Capital !! !! !! !! !! !!
!!!!!! Ten-year  employment growth: log(employmenti,t/employmenti,t-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
! ! ! ! ! ! !Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.087 0.067 0.064 0.026 0.124  
!
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.041) (0.050)***  
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.066 -0.444 -0.345 -0.814 -0.739 -0.429 
!
(0.007)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.037)*** (0.091)*** (0.044)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10  0.105 0.121 0.042 -0.003 0.105 
!
 (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.025)* (0.044) (0.019)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10  0.041 0.032 0.049 -0.016 0.047 
!
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025)* 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10  0.076 0.011 -0.019 -0.019 0.070 
!
 (0.037)** (0.038) (0.046) (0.081) (0.037)* 
Log (% Share Manu), t-10*1981 Dummy   -0.141    
!
  (0.029)***    
Log (% Share Manu), t-10*1991 Dummy   -0.054    
!
  (0.013)***    
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951      0.039 
      (0.011)*** 
       
North-East   0.092    
!
  (0.013)***    
Center    0.041    
!
  (0.013)***    
South   -0.013    
!
  (0.025)    
Islands   -0.038    
!
  (0.032)    
       
!       
       
Lagged Age Distribution no yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes  yes              yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects no yes no              no  no yes 
LLM fixed effects no no no              yes yes no 
       
Observations 831 831 831 831 340 816 
Local Labor Markets 277 277 277 277 120 272 
R-squared 0.713 0.826 0.820 0.948 0.962 0.827 
Estimation Method OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Table shows the impact of the log of the percent college graduates on employment growth, measured as the log change of 
employment between census waves. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within 
local labor markets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 8. 
City Growth and Human Capital. 
!!!!!!!Ten-year  employment growth: log(employmenti,t/employmenti,t-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
!
        
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.000 0.108   0.124 
!
(0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.023) (0.048)***   (0.042)*** 
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.047 -0.257 -0.205 -0.874 -0.766 -0.267 -0.308 -0.074 
!
(0.007)*** (0.041)*** (0.037)*** (0.058)*** (0.085)*** (0.040)*** (0.045)*** (0.012)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10  0.072 0.099 0.021 -0.001 0.084 0.042 0.074 
!
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.036) (0.035) (0.023)*** (0.022)* (0.020)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10  -0.026 -0.028 -0.006 -0.016 -0.021 0.030 0.046 
!
 (0.014)* (0.014)** (0.010) (0.045) (0.013) (0.035) (0.035) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10  0.107 0.081 0.011 -0.041 0.114 0.141 0.279 
!
 (0.036)*** (0.034)** (0.041) (0.074) (0.035)*** (0.042)*** (0.033)*** 
Log (% Share Manu), t-10*1981 Dummy   -0.105      
!
  (0.025)***      
Log (% Share Manu), t-10*1991 Dummy   -0.068      
!
  (0.021)***      
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951      0.084   
      (0.017)***   
Log (% Share of High School Enrollment), 1931       0.049  
 
      (0.012)***  
       
!
 
North-East   0.097      
!
  (0.017)***      
Center    0.091      
!
  (0.016)***      
South   0.068      
!
  (0.031)**      
Islands   0.070      
!
  (0.032)**      
       
! !Lagged Age Distribution no   yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Year fixed effects yes   yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects no   yes no no no yes yes yes 
LLM fixed effects no   no no yes yes no no no 
         
Observations 1326 1326 1326 1326 399 1303 483 483 
Cities 442 442 442 442 145 438 161 161 
R-squared 0.546 0.648 0.657 0.878 0.936 0.654 0.848 0.841 
Estimation Method OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
Table shows the impact of the log of the percent college graduates on employment growth, measured as the log change of employment between census 
waves. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within local labor markets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 9. 
Heterogeneity in Human Capital and LLMs Growth          
       Ten-year  employment growth: log(employment,t/employmenti,t-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
     
    Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.131 0.120 0.191 0.136 
 
(0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** 
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.065 -0.445 -0.026 -0.420 
 
(0.007)*** (0.047)*** (0.007)*** (0.048)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10  0.112  0.087 
 
 (0.019)***  (0.020)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10  0.031  0.043 
 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024)* 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10  0.093  0.033 
  (0.037)***  (0.038) 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10*1981 Dummy -0.070 -0.088   
 
(0.028)** (0.020)***   
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10*1991 Dummy -0.047 -0.059   
 
(0.022)** (0.020)***   
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10*South Dummy   -0.216 -0.084 
 
  (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
 
    
Lagged Age Distribution no yes no yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects no yes no yes 
LLM fixed effects no no no no 
     
Observations 831 831 831 831 
LLMs 277 277 277 277 
R-squared 0.716 0.829 0.773 0.828 
Estimation model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Table shows the time-variant (col. 1 and 2) and space-variant (col. 3 and 4) impact of the log of the percent college graduates 
on employment growth at the LLM level.  Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation 
within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heterogeneity in Human Capital and City Growth         
       Ten-year  employment growth: log(employment,t/employmenti,t-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
     
    Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.118 0.145 0.081 0.085 
 
(0.020)*** (0.024)***  (0.016)*** (0.019)*** 
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.048 -0.258 -0.036 -0.257 
 
(0.007)*** (0.038)*** (0.007)*** (0.040)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10  0.098  0.061 
 
 (0.022)***  (0.023)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10  -0.007  -0.029 
 
 (0.013)  (0.014)** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10  0.130  0.093 
  (0.033)***  (0.036)** 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10*1981 Dummy -0.067 -0.128   
 
(0.022)*** (0.019)***   
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10*1991 Dummy -0.081 -0.090   
 
(0.022)*** (0.017)***   
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10* South Dummy   -0.096 -0.053 
 
  (0.018)*** (0.020)*** 
  
   
Lagged Age Distribution no yes no yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects no yes no yes 
LLM fixed effects no no no no 
 
    Observations 1326 1326 1326 1311 
LLMs 442 442 442 441 
R-squared 0.552 0.658 0.566 0.650 
Estimation model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Table shows the time-variant (col. 1 and 2) and space-variant (col. 3 and 4) impact of the log of the percent college graduates 
on employment growth at the city level.  Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation 
within cities. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 11. 
Highest and lowest house price, rental price and wage fixed effects, 1986, 1991 and 2000. City-level. 
A. House value fixed effects   
 
Highest   1986     1991             2000 
Rapallo, GE  (0.45)  Siena, SI  (0.97)  Parcines, BZ (0.51) 
  Siena, SI  (0.34)  Sestri L., GE  (0.47)  Siena, SI (0.38) 
  Roma, RM  (0.32)  Firenze, FI  (0.45)  Bolzano, BZ (0.29) 
  Firenze, FI  (0.31)  Roma, RM  (0.41)  Merano, BZ (0.29) 
  Tivoli, RM  (0.30)  Bolzano, BZ  (0.37)  Bressanone, BZ (0.23) 
 
 
Lowest   S. Giovanni F., CS (-0.71)  Licata, AG  (-0.97)  Cervinara, AV (-1.24) 
  Modica, RG  (-0.75)  Collepasso, LE  (-0.98)  Acri, CS (-1.25) 
  Bolotana, NU  (-0.82)  Palagonia, CT  (-0.99)  S.Giovanni F, CS (-1.33) 
  Villamassargia, CI (-1.01)  Boscoreale, NA  (-1.00)  Collepasso, LE (-1.37) 
  Castrofilippo, AG (-1.15)  Barrafranca, EN  (-1.02)  Barrafranca, EN(-1.45) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B. Rental price fixed effects 
 
Highest   1986     1991             2000 
  Bari, BA  (0.57)  Siena, SI  (0.83)  Albenga, SV (0.57) 
  Cremona, CR  (0.27)  Como, CO  (0.76)  Bolzano, BZ (0.25) 
  Sassari, SS  (0.26)  Livorno, LI  (0.69)  Siena, SI (0.21) 
  Formia, LT  (0.24)  Parma, PR  (0.56)  Monticelli O., PC (0.18) 
  Piacenza, PC  (0.18)  Monteroni d’Arbia, SI (0.48)  Firenze, FI (0.15) 
 
 
Lowest  Castrofilippo, AG (-1.05)  Palagonia, CT  (-0.74)  Marsala, TP (-1.27) 
  Enemonzo, UD  (-1.05)  Cervinara, AV  (-0.76)  Forenza, PZ (-1.29) 
  Galatina, LE  (-1.06)  S. Giovanni F., CS (-0.77)  Lizzano, TA (-1.30) 
  Sannicola, LE  (-1.07)  Acri, CS  (-0.82)  S.Giovanni F, CS (-1.43) 
  S. Giovanni F., CS (-1.14)  Collepasso, LE  (-0.82)  Barrafranca, EN (-1.51) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
C. Hourly wage fixed effects 
 
Highest   1987     1991             2000 
  Ospedaletti, MI  (0.30)  Como, CO  (0.48)  Imperia, IM (0.12) 
  Nembro, BG  (0.24)  Reggello, FI  (0.31)  Piacenza, PC (0.13) 
  Rho, MI  (0.20)  Sassari, SS  (0.25)  Castellano, RE (0.15) 
  Molinella, BO  (0.20)  Carbonia, CI  (0.24)  Padova, PD (0.16) 
  Varese, VA  (0.18)  Sondrio, SO  (0.24)  Riofreddo, RM (0.22)  
 
Lowest  San Giustino, PG (-0.32)  Matera, MT  (-0.24)  Pagani, SA (-0.44) 
  Manfredonia, FG (-0.32)  Alghero, SS  (-0.25)  Scafati, SA (-0.45) 
  Mirandola, MO  (-0.33)  Manfredonia, FG (-0.26)  Gravina P., BA (-0.49)  
  Trapani, TP  (-0.36)  Lizzano, TA  (-0.28)  Mazzara V., TP (-0.51) 
  Villamassargia, CI (-0.39)  Terrasini, PA  (-0.30)  Marsala, TP (-0.69) 
House value fixed effects are the coefficients on city dummies in cross-section regressions of the log value of the dwellings on these 
dummies and controls for observable housing characteristics. Rental price fixed effects are the coefficients on city dummies in cross-
section regressions of the log of the annual rent of the dwellings on these dummies and controls for observable housing characteristics. 
Hourly wage fixed effects are the coefficients on city dummies in cross-section regressions of the log of the hourly wage on these dummies 
and controls for observable worker features. Sources: see text. 
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Table 12. 
Human capital, House Value and Wage Growth. LLM level 
(1)  (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
                   PANEL A. Dependent variable is growth in House value   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10  0.141  0.134  0.055  0.154 
      (0.044)*** (0.039)*** (0.081)  (0.094)* 
Log (House value), t-10    -0.669  -0.895  -1.398  -1.446   -0.911 
      (0.075)*** (0.069)*** (0.094)*** (0.082)*** (0.070) 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                      0.084 
              (0.025)*** 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
            
                   PANEL B. Dependent variable is growth in Rental price   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10  0.330  0.359  0.515  0.824 
      (0.084)*** (0.075)*** (0.256)** (0.116)***  
Log (Rental price), t-10    -0.809  -0.956  -1.309  -1.308  -0.969 
      (0.063)*** (0.055)*** (0.095)*** (0.107)*** (0.055) 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                      0.222 
                           (0.052)*** 
________________________________________________________________________________________________  
            
                   PANEL C. Dependent variable is growth in Wage   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10  0.034  0.029  -0.255  -0.184   
      (0.020)*  (0.041)  (0.151)*  (0.181) 
Log (Wage), t-10     -0.873  -0.974  -1.539  -1.478  -0.969 
      (0.072)*** (0.077)*** (0.089)*** (0.120)*** (0.077) 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                      0.028 
                           (0.022) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Year fixed effects              yes   yes  yes  yes  yes 
Region fixed effects              no   yes  no  no  yes  
LLM fixed effects              no   no  yes  yes  no 
Other variables in Table 7              no   yes  yes  yes  yes 
 
Observations              330   330  330  187  330 
LLMs              197   197  197  103  197 
Table shows the impact of the log of the percent college graduates on the dependent variable in the Local Labour Market. House value, 
rent and wage growth are measured as the log change in LLM fixed effects obtained as described in section 4.2 in the text. Standard errors, 
reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 13. 
Human capital, House Value and Wage Growth. City level 
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)               (5)  
  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
                   PANEL A. Dependent variable is growth in House value   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.163                0.203  0.098         0.233   
     (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.132)            (0.137)*   
Log (House value), t-10   -1.127  -1.440  -2.347         -2.202    -1.405   
     (0.133)*** (0.123)*** (0.133)***      (0.124)*** (0.125)*** 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                     0.131 
             (0.038)*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
            
                   PANEL B. Dependent variable is growth in Rental price   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.226  0.269  0.243  0.079  
     (0.048)*** (0.053)*** (0.149)*  (0.094)  
Log (Rental price), t-10   -1.420  -1.545  -2.290  -2.287  -1.527 
     (0.122)*** (0.100)*** (0.105)*** (0.081)  (0.099) 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                     0.189 
             (0.041)*** 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________  
            
                   PANEL C. Dependent variable is growth in Wage   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.047  0.043  0.047  0.063   
     (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.073)  (0.069) 
Log (Wage), t-10    -1.060  -1.144  -1.653  -1.720  -1.144   
     (0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.081)*** (0.126)*** (0.067)*** 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951                     0.028 
             (0.013)** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Year fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Region fixed effects no  yes  no  no  yes 
City fixed effects no  no  yes  yes  no 
Other variables in Table 8 no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 
Observations 413  413  413  212  413           
Cities 269  269  269  118  269 
Table shows the impact of the log of the percent college graduates on the dependent variable at city-level. House value, rent and wage 
growth are measured as the log change in city fixed effects obtained as described in section 4.2 in the text. Standard errors, reported in 
parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
Sources: see text. 
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Table 14. 
Human Capital and Growth: unraveling between productivity and quality of life growth, LLM 
Share of spending  Coeff.  Impact of human capital on growth in  Share of growth due to  
on non-traded  used          growth in quality of life. 
goods     Productivity  Quality of life      !! ! !!     !!    !!     !!!!!!!! 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0.31         !!"#$   0.05   0.004     0.10  
 
0.43   !!"#$  0.05   0.017     0.37 
 
0.31   !!"#$%  0.04   0.011     0.27 
 
0.43   !!"#$%  0.04   0.023     0.41 
Calculations of the parameters  !! and  !! are based on the formulas (11) and (12). All calculations use !!"#= 0.08,  !!"#$ != 0.03 and  !!"#$% = 0.10. Theoretically, the values of !! and !! should not change when either !!"#$ or !!"#$% are used to determine their values. 
Empirically this occurs because our calibration does not satisfies perfectly the relationship  !!"#$% = !!!"# ! !!!"#$ . The estimates of the 
share of spending on non-traded good are obtained by using the methods described in the appendix B.3. Sources: see text. 
 
 
 
Table 15. 
Growth and Human Capital: within  local labour market regressions.  
         Dependent variable is growth in… 
       
 Employment  House Value  Rental price 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10  0.042   0.160   0.180   
       (0.020)**  (0.060)***  (0.070)*** 
Log (Employment), t-10                 -0.590    
       (0.013)*** 
Log (House value), t-10        -1.931    
          (0.162)***   
Log (Rental price), t-10           -2.034 
             (0.132)*** 
 
Year fixed effects     yes   yes   yes   
LLM fixed effects     yes   yes   yes   
Other variables in Table 8    yes   yes   yes 
 
Observations      1326   413   413   
Cities       442   269   269 
R-squared      0.695   0.767   0.895   
Table shows the impact of the log of the percent college graduates on the dependent variable at city-level controlling for the average 
growth rate of the local labor market to which the city belongs. House value and rent growth are measured as the log change in city fixed 
effects obtained as described in section 4.2. Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. 
***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table 16. 
The North-West case: testing the reinvention hypothesis 
PANEL A       Dependent variable is growth in… 
       
Share of  
manufacturing     Employment 
1951-2001      1951-2001   
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), 1951  -0.031      0.002 
      (0.097)      (0.012)    
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), 1951 -0.321      -0.016   
       (0.096)***     (0.012)   
Log (Employment), 1951    -0.006      -0.018   
       (0.031)      (0.005)***   
Log (% Share Manu)*(% Share of Grads),1951 -0.088    
      (0.032)***   
Log (Employment)*(% Share of Grads),1951        -0.001 
            (0.001) 
 
 
Observations     438      438    
R-squared     0.180      0.168  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
PANEL B       Dependent variable is ten-year growth in… 
 
      Employment  House Values  Rents  Wages 
      _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10  0.053   0.295   0.438  0.031 
      (0.024)**  (0.059)***  (0.067)*** (0.019) 
Log (Employment), t-10    -0.026 
      (0.007)*** 
Log (House value), t-10       -1.515 
         (0.117)*** 
Log (Rental price), t-10          -1.634 
            (0.092)***   
Log (Wage), t-10             -1.146 
              (0.067)*** 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10 0.079   0.028   0.019  -0.001 
      (0.024)***  (0.053)   (0.068)  (0.029) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10  -0.014   -0.070   -0.176  -0.019 
      (0.014)   (0.129)   (0.114)  (0.052) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10  0.274   -0.114   0.029  -0.036 
      (0.036)***  (0.078)   (0.105)  (0.035)  
Log (% Share of Immigrants), t-10   0.015   0.179   0.435  -0.100 
      (0.017)   (0.097)*   (0.136)*** (0.027) 
Log (% Share of Imms)*(% Share of Grads), t-10 -0.027   -0.102   -0.196  0.016 
      (0.015)*   (0.046)**  (0.051)*** (0.015) 
 
Year fixed effects     yes   yes   yes  yes  
Region fixed effects    yes   yes   yes  yes 
 
Observations     1326   413   413  413 
Cities       442   269   269  269 
R-Squared     0.624   0.615   0.694  0.647  
House value, rent and wage growth are measured as the log change in city fixed effects obtained as described in section 4.2. Standard 
errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level respectively. Sources: see text..
!
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      T
able 17. 
E
ffect of quality of life on the w
age: interactions of quality of life variables and hum
an capital. 
D
ependent variable is log (W
age) 
 Independent variable is:  
  
(1) 
 
          (2) 
 
(3) 
 
          (4) 
 
 (5) 
 
    (6) 
 
 
 
Public transportation 
H
ealth services 
   Local bureaucracy 
T
raffic congestion          A
ir quality            
N
ursery   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
-0.014 
 
      0.004 
 
0.020 
 
        -0.016 
              -0.001 
 
0.003 
  
 
 
(0.0075)* 
     (0.011) 
 
(0.011)*                       (0.008)** 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.017) 
 Interaction w
ith hum
an 
capital dum
m
ies: 
 H
igh school 
 
 
0.022 
 
       0.040 
 
0.022 
 
        0.023 
 
0.009 
 
0.006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
      (0.020)** 
 
(0.022) 
 
       (0.013)* 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.029) 
 
 
C
ollege 
 
 
 
0.070 
 
      -0.004 
 
0.031 
 
        0.023 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.048)                        (0.038) 
 
(0.047) 
 
       (0.033) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.050) 
Postgraduate education 
 
-0.093 
 
      -0.204 
 
-0.267 
 
       -0.103 
 
-0.136 
 
0.010 
 
 
 
 
(0.051)**  
      (0.095)** 
 
(0.061)***                    (0.061)* 
 
(0.079)*  
(0.131) 
 
 
  A
dditional controls 
 
yes                               yes  
 
yes 
 
       yes 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
O
bservations 
 
 
2757                            2944 
 
2966 
 
       2995 
 
3000 
 
2174 
R
-squared 
 
 
0.316 
0.350 
 
0.319 
 
       0.310 
 
0.348 
 
0.324 
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       T
able 17.  
C
ontinued 
 D
ependent variable is log (W
age) 
 Independent variable is:  
  
(7) 
 
          (8) 
 
(9) 
 
          (10) 
 
 (11) 
 
                 (12) 
 
 
 
Prim
ary and secondary 
Street cleaning 
       G
reen A
reas  
Safety and crim
e   Shopping possibilities 
        Leisure activities 
 
 
 
 
           School                                                                                                   control 
 
 
 
(cinem
as, theatres, m
useum
s,..) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
-0.036 
 
      -0.015 
 
-0.010 
 
         -0.019 
 
-0.020 
 
              -0.017 
  
 
 
(0.018)**  
      (0.008)* 
 
(0.010) 
 
        (0.010)* 
 
(0.011)*  
              (0.008)** 
 Interaction w
ith hum
an 
capital dum
m
ies: 
 H
igh school 
 
 
0.017 
 
       0.022 
 
0.017 
 
        0.011 
 
0.009 
 
               0.012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.033) 
 
      (0.021) 
 
(0.019) 
 
       (0.020) 
 
(0.026) 
 
              (0.017) 
 
 
C
ollege 
 
 
 
 0.028 
 
       0.031 
 
0.017 
 
        0.011 
 
0.033 
 
              -0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.053)                        (0.043) 
 
(0.035) 
 
       (0.041) 
 
(0.070) 
 
              (0.033) 
Postgraduate education 
 
0.130 
 
       -0.052 
 
-0.166 
 
       -0.276 
 
-0.139 
 
              -0.199 
 
 
 
 
(0.136) 
 
      (0.105) 
 
(0.091)*  
       (0.097)*** 
 
(0.146) 
 
              (0.103)**  
 
  A
dditional controls 
 
yes                               yes  
 
yes 
 
       yes 
 
 
yes 
 
                yes 
O
bservations 
 
 
2421                            2947 
 
2947 
 
       2922 
 
2953 
 
                2899 
R
-squared 
 
 
0.350 
0.354 
 
0.353 
 
       0.349 
 
0.353 
 
                0.355 
T
able show
s the effect of several indexes of quality of life on the (log) w
age and the cross-effect of these indexe w
ith hum
an capital. T
he indipendent variables are the interview
eds’ 
subjective evaluations (1 for low
est satisfaction and 10 for highest satisfaction) for these city’s attributes. A
dditional controls are: the variable !!!!!"#$!!   w
here !!!
 is set to 
0.31 and observable w
orker characteristics. T
he latter include: age, age squared and civil status. R
obust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 
1%
, 5%
, 10%
 level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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      T
able 18. 
E
ffect of job satisfaction on the w
age: interactions of job satisfaction indicators and hum
an capital. 
D
ependent variable is log (W
age) 
 Independent variable is:  
  
          (1) 
 
          (2) 
 
    (3) 
 
   (4) 
 
  (5) 
 
 (6) 
 
    (7) 
 
 
 
 
Job satisfaction 
 
E
nvirom
ental 
 
D
anger to 
 E
ffort 
       Interestingness       C
onsidertion 
C
oncern about 
 
 
 
 
 
(O
verall Index) 
 
conditions 
 
life or health 
 R
equired 
 
           by others 
 
losing your  
 
 
 
 
 
                         (physics and social)  
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
em
ploym
ent 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0.047 
 
      
0.074 
 
   
-0.025 
 
 0.033 
               0.067 
 
0.065 
 
-0.066 
 
 
                                                        (0.028)* 
    
             (0.032)**  
 
(0.012)**  
(0.035) 
 
(0.037)*  
(0.032)**  
(0.016)*** 
 Interaction w
ith hum
an 
capital dum
m
ies: 
 H
igh school 
 
 
0.053 
 
        
0.012 
 
 
0.011 
 
 0.006 
 
0.018 
 
0.015 
 
0.029 
 
 
 
 
(0.025)**  
       
(0.042) 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.021) 
C
ollege 
 
 
 
-0.102 
 
       
-0.142 
 
 
0.028 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.114 
 
0.020 
 
 
 
 
(0.059)*                              (0.058)**  
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.074)*** 
(0.043)*  
(0.058)**  
(0.031) 
Postgraduate education 
 
-0.140 
 
              -0.324 
 
 
-0.246 
 
-1.024 
 
0.062 
 
-0.220 
 
0.127 
 
 
 
 
(0.178) 
                     
(0.188)*  
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.615)*  
(0.347) 
 
(0.077)*** 
(0.115) 
 A
dditional controls 
 
yes                                
yes 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
O
bservations 
 
 
3058                                   3054 
 
 
3059 
 
3060 
 
3059 
 
3048 
 
3054 
R
-squared 
 
 
0.460                                  0.460 
 
 
0.456 
 
0.458 
 
0.460 
 
0.457 
 
0.459 
T
able show
s the effect of several indexes of quality of job on the (log) w
age and the cross-effect of these indicators w
ith hum
an capital. T
he indipendent variables are the interview
eds’ 
subjective evaluations (1 for low
est satisfaction and 5 for highest satisfaction) for job satisfaction indicators. A
dditional controls are: the variable !!!!!"#$!!   w
here !!!
 is set 
to 0.31 and observable w
orker characteristics. T
he latter include: age, age squared and civil status. R
obust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** , * denote significance at 
the 1%
, 5%
, 10%
 level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Growth in Italian Cities 
Appendices. 
 
Appendix A. Employment growth-education relationship: Robustness checks. 
 
Table A.1 
City Growth and Human Capital: Robustness tests. 
       Ten-year  employment growth: log(employment,t/employment,t-10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.061 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.104** 0.152*** 0.235*** 
!
(0.018)*** (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.033) (0.048) (0.042) (0.051) 
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.261 -0.255*** -0.209*** -0.267*** -0.755*** -0.789*** -0.760*** -0.442*** 
!
(0.044)*** (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.074) (0.100) (0.088) (0.052) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10 0.076 0.073*** 0.036 0.074*** 0.013 -0.032 0.015 0.038** 
!
(0.024)*** (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.019) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10 -0.016 -0.026* -0.028** -0.029** -0.008 -0.040 0.001 -0.037 
!
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.036) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10 0.099 0.112*** 0.073** 0.104*** -0.021 -0.029 -0.061 0.064 
 (0.038)** (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.065) (0.090) (0.074) (0.040) 
Log (Restaurants and Hotels per 100 inhabitants), t-10 -0.022        
!
(0.019)        
Log (Museums and Ricreational Estab. per 100 inh.), t-10 0.012        
!
(0.010)        
Log (Membership Organizations per 100 inhabitants), t-10 -0.002        
!
(0.011)        
Log(% Electoral turnout), t-10 
!
0.002       
! !
(0.014)       
Log (Population), t-10 
!
  0.223     
! !
  (0.157)     
! !
       
Lagged Age Distribution yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-Region fixed effects no no yes no no no no no 
City fixed effects no no no no yes yes yes no 
 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Observations 1233 1326 1326 1326 456 325 384 483 
Cities 436 442 442 442 164 120 128 161 
R-squared 0.668 0.648 0.690 0.649 0.238 0.268 0.248 0.854 
Estimation model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
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Table A.2 
       LLM Growth and Human Capital: Robustness tests.             
       Ten-year  employment growth: log(employmenti,t/employmenti,t-10) 
 
 
       
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       Log (% Share of College Graduates), t-10 0.044 0.069*** 0.049** 0.065*** 0.117*** 0.145*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.019)*** (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.043) (0.053) (0.052) 
Log (Employment), t-10 -0.124 -0.443*** -0.397*** -0.458*** -0.733*** -0.755*** -0.722*** 
 
(0.049)** (0.047) (0.045) (0.048) (0.081) (0.100) (0.092) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Manufacturing), t-10 0.050 0.106*** 0.030 0.098*** 0.016 0.003 -0.009 
 
(0.019)*** (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.037) (0.047) (0.044) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Services), t-10 0.151) 0.041 0.025 0.030 -0.024 0.006 0.003 
 
(0.058)*** (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.047) (0.044) 
Log (% Share of Workers in Trade), t-10 -0.027 0.073* -0.015 0.062* -0.006 -0.048 -0.025 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.075) (0.089) (0.082) 
Log (Restaurants and Hotels per 100 inhabitants), t-10 -0.058       
 
(0.028)**       
Log (Museums and Ricreational Estab. per 100 inh.), t-10 0.022       
 
(0.015)       
Log (Membership Organizations per 100 inhabitants), t-10 -0.021       
 
(0.014)       
Log(% Electoral turnout), t-10 
 
-0.014*      
  
(0.008)      
Log (Population), t-10 
 
  0.485***    
  
  (0.122)    
  
      
Lagged Age Distribution yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-Region fixed effects no no yes no no no no 
LLM fixed effects no no no no yes yes yes 
 
       Observations 831 831 831 831 388 300 324 
LLMs 277 277 277 277 134 103 324 
R-squared 0.830 0.827 0.859 0.823 0.963 0.962 0.963 
Estimation model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard errors, reported in parenthesis, have been adjusted for serial correlation within cities. ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
respectively. Sources: see text. !!!
! "%!
Appendix B: Local Area Wages, House Value, Rents and the Share of Spending on 
Housing. 
 
B.1 Measuring Local Area House Value and Rents. 
 
In order to measure relative house value in cities in 1986, 1991 and 2000, we regress the log of the value of all 
dwellings reported in SHIW at time t on dummies for cities and a set of controls. The dependent variable and the 
housing characteristics we used are described below (SHIW variable name in parentheses). 
 
• House Value (VALABIT). SHIW reports the value of four types of real estate: dwelling (code 1); other 
building (code 2); agricultural land (code 3); and not agricultural land (code 4). We limit our sample to only 
dwellings. The sample is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of dwellings value. 
 
Set of controls: 
 
• Surface in square meters (SUPAB).  
 
• An indicator variable equal to one if two or more bathrooms are available in the dwelling (BAGNI).  This 
variable is not available for the years 1991 and 1986. 
 
• An indicator variable equal to one if an heating system is available in the dwelling (RISCALD). This variable 
is not available for the years 1991 and 1986. 
 
• Year built (ANCOSTR). This variable contains the construction year of the dwelling.  
 
• House’s location (UBIC1). This variable indicates the position of the dwelling as follows: coutryside, isolated 
area (code 1); town outskirts (code 2); area between outskirts and city center (code 3); city center (code 4); 
other (code 5); and hamlet (code 6).  In 1991 and 1986 we used the variable (UBIC) rather than (UBIC1).  
 
• Dwelling’s category (CATABIT). The categories are: luxury (code 1); upscale (code 2); mid-range (code 3); 
modest (code 4); low-income (code 5); very-low income (code 6); rural (code 7); and other (code 8). 
 
• Use status (USOIMM). The categories are: main dwelling (code 1); vacation residence (code 2); professional 
or commercial use (code 3); rented out to individuals or households during the whole year (code 4); rented 
out to companies during the whole year (code 5); rented out to individuals or households in a part of the year 
(code 6); rented out to companies in a part of the year (code 7); not rented out (code 8); other (code 9).  
 
In order to obtain rents in cities in 1986, 1991 and 2000, we regress the log of annual rent of all dwellings in the 
sample in each year on dummies for cities and the set of controls described above.  
For each household, the interviewed can be either the tenant or the property owner. In the case the interviewed is the 
tenant, SHIW reports the actual rent paid by the tenant. If the interviewed is the property owner, SHIW collects the 
rent the owner charges. In both cases the variable of interest is called (AFFEFF). If the interviewed is the property 
owner but the dwelling is not rented or it is the family residence, SHIW reports her best estimate for the rent she 
could charge (AFFIMP).  
Since the two conditions are mutually exclusive and in order to get a complete series of annual rents we combine the 
two variables. Our sample of annual rents is restricted to dwellings and it is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile of 
the distribution of rents. 
 
We repeated the same procedure to calculate the house value and annual rents for LLMs. 
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B.2. Measuring Local Area Wages 
 
In order to measure relative hourly wage levels in cities at time t, we regress the log of hourly wage of all workers of 
age between 15 and 65 in the sample at time t on dummies for cities and a set of controls. In what follows we 
describe each variable in detail (SHIW variable name in parentheses). 
 
• Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the annual earnings by the total amount of hours worked in a year. 
Annual earnings are those from any activity as employee, including fringe benefits net of taxes an social 
security contributions (YLM+YLNM). We obtain the total amount of hours worked in a year as average 
hours worked per week * months worked * 4.3333 (ORETOT * MESILAV * 4.3333). The sample is 
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of hourly wages. 
 
Set of controls: 
 
• Age in years (ETA) and the square of age in years. 
 
• Civil status (STACIV). The categories are married (code 1); never married or single (code 2); separated or 
divorced (code 3) and widowed (code 4); 
 
• Educational attainment (STUDIO). The categories, which correspond to completed years of schooling are: 
none (code 1); primary school (code 2); lower secondary school (code 3); upper secondary school (code 4); 
university degree (code 5) and postgraduate education (code 6). Observations with missing data on 
educational attainment were dropped from the hourly wage regression. 
 
• Sector of economic activity (SETTP9). The categories are: agriculture (code 1); industry (code 2);  
construction (code3); wholesale and retail trade, business and repair services, hotel and restaurants (code 4); 
transportation and telecommunications (code 5); finance and insurance (code 6); real estate, professional and 
related services (code 7); public administration and other public and private services (code 8); and not 
professional condition (code 9). We chose SETTP9  because this variable was available for all the years we 
were interested in. Observations with missing data on sector of actvity were dropped from the hourly wage 
regression. 
 
• Occupational category (QUALP10).  This variable divides workers into two groups: employees and self-
employed/employers. Since our dependent variable is hourly wage as employee, we restict the sample to 
employees. The categories are: laborer (code 1); employee or teacher (code 2); mid executive level manager 
(code 3), manager (code 4). The variable (QUALP10) is not available for the year 1987 so we used for this 
year the variable (QUALP7N). Codes and categories do not change at all. Observations with missing data on 
occupation were dropped from the regression. 
   
We repeated the same procedure to measure relatively hourly wage levels in LLMs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! "'!
B.3. Estimating the share of spending on housing prices. 
 
The first strategy we employ to estimate the parameter !!! !! is to use the micro-data in the SHIW. The 
archive (CONS) reports the total consumption for 15191 individuals. We match this dataset with the archives 
(COMP) which contains information about consumers’ characteristics. We focus on the year 2000. We regress the 
log of the annual total consumption on both the log of the annual rent and the log of the house value.1 Table (B.3.1) 
presents the results of this exercise. Column 1 shows an elasticity of 0.35 percent when the housing price is included 
as the only regressor. A one percent increase in the implicit price of land increases the consumption expenditure by 
0.35 percent. This elasticity becomes approximately 0.31 percent when we control for individuals’ characteristics 
(column, 2). Results are similar when the rental price rather than house value is used as regressor. (columns, 3 and 4). 
The second way of estimating !!! !! is to use a city-level price index and regress the log of this price index 
on the log of the rental price. ISTAT makes two price indices available for 70 large cities: the FOI (blue and white 
collar workers price index) and the NIC (based on the total population).2 We use the FOI because it is the official 
price index used to adjust rents. Table (B.3.2) shows that a one percent increase of rental price raises the cost of 
living by about 0.33 percent (column, 1). As we argued in the paper, the rental price coefficients could be biased if 
there are some omitted characteristics of the dwellings or because of measurement error. To deal with these potential 
concerns and following Shapiro (2006), we use the housing price as instrument for the rental price. Column 2 in 
Table (B.3.2) shows that the estimate increases to 0.427 percent consistent with the presence of measurement error in 
the first column.  
 Together, these two methods confirm that a reasonable estimate of the share of spending on non-traded 
goods lies between 0.31 and 0.43. In the paper we use both of these values. 
 
 
 
Table B.3.1 
The impact of the housing price on the total consumption, 2000.    
Dependent variable: log (Total Consumption) 
 
                                                                    (1)   (2)    (3)   (4)  
   
 
Log (House value)   0.351   0.307    
     (0.007)***  (0.006)*** 
 
Log (Rental price)         0.365    0.312  
           (0.008)***  (0.008)***
  
Individual’s characteristics no   yes   no   yes  
listed in section A.1 
 
Observations 15191               15191   15191   15191  
R-squared          0.215   0.320   0.217   0.323  
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We construct the series of the annual rent and house value as explained in the section B.1 
2 At the city-level, the FOI is available from 1996 onwards; the NIC from 1999 onwards. We combine 70 cities of our sample with the FOI 
dataset in the year 2000. 
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Table (B.3.2) 
The impact of the rental price on the cost of living, 2000.    
Dependent variable: log (FOI cost of living index) 
 
                                                                                                   (1)    (2)        
   
       
Log (Rental price)      0.334     0.427   
        (0.012)* **   (0.019)* ** 
    
 
Observations                 70    70   
R-squared             0.460      
Estimation method    OLS    2SLS 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** , * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Sources: see text. !!
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Appendix C: Data Appendix 
 
Table (C.1) 
Data description. 
Variable  Description and Source 
 
Population  Data refer to resident population. Population Censuses 1861-2001, ISTAT. The 1891 and the 1941 
population Censuses were not carried out because of financial difficulties in the first case and WWII in 
the second one. From 1971 to 2001 data on population are from “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, 
ISTAT.  
(Total) Employment Employment is the sum of all workers over the ISTAT economic activities’ classification “Ateco”. 
Agricultural workers are not taken into account. Industrial and Commercial Censuses 1911-2001, 
ISTAT. Data for 1911 are from Industrial Census, 1911, Vol. I, Table 1 and Vol. IV, Table IV.a. Data 
for 1927 are from Industrial and Commercial Census, 1927, Vol. V and Vol.1. Data for 1951 are from 
Industrial and Commercial Census, 1951, Vol.1. From 1971 to 2001 data on employment are from  
“Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, ISTAT. 
Share workers in  Employment in manufacturing over total employment.  Industrial and Commercial Census, 
manufacturing 1951-2001, ISTAT. From 1971 to 2001 data are from “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, ISTAT. Ateco 
Section: D 
Share workers in  Employment in services over total employment.  Industrial and Commercial Census, 
services 1951-2001, ISTAT. From 1971 to 2001 data are from “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, ISTAT. Ateco 
Sections: K and M 
Share workers in  Employment in trade over total employment.  Industrial and Commercial Census, 
trade 1951-2001, ISTAT. From 1971 to 2001 data are from “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, ISTAT. Ateco 
Section: G 
Share of college Number of persons with a university degree over population. Population Census,  
graduates 1951-2001, ISTAT. From 1971 to 2001 data are from “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”, ISTAT.  
Local area wages Obtained as the cities (or LLMs) fixed effects of indipendent cross-sectional regressions where we 
control for age, age squared, civil status dummies, education dummies, sector of economic activity 
dummies and occupation category dummies. SHIW, 1987, 1991, 2000, BANCA D’ITALIA 
Local area house value Obtained as the cities (LLMs) fixed effects of indipendent cross-sectional regressions where we control 
for surface, number of bathrooms, presence of an heating system, year of construction, location 
dummies, category dummies and use status dummies. SHIW, 1986, 1991, 2000, BANCA D’ITALIA 
Local area rents  Obtained as the cities (LLMs) fixed effects of indipendent cross-sectional regressions where we control 
for surface, number of bathrooms, presence of an heating system, year of construction, location 
dummies, category dummies and use status dummies. SHIW, 1986, 1991, 2000, BANCA D’ITALIA 
Restaurants & hotels Number of Restaurants and Hotels over population (*100). Data are from “Atlante Statistico 
per 100 inhabitants dei Comuni”. Ateco Section: H 
 
Museums & recreati- Number of museums and recreational establishments over population (*100). Data are from  
onal establishments “Atlante Statistico dei Comuni”. Ateco Section: O, Two-Digit Code: 92. 
per 100 inhabitants 
 
Membership Org. Number of associative organizations over population(*100). Data are from “Atlante Statistic 
per 100 inhabitants dei Comuni”. Ateco Section: O, Two-Digit Code: 91 
 
Electoral turnout       Obtained as the ratio between actual and eligible voters for the election of the Italian Chamber of                                              
                          Deputies. As census and election years did not correspond, the closest time match has been found. i.e.                               
                          census years in the 1961-1991 span have been  associated to the following election years: 1963,             
                          1972,1983,1992. Data are from the Italian Ministry of Interiors. 
Share of High school Number of persons enrolled in a high school over population in 1931. “Annuario delle Città 
! ")!
enrollment in 1931  Italiane”, Parte II, 1934. Istituto Nazionale di Urbanistica.  
 
FOI, price index. Blue and white collar workers price index. http://dati.istat.it/ 
 
Share of Immigrants Number of people who moved to a city from another one over population. Foreign immigrants are not 
taken into account. “Popolazione e Movimento Anagrafico dei Comuni”. ISTAT. 
 
 
Figure (C.1) 
The distribution of the cities and LLMs on Italian territory. 
 
 CITIES        LLMs 
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Cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2001: 
 
Torino, Moncalieri, Novara, Cuneo, Asti, Alessandria, Busto Arsizio, Legnano, Varese, Como, Monza, Cinisello Balsamo, Rho, 
Milano, Sesto San Giovanni, Bergamo, Brescia, Pavia, Vigevano, Cremona, Bolzano, Trento, Verona, Vicenza, Treviso, 
Chioggia, Venezia, Padova, Rovigo, Udine, Trieste, Sanremo, Savona, Genova, La Spezia, Piacenza, Parma, Reggio nell’ Emilia, 
Carpi, Modena, Bologna, Imola, Ferrara, Faenza, Ravenna, Cesena, Forlì, Rimini, Carrara, Massa, Lucca, Viareggio, Pistoia, 
Scandicci, Firenze, Livorno, Pisa, Arezzo, Siena, Grosseto, Prato, Foligno, Perugia, Terni, Fano, Pesaro, Ancona, Ascoli Piceno, 
Viterbo, Civitavecchia, Guidonia Montecelio, Roma, Latina, Aprilia, L’aquila, Teramo, Pescara, Chieti, Campobasso, Aversa, 
Caserta, Benevento, Castellammare di Stabia, Marano di Napoli, Giuliano in Campania, Ercolano, Portici, San Giorgio a 
Cremano, Napoli, Pozzuoli, Casoria, Afragola, Torre del Greco, Avellino, Cava de’ tirreni, Battipaglia, Salerno, Cerignola, 
Foggia, Manfredonia, San Severo, Altamura, Bari, Bitonto, Barletta, Andria, Trani, Bisceglie, Molfetta, Taranto, Brindisi, Lecce, 
Potenza, Matera, Cosenza, Catanzaro, Lamezia Terme, Reggio di Calabria, Crotone, Mazara del Vallo, Marsala, Trapani, 
Bagheria, Palermo, Messina, Caltanissetta, Gela, Acireale, Catania, Modica, Ragusa, Vittoria, Siracusa, Sassari, Quartu 
Sant’Elena, Cagliari.  
 
LLMs with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2001: 
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Cirie, Torino, Novara, Alba, Cuneo, Asti, Alessandria, Biella, Busto Arsizio, Varese, Como, Milano, Seregno, Bergamo, Brescia, 
Pavia, Vigevano, Cremona, Mantova, Lecco, Lodi, Bolzano, Trento, Verona, Arzignano, Bassano del Grappa, Vicenza, 
Castelfranco Veneto, Conegliano, Treviso, San Donà di Piave, Venezia, Padova, Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Pordenone, Savona, 
Chiavari, Genova,  La Spezia, Piacenza, Parma, Reggio nell’ Emilia, Carpi, Modena, Sassuolo, Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, 
Cesena, Forlì, Rimini, Lucca, Viareggio, Pistoia, Firenze, Livorno, Pisa, Pontedera, Arezzo, Siena, Montevarchi, Prato, Perugia, 
Terni, Fano, Pesaro, Ancona, Ascoli, San Benedetto del Tronto,  Viterbo, Roma, Velletri, Formia, Latina, Cassino, Frosinone, 
Avezzano, Pescara, Atessa, Campobasso, aversa, Caserta, Benevento, Castellammare di Stabia,Napoli, Nola, Torre del Greco, 
Avellino, Nocera Inferiore, Salerno, Foggia, Altamura, Bari, Barletta, Bisceglie, Taranto, Brindisi, Lecce, Potenza, Cosenza, 
Catanzaro, Lamezia Terme, Reggio di Calabria, Crotone, Marsala, Trapani, Palermo, Messina, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Gela, 
Acireale, Catania, Modica, Augusta, Sassari, Cagliari.  
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Abstract 
 
The relationship between emigration and human capital is a hotly debated issue. Nowadays 
discussions focus mainly on the so called brain drain, i.e. the reduction in the human capital 
endowment of a country due to emigration of high skilled people. Differently, this paper investigates 
whether and how the Italian emigration of the early twentieth century induced a domestic increase in 
schooling proxied by primary school attendance rates. Many historical evidences stress that this 
actually happened in Italy at the turn of the XIX century and at least three rationales lie at the heart of 
such a relationship. First, emigration or its prospects could increase the expected return to schooling, 
thus making education more attractive; second, return migration could fuel a rise in school 
attendance via monetary and non-monetary channels; third, remittances could help in relaxing the 
budget constraint that prevented people to invest in education. Using a new dataset at the city level 
and different econometric techniques, we find quantitative support that primary school attendance 
rates have been positively correlated with (and arguably in part caused by) emigration and return 
migration. We also find a positive effect on schooling associated with a rough proxy of remittances.  
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1 Introduction1
Migration can act as an equilibrating force that fosters convergence between regions
and countries, with the effect of offsetting pre-existing disparities. The mechanism is
similar to the one predicted by Heckscher and Ohlin in their theory on international
trade (Harris and Todaro, 1970)2: thanks to the movements of people and goods, relative
prices tend to level off in different countries.
For several reasons, the impact of emigration on sending countries is a relatively
poorly studied issue with respect to the impact of immigration in host countries. When
analyzed, the stress is often put on the so called brain drain phenomenon: if people who
move out of a country are the most skilled, migration could damage native countries
because of human capital depletion. By stressing on this point, traditional literature on
brain drain has long labeled the loss of human capital as a looting that by reducing the
human capital stock in sending countries could hamper the convergence in per capita
income levels across countries (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989;
Piras, 2007; Ciriaci, 2005).
In contrast with this traditional view, recent theoretical and empirical literature
recognizes that the experience of migration, or only the prospects of it, can make explicit
the importance of education favoring schooling of both adults and children (brain gain)
and points out the channels through which migration may positively influence the human
capital endowment in source countries. In particular, three main channels could be
identified (Mayr and Peri, 2008; Docquier and Rapoport, 2009): the first operates
through migration or its prospects; the second through return migrants; the third through
remittances. This paper is a first attempt of investigating along these lines.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2 we make a short review of the existing
literature. In section 3 we describe the three information pillars on which our analysis
is built: a solid qualitative and historical evidence that tells us about the possible
mechanisms at work; the description of the structure of Italy’s public education system;
a new dataset that reports figures at the city level. We also present some descriptive
evidences on the patterns of outflows (inflows) from (to) Italian cities as well as on school
attendance. In section 4 we describe our identification strategy and we get to an empirical
model in reduced form to be estimated. We divide this section in three subsections: in
the first we test the relationship between attendance rates and emigration (returns) in a
specification where in-and out-migration are used as the only predictors for attendance.
Then, we try to deal with endogeneity issues by using an IV approach. In particular
we exploit the shipping lines’ transportation costs as instrument. Last, we estimate a
multivariate model with a GMM technique.
The main results are the following: 1) for the first decade of the twentieth century
migration and return migration could have caused part of the increase in primary school
1We are grateful to Antonio Accetturo, Alberto Baffigi, Federico Barbiellini Amidei, Elio Cerrito, Al-
fredo Gigliobianco, Claire Giordano, Paolo Sestito, Francesco Vercelli, Eliana Viviano, Jeffrey Williamson
and an anonymous referee for comments and support. We also thanks participants at the First CEPR
Economic History Symposium held in Perugia, April 2013. This work has benefited from the great help
of Ivan Triglia, Sandra Natoli, Antonella Maria Pulimanti and Rita Anselmi. All errors remain our own.
The opinions herein expressed are solely of the authors.
2Heckscher and Ohlin predictions were fomalized by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
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attendance; 2) we detect a positive effect on schooling associated with a rough proxy of
remittances; 3) when controlling for fixed effect at the city level, we do not find differential
effects between the South and the North of Italy. In Section 5 we turn elasticities into
figures that tell us how many people migration kept at school. Section 6 concludes.
2 Brain gain: how does it work?
This work focuses on the three key channels that have been the subjects of both his-
torical and contemporary analysis and have stressed on the association between migration
and education:
- emigration and its prospects can boost the incentives for education in the source
country. This happens because the usefulness of basic education is rightly perceived as
having a great importance for different reasons (necessity of writing home, remittances
bookkeeping, expected school-premia in wages, defense from being cheated);
- return migrants could foster education to the extent that returnees, thanks to their
experience abroad, are more sensitive to the importance of schooling.
- remittances can play an important role in relaxing a possible budget constraint that
prevents people to invest in education.
The first mechanism emphasizes the fact that potential migrants base their decision
to leave on the comparison of future expected incomes abroad and at home (among other
push and pull factors)3. Historical and contemporary literature seems to agree that the
magnitude of this incentive depends mainly on the income and /or wage gap between
source and destination countries; the greater the gap, the stronger the motivation to
leave.
What was the magnitude of this gap? Figure 1 plots the average unskilled salary
in Italy between 1900 and 1913, compared to that of some European and transoceanic
countries which at the time were the preferred destinations of Italian migrants. In Italy,
the average wage was the lowest one and the gap between Italy and the U.S. overcame
100 points. Furthermore, the skill premium, i.e. the ratio between skilled and unskilled
wages, was higher in U.S with respect to Italy (Betran and Pons, 2004). In this respect,
potential leavers commitment to acquire basic education was in order to get this possible
wage increase once arrived at destination. In doing so, they could generate a brain gain
since the probability to emigrate (for the most educated) is likely to be less than one, i.e.
a perfect selection among migrants does not occur. In early 20th century Italy, migratory
outflows differed from those of the other European countries chiefly because of a lower
literacy rate among emigrants due to the large number of poor Southerners.
The strand of migration literature that investigated on the brain gain dates at least
3See Hatton (2010) for a complete survey on the cliometrics of international migration. Gomellini
and O´ Gra´da (2013) propose an estimate of the determinants of emigration. Another paper that focuses
on the Mass Migration Era is Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008). The authors emphasize, beside the role
of economic and demografic factors, the role of institutional factors in the host countries in driving
immigration. In the paper two separate sets of institutions are considered. The first fosuses on the
political institutions, i.e. the level of democracy and the extension of suffrage; the second one focuses on
migration institutions, i.e the kind of citizenship laws, land distribution policy, public education policy,
and immigration policy attitudes. They find that both political and migration institutions positively
contribute to the level of attractiveness of a country toward migrants.
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Figure 1: International (unskilled) real Wage Indexes.
Source: Williamson, 1995
as far back as Mountford (1997): he emphasized the ’emigration prospects’ transmission
mechanism: the possibility of emigrating rises the expected return to schooling and render
education more attractive, spurring investments in education. Theoretically and from the
point of view of the source country, if return to education is greater in the latter than
in the host country, then negative selection might be the result; vice versa, the greater
the gap between incomes between sending and receiving economies, the more likely is
the hypothesis that the more skilled will leave4. Brain gain will come forth to the extent
that the probability to migrate is large enough to activate the channel and sufficiently
low to avoid a total escape of brains (Stark et al., 1997, 1998; Beine et al., 2001; Lucas,
2004; Docquier and Rapoport, 2003, 2009; Egger and Felbermayr, 2009)5.
4The economic theory suggests, moreover, that the higher the fixed costs of migration the more
plausible the hypothesis of a selective migration because skilled individuals will be able to amortize
costs more quickly. In the age of mass migration the cost of voyage from Italy to U.S., included the
cost to reach the port of embarkation, was not negligible at all, although affordable. See Commissariato
Generale dell’ Emigrazione (1927), Fenoaltea (2002), Gomellini and O´ Gra´da (2011) for a more detailed
analysis
5The first laws on migration issued by the government of the Kingdom of Italy were inspired by a
deliberately repressive philosophy, strongly limiting the possibility of leaving (The Menabrea law 1868;
The Lanza law, 1873). These limitations were supported by the concerns of industrial groups in the
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The incentive to invest in education is not only a theoretical curiosum but it has
an empirical relevance (Mayr and Peri, 2008). For example Beine et al. (2001) find
a positive and significant effect of migration prospects on human capital formation in
a cross-section of 37 developing countries. This is confirmed by other macroeconomic
studies such as Beine et al. (2011) who perform a panel data analysis to control for
unobserved heterogeneity and for the endogeneity of emigration rate. They show that
the channel works and it is stronger in low-income countries. Lucas (2004) shows that
the brain gain caused by the possibility to leave exists at micro-level too. By observing
the very high rates of enrollment in higher education in the Philippines, although the low
domestic return to human capital, he argues that higher education is almost certainly
induced to a significant extent by potential for emigration.
Even though this literature focuses heavily on skilled migration, in particular on
tertiary educated migrants, there are strong parallels with historical studies which refers
inevitably to primary educated, or literate, leavers.(Williamson, 2006).
Part of the economic literature views migration as a permanent phenomenon, par-
ticularly if referred to highly-skilled individuals (Becker et al., 2004; Monteleone and
Torrisi, 2010; Biondo et al., 2012). Differently, when migration is a transitory event,
return migration can have a positive influence on sending regions (Borjas and Bratsberg,
1996; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007; Mayr and Peri, 2008; Dustmann et al., 2011). Lalonde
and Topel (1997) found that about one third of immigrants to the US between 1890 and
1957 returned home.
Dustmann and Weiss (2007) and Mayr and Peri (2008) suggest that the experience
abroad increases the amount of individual human capital and therefore the level of
productivity of the agents; as a result return migration can lead to a mitigation of the
brain drain, or even the creation of a brain gain, to the extent returns bring into the
home country raised skills. Furthermore Dustmann et al. (2011) extend the seminal
work of Borjas (1989), introducing the idea that some countries can be seen as learning
headquarters where individuals can acquire specific skills expendable in the native area.
Under this assumption each return generates a human capital gain with beneficial impact
on income.
In the age of mass migration, though most of migrants were away a long time, a
significant proportion returned. According to Giusti (1965)6 during the period 1811-1911
net migration was about one third of the gross flow. Hatton and Williamson (1998)
suggest that the big surge in gross emigration after the 1890s was not matched by a big
blood in net migration but was mainly a spurious result due to a change in passport
regulation. Bandiera et al. (2012), using the Ellis Island archive, points to an underes-
timation of returnees figures in official data. Gomellini and O´ Gra´da (2011) show the
relative importance of return migration in the cases of the United States and Argentina by
North of the country and of landowners in the South: a large number of expatriates could create a
shortage of cheap labor and, therefore, stimulate the growth of real wages. Other restrictions were
introduced later to avoid the emigration as a practice to escape the conscription introduced immediately
after the Unification (The Crispi law, 1988). It was only with the 1901 law, backed by Luttazzi and
Pantano (two Italian politicians), that emigration became finally a free choice of the individual. See
Einaudi (2007) for more details.
6For a close examination, see Gomellini and O´ Gra´da (2011).
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comparing gross migration flows and the number of Italian-born residents as recorded in
the census. They find that a gross migration of over 0.6 million Italians during the 1890s
led to an increase in the number of Italian-born of only 0.3 million in the U.S. between
1890 and 1900 while a gross outflow of 1.2 million in 1896-1914 yielded increases in the
numbers of Italian-born of about 0.4 million in Argentina in the same period. Del Boca
and Venturini (2003) argue that Italian emigrants did not settle permanently abroad. If
during the first period of prevailingly transoceanic emigration (until 1895) the proportion
of returns was relatively small, in a second phase (1896-1921), returns tended to be of
sizable number. Yet, according to Coletti (1911) in the two-year period 1905-1906 the
proportion of returns in Italy was, on average, 46 percent (41 and 52 percent respectively
in the South and in the North) with respect to migrants left four years before.
This paper adds to existing literature new insights of the effects of migration on
schooling in Italy in the first decade of the twentieth century, a period often referred to
as the ‘Age of Mass Migration’. Firstly we embrace the hypothesis according to which
the prospect of emigration rises the expected income to schooling and as a consequence
renders education more attractive. In second place we test the return migration transmis-
sion mechanism. Here the idea is that who returns could raise attendance, to the extent
the returnees are more sensitive to the importance of education.
Differently from the official sources commonly used to empirically evaluate the role
of migration on Italy’s development,7 we use a unique dataset at the city level which
collects statistics on the social and economical life of the cities with more than 10,000
inhabitants at the time. The detailed records on the population and on education allows
us to overcome many shortcomings of the existing historical studies. For example these
studies fail at capturing the unobserved heterogeneity between units of analysis because
of the use of cross-section regressions.
3 A three information pillars based investigation
At the core of our analysis there is the attempt of evaluating the effects of outward
and return migration on primary school attendance rate in Italy during the first decade
of 20th century. Our strategy is based on the following three pillars of information.
3.1 Historical evidences
The period that goes from the second half of the Nineteenth century to the outbreak
of WWI is often referred to as the age of mass migration from Europe to the New World
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998). In the early decades the phenomenon was mainly confined
to migrants from North-West Europe and Italian emigration was limited. The progressive
transport revolution made overseas trips safer and cheaper and co-determined a big surge
of emigration to United States that lasted until the Great War. Between 1876 (when data
on Italian emigration first become available) and 1914, Italy’s emigration rate rose from
5 per thousand (of population) to nearly 25 per thousand. Nearly 14 million left and
about two thirds left in the first decade of the twentieth century. Though a majority of
migrants remained abroad, a significant but varying proportion returned. Official data on
7For example The Annuario Statistico della Migrazione Italiana dal 1876 al 1925 and IPUMS dataset.
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returnees, available from 1905, show that on average, between 1905 and 1913 the yearly
share of returnees on migrants was around 30 per cent (Gomellini and O´ Gra´da, 2013).
As far as brain gain is concerned, there are plenty of qualitative evidences. Those given
by Coletti (1911)8,in particular, are striking. He argues that the migratory experience
made explicit the usefulness of schooling to achieve higher salaries or reach better quality
of life. Analyzing the overall impact of migration on Italy’s development in the liberal
age, he highlighted that
Migration is the best friend of literacy [. . . ]. It is the experience of migration that provided
strong evidence about the utility of primary education as a powerful tool of an upward
social mobility and it is undoubtedly the most persuasive deterrent to dropping out of
primary school. [...] Migration is the main cause of the school attendance rate rise
This hypothesis is stressed also by Jarach (1877)9 and Cipolla (1969) who argue that,
notwithstanding the countless factors which hamper pupils of getting school, literary
knowledge is crucial because of the need, once crossed the ocean, to send news on health
and on the accumulation of savings to own family at home.
There are many qualitative evidences about the relationship between migration and
education at the regional level. With respect to the Italy’s region Abruzzi which, at
the time, recorded high emigration rates and notable advancements in fighting against
illiteracy, Jarach (1877) writes:
The helpfulness of literacy is penetrated into the consciousness of the population. It has
rapidly conquered the minds of farmers and shepherds because of the need, once crossed
the ocean, to send news on health and on the accumulation of savings to the families at
home, without relying on a stranger. From the U.S. come incitements to the wives to send
children to school. [...].These facts are neither isolated nor rare.
In Sicily, the number of enrollments in the primary school increased remarkably in
the first decade of 20th century. The enrollment rate raised from 54.5 per thousand
inhabitants in 1902 to 73.5 in 1907. Coletti (1911) writes:
Since there are no other causes being able to explain the event, the reason must be sought
in the consciousness of people. Despite the hostility of the environment in which people
live and their financial straits, finally individuals make themselves more confident that
literacy may be an effective weapon against poverty. This firm conviction emerges thanks
to emigration. It is emigration the main cause for the growth in the attendance rates.
Lucania was, at the time, the region with the highest emigration rate. The following
words are drawn by Coletti (1911).
In most municipalities there is a new common sense among peasants. They have a keen
desire to send their children to school. To this end and very frequently, emigrants exhorted
their own relatives at home so that their brothers (sisters), nephews (nieces) in order to go
to school.
8Francesco Coletti (1866-1940) was an Italian statistician and economist.
9C. Jarach was a statistician. He was commissioned, among others, by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Industry and Business to carry on the inquiry on the conditions in agriculture in the South of Italy. In
particular, Jarach was in charge of the Italy’s region Abruzzi.
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In Calabria, where outflows were soaring, schools were becoming increasingly populated
by pupils.
Mothers clean up their children, take them to school and ask the teacher for their children
to learn as much as possible. This is because fathers write from the U.S. that their children
have to be educated. Only through the migratory experience fathers realize the damage
from being illiterate (Coletti, 1911).
As regards northern Italy, Cipolla (1969), analyzing the high literacy rate among
the population living in the Alpine areas on the border with Austria, Switzerland and
France, argues that literacy is triggered off by emigration which forces potential migrants
to become literate in order to keep in touch with relatives.
The second mechanism we investigate, stresses on the fact that return migrants, having
acquired in their experience abroad augmented skills, are more capable of perceiving
education as a tool to achieve success and prosperity; as a result they may foster school
attendance. The returnees channel is well documented by qualitative literature too.
Coletti (1911) writes:
who returns from America is a human being transformed and able to transform [. . . ].
He embodies the old village-like soul which was renewed by the American economy and
society so he can bring a new energy in the country to which he returns. The depth of the
trasformation that emigration will be able to cause in Italy will strongly depend on his
physical and mental conditions.10
Coletti (1911) ’s testimony clearly shows migrants’ ability to learn from abroad
experiences:“Emigration is a great school; it embodies [. . . ] thousands of thousands of
scholarships. It gets rid of the old rust from the mind, it inculcates ideas that otherwise
would not be able to penetrate”. Return migrants were psychologically changed with
respect to the time they left. Ease, fluency and manner of speaking, style of dress, greater
awareness of their own dignity and their rights, no awe of the old employers, the desire to
deal with municipal affairs, political and general interests are just a few traits of people
who came back from abroad. “It is a miracle occurred thanks to migration. [...]. The
awakening of the consciences promote the diffusion of literacy amongst peasants”.
As evident, the social life of a community is so closely tangled within its components
that is extremely difficult to isolate the determinants of a certain phenomenon from
other possible causes. For this reason we need some additional clarifications to better
identifying our transmission channels.
According to the first channel, the prospects of emigration are incentives for both
adults (parents) and children to go to school. This does not mean that children were
able to make decisions on their own, but simply that parents, or somebody else, made
decisions on behalf of children. We try to separate the impact of migration on children
and on adults education by distinguish the effect of migration on the attendance rate
10Clearly the effect of returns on the sending country depends on the health of returned migrants,
on the investments they implement in the native country and on the amount of savings accumulated
abroad. For example Cerase (1967), in his research on returns from USA, shows a discouranging scenario
in the South. He finds out that 19 per cent returned because their migratory project failed, 40 per cent
because their savings plans were reached, 26 per cent for retirement and only 16 per cent to invest in the
area of origin. See Del Boca and Venturini (2003) and Bevilacqua et al. (2001).
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of public schools and the enrollment rate of evening classes (public primary school was
entirely attended by children while evening schools were mainly attended by adults).
More important: following the literature on brain drain quoted above, we argue that the
agent’s conjecture to emigrate in the future relies on what he or she observes (and has
observed), i.e. the present (and past) outflows.
As far as the second channel is concerned, it hides at least two mechanisms. The first
relies on the returnees that are richer than they were at the time they left: thanks to
accumulated savings they can afford the cost of sending children to school. The second
is based on the ’awareness’ rationale (Coletti, 1911) that induce returnees to send their
children at school. We will not try to disentangle the two mechanisms in our empirical
model.
3.2 Italy’s education system (1860-1911)
Analysing the structure and the working of Italy’s education system is a necessary
step in our investigation. Very recently the topic have been deeply studied (Bertola and
Sestito, 2011, 2013).
The first law issued in the new Kingdom of Italy (founded in 1861), the Casati Law,
was issued in November 1859. It was inspired by the German system of nationally directed
education and shaped Italy’s education system up to 1877 (Zamagni, 2002; Bertola and
Sestito, 2013). The law envisioned for free and compulsory primary school (for children
from 6 years old) which was made up in two grades (high and low) each lasting two years.
Funding of primary education was left to municipalities and the obligation to establish
the high grade was limited to municipalities with over 4,000 inhabitants. De facto, only
the low grade was mandatory. Privately organized establishments would be allowed
to coexist with public ones, but all would have been subject to a common regulatory
framework. Matteucci (1867) illustrated that the claim of a national mandatory school
ended up in an unavoidable failure because the Italian liberal State exempted from
providing constructions and teachers remuneration by shifting both charges to cities
without making sure of their disposable funds (Genovesi, 2010; Vecchi, 2011).
In 1877 the Coppino Law extended compulsory schooling from two to three years and
introduced a 5-year primary school curriculum, with provisions for enforcement and fines
for non-compliant parents (Bertola and Sestito, 2013). Buonazia (1873) highlighted both
delays on the supply side of the education system and insufficient demand for schooling
by households.11 The investigation thus showed that primary school was still heavily
dependent from income (this is one of our key indentifying assumption on which our
instrumental variable exercise presented in paragraph 4.2 is based). The situation turned
up in huge disparities in primary education performances and even in the quality of
teaching throughout the country.12 Therefore, in the first decades after Unification the
11In northern Italy, in rural areas, there was a widespread practice of dropping out of school because of
the use of children in farming and textile industries (Vecchi, 2011). Between 1870 and 1900, in Piedmont,
at the beginning of the harvest season, schools were deserted. In Liguria there was no reluctance of
farmers to the school, rather, as Cipolla (1969) stresses, it is the school that does not fit the needs of
rural life.
12The quality of education does not depend only on the number of teachers and on the percentage
of population attending school but also on what is taught and on the effectiveness of teaching as well
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strong dependence of primary school on local resources crystallized the huge territorial
differencies inherited from the pre-unitary period (Bertola and Sestito, 2013, p. 252).
Between November 1903 and March 1914, part of the period known as Giolittian
Age, the political climate shifted in more progressive directions. In 1904, the Orlando
law extended compulsory education to twelve years, reduced the primary school curricu-
lum to four years and contemporaneously established the two-year professional training
course (fifth and sixth grade). Actually, mandatory education could be accomplished
by successfully completing the four-year program. The law also envisioned for the es-
tablishment of the evening classes for illiterate adults and in 1906 in the South was set
up the“Commissione Centrale per il Mezzogiorno” to put up a fight against illiteracy.
The ministerial inquiry carried out by Corradini (1909)13 showed that the main problem
of primary education system was the unsatisfactory actions realized by municipalities
due to the lack of local resources (Cives, 1990; Vecchi, 2011). The final judgment on
the reforms implemented is clear: they had little or no effects on the attendance rate of
primary school (still, in the econometric exercise that will follow, we add controls for the
possible effects of reforms).
The Corradini report significantly influenced the 1911 Daneo-Credaro law which finally
bore the cost of all personnel and materials for primary education to the central State
budget, “leaving local governments in charge only of providing adequate buildings”14.This
choice marked a substantial step forward in the fight against illiteracy (Genovesi, 2010;
Felice, 2011)
3.3 A new dataset on Italian cities
Core to our analysis is the Annuario Statistico delle Citta` Italiane from 1906 to 1914,
published every two years by the Unione Statistica delle Citta` Italiane and inspired by the
Annuario delle Citta` Tedesche.15 The Annuario collects records on the social, political
and economical life of the largest municipalities (with more than 10,000 inhabitants)
by breaking down data in the following categories: territory and population, education,
hygiene and health, industry and employment. As argued by Niccolini (1906)16 the
choice to sample more important municipalities was taken to guarantee the comparability
among the Italian cities and then minimize measurement errors as well as to tackle funds
(Cipolla, 1969). Because of their very low salaries, teachers were culturally and technically inadequate.
In 1897, 4,009 teachers out of 17,940 did not have the legal authorization, many of them worked as
tailors, sacristans and bell-ringers. In such an enviroment pupils dropped out of school, attended it
listlessly or with great difficulty, anyway without being able to draw large payoffs from attending classes
(see Genovesi (2010) for a detailed analysis on the economic conditions of teachers).
13Camillo Corradini (1867-1928) was an Italian politician.
14Actually Genovesi (2010) argues that the Daneo-Credaro law was not applicable to the provincial
and district capitals. Therefore these cities continued to hold up the primary education costs, even after
1911. We note that our sample records statistics only on these municipalities.
15The 1912 Annuario is the only exception. It reports statistics on 1909. Unfortunately 1909 data on
education are not so detailed as previously collected and therefore they are useless to our goal. Notice
also that the Annuari contain data referring to two years before; so that the Annuario published in 1906
reports 1904 figures and so on.
16See the Annuario Statistico delle Citta` Italiane 1906
13
shortage.17
The section “Public Education” includes information on the number of schools (public,
private and evening classes), number of teachers and pupils as well as on attendance and
learning results. Data on public spending on education are available too. The chapters
“Taxes” and “Main Consumptions” contain, instead, details on council public finance and
data on consumptions (in kilograms) carefully divided into many product groups from fish
to coffee, from meat to beer. Current prices of goods are also reported. Most relevant for
this study is that available information allows us to measure abroad migration outflows
(inflows) from (to) each municipality collected in the Annuario. Record keeping, however,
became less detailed from 1914 onwards, then inadequate for our purpose: it contains
only the net migration rate with no disentanglement between migration and returns.
Since our thesis is that in-and out-migration was correlated with higher levels of
education, to begin with we present some wide empirical evidence on migration and
schooling patterns from our municipalities dataset.
Figure 2 illustrates the cities distribution throughout Italy and shows that the munic-
ipalities in the sample are almost uniformly spread across national territory: out of
roughly 110 cities detected, 47 belong to the South and 63 to the North. Hence a
potential distorsion stemming from an over-represented area is avoided. Figure 3 shows
the relationship between leavers (returns) and educated population at the city level.
Correlation coefficients are all positive and statistically significant (except for Figure 3.c)
at the 5 percent level.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The values for Attendance rate are the
percentage of pupils (of those enrolled) who did not drop out primary school. On average
this attendance rate is about 81 percent but it results from the significant heterogeneity
between the municipalities situated in the South (76.3 percent) and those in the North
(83.7 percent). Migration and Returns represent the abroad outflows and from-abroad
inflows respectively, obtained by dividing the flows by the municipality population and
then multiplied by 1000. Both Table 1 and Figure 3 highlight the preponderance of
returns in the North with respect to the South and show that Southerners were much
more likely to leave than Northerners.
The attendance rate depends definitely on disposable income. At the city level
yearly estimates of disposable income do not exist. Following Ciccarelli and De Fraja
(2012),Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Mortara (1913), we proxy income with a
measure of tax proceeds. We choose as our best proxy the sum of the tax revenues
accruing from a large variety of council taxes. Specifically the categories are: family
tax; local property and business taxes; taxes on boats, cars and velocipedes; servant tax;
livestock and pet tax; hotel patent tax end tax on sparkling water production.18 This
wide range of taxes allows us to overcome two problems: the first is to avoid a possible
17Ippolito Niccolini (1848-1919) was an Italian politician and mayor of Florence from 1904 to 1907.
He was chairman of the Unione Statistica delle Citta` Italiane from 1905 to 1907. In the first decade of
the twentieth century, in Italy, the municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants were about 500, but
among them only 20 percent responded to the questionnaires sent by the Unione. Furthermore, Ugo
Giusti (already mentioned Italian statistician) points out that small municipalities (which have high
heterogeneity) should be kept out from the survey in order to guarantee data compatibility.
18For more details see the Annuario Statistico delle Citta`Italiane, from 1906 to 1914 and Villani (2011).
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Figure 2: The distribution of the sampled cities on Italian Territory.
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Source: Annuario Statistico delle Citta` Italiane
skewness in the distribution of taxpayers going from the wealthiest households to the
poorest ones so that we have a relative broad and representative basis; the second is that
we do not need to account for special circumstances affecting only some municipalities,
for example by distinguishing those with the city gates or as Ciccarelli and De Fraja
(2012) suggest, those that had a major ports.
The correlation coefficient between per capita GDP, as estimated in Baffigi (2011),
and our measure of per capita tax proceeds is 0.98, statistically significant at the 5
percent level. Expenditure is the variable that proxies the education supply-side: it is the
per capita public spending in primary education at the municipality level. By including
this variable in equation 1 we catch the effect of different education policy decisions
made by municipalities. Finally, Remittances is a rough proxy. It is the ratio between
consumption tax proceeds and income tax proceeds, with the idea that an important
part of not officially traced remittances is used for consumption although does not appear
in official income.
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Figure 3: The Cross-City Patterns of Migration and Education, 1911.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Source: see text.
4 Identification strategy and empirical findings
The three pillars of information just described (qualitative evidences, the primary
education system and the new dataset) guide our identification strategy. The empirical
model of endogenous schooling formation we estimate is the following:
yi,t = α + β1yi,t−1 + β2mi,t + β3reti,t + β4expi,t + β5taxi,t + υi,t (1)
where yi,t is alternatively the (log of) public primary school attendance rate or the evening
school enrollment rate;19 in year t, t = 1904, 1906, 1908, 1911 in the city i,i = 1, . . . , 87;
mi,t and reti,t are the logs of abroad migration rate and return migration rate, respectively,
in year t in the city i; expi,t is the log of the per capita public expenditure on primary
education, measured in current lire; taxi,t is the log of the per capita proxy of income in
year t in the city i. It is worth to note that using the attendance rate rather than the
enrollment rate (in the case of public education) allows us to overcome some problems: a)
higher enrollment rate does not imply higher attendance rates; b) the use of enrollment
19When the dependent variable is ’evening enrollment rates, the variable exp is dropped out since it
only refers to public primary schools.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1904-1911a
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sample Attendance rateb 81.4 9.04 45.2 98.8
Enrollment rate of evening schoolsc 9.37 7.39 0.00 35.3
Literacy rated 75.8 19.7 22.0 100
Migratione 6.87 4.10 0.29 40.6
Returnsf 2.65 1.63 0.11 7.54
Expenditureg 3.89 2.16 0.93 17.7
Council taxesh 2.21 1.11 0.10 20.5
Remittancesi 13.6 8.20 0.30 41.5
Transport Costsl 186.7 34.3 157 227.2
South Attendance rate 76.3 10.5 45.2 98.0
Enrollment rate of evening schools 7.34 5.65 0.00 22.2
Literacy rate 53.8 13.6 22.0 90.4
Migration 11.2 9.50 0.29 40.6
Returns 1.23 1.07 0.11 5.66
Expenditure 2.60 1.20 0.93 7.30
Council taxes 2.14 0.59 0.10 4.65
Remittances 19.4 7.98 0.83 41.5
Transport Costs 185.0 36.3 157 216.3
North Attendance rate 83.7 7.10 57.2 98.8
Enrollment rate of evening schools 10.2 7.86 0.00 35.3
Literacy rate 85.7 12.8 43.7 100
Migration 4.82 4.26 1.01 25.0
Returns 3.31 1.41 0.52 7.54
Expenditure 4.48 2.26 1.18 17.8
Council taxes 2.24 1.29 0.86 20.4
Remittances 11.7 8.14 0.30 38.7
Transport Costs 187.4 34.9 157 227.2
aDescriptive statistics on municipalities are based on annual data relative to 84 cities for the years
1904, 1906, 1908 and 1911. Total number of observations is thus equal to 337. We split the sample
into the cities belonging to the South and the North as well. battendance rate in public primary
school; cenrollment rate in evening classes; dliteracy rate; eabroad migration rate; freturn migration
rate; hper-capita public expenditure on primary education; iper-capita council taxes; hper-capita
remittances; ltransportation costs. Source: see text
rate tends to bias upward the education level of a given population. Cipolla (1969) and
Vecchi (2011) suggest that the attendance rate is the best indicator to investigate the
literacy rate of Italian population.
The lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of equation (1) tries to control
for the following two issues:
- The urbanization process. It is likely that large cities were attractive poles rather
than repulsive ones as population relocates over the national territory in search of the
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best work opportunities (Accetturo et al., 2012); if so, the attendance rate could be
altered abruptly if a large number of people and their families moved on to the nearest
city from the countryside. Thus attendance rate would pick up effects that would have
nothing to do with the abroad migration or return migration;
- The natural dynamics of population. As before, it is clear that the natural increase
may be a common driver of both migration (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) and attendance
rate: the larger the shock on newborns (with respect to deaths) the larger the probability
that primary school dropouts will change in the future;
As in Arellano and Bond (1991), the error term υi,t is a two-way error-component:
υi,t = λt + ηi + εi,t i = 1, . . . , I t = 1, . . . , T (2)
In (2), λt represents the municipality-invariant time-specific effect, ηi represents the time-
invariant municipality-specific effects and εi,t is a white noise, normally and independently
distribuited across cities and periods.
Hence, the proposed formulation in equation (1) has the substantial advantage of
reducing the burden of omitted variables by including the dependent lagged variable as
explanatory one as well as time and cities’ fixed effects. In this way, the coefficients of mi,t
and reti,t is more likely to capture the vigor of transmission channels we are interested in.
To investigate the idea that sees emigration and returns as drivers of schooling in
Italy in the age of mass migration, we split this section into three parts: in the first part
we test the relationship in the simplest possible way, namely, by testing a model with
abroad outflows and from abroad inflows, as the only regressors (dummies are included).
Then we try to deal with potential endogeneity issues between emigration and attendance.
In the second part we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach while in the third
part we estimate equation 1 in a multivariate framework using a GMM technique.
4.1 Migration and schooling: basic formulation.
The basic equations that we use in order to gauge our ’incentive channels’, are the
following:
yi,t = α0,i + α1mi,t + φ1λt + εi,t (3)
yi,t = β0,i + β1reti,t + δ1λt + εi,t (4)
where λt is a set of time dummy variables capturing shocks common to all cities (for
instance the influence of educational reforms), while cities’ fixed effects catch unobservable
time-invariant heterogeneity across municipalities.
The first column of table 2 gives evidence of a positive relationship between the
abroad emigration rate and the attendance rate of public primary schools. A significant
association between return migration and schooling comes to light as well. The coefficient
of 0.019 (0.037) tells us that a 10 log point increase in the outflows (inflows) is associated
with a 0.19 (0.37) log point increase in the attendance rate.
To control for the possibility that results are biased by geographical differences
at higher level of aggregation than the city level, column (2) adds a complete set of
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interaction terms between geographical dummy variables at macro-area level and time
dummy variables. More precisely we classify our cities as belonging to the North-West,
the North-Est, the Center and to the South and we make time dummies interact with
geographical ones. To the extent that there is unobserved macro-regional time-variant
heterogeneity, these interaction dummies should be able to capture most of its essence.
Hence, the equations we estimate are the following:
yi,t = α0,i + α1mi,t + φ1λt + φ2(λt ∗ ϑmacro−areas) + εi,t (5)
yi,t = β0,i + β1reti,t + δ1λt + δ2(λt ∗ ϑmacro−areas) + εi,t (6)
The estimated association between in-and out-migration and schooling remains robust.
Column (3) of table 2 shows the robustness of the relationship between migration
and the attendance rate for a specification where outflows and inflows are jointly plugged
into the same model: the coefficients are rather stable.
Table 3 -columns (1), (2) and (3)- reports the results obtained using the evening
school enrollment rate as dependent variable. As in table 2, the results are quite robust
across different specifications although the values of the elasticities tends to be much
higher both for out-migration and for returns. The elesticity of enrollment rate with
respect to emigration (returns) is 0.161 (0.300). This may provide some weak evidence
for the view that migration would have spurred adults education. In section 5 we will
resume this point related to the values of the elasticities.
Several worries may emerge in evaluating the association between emigration and
schooling in a causal sense where endogeneity is not properly considered. This can be due
to a two-way relationship between the dependent and independent variables, to possible
omitted variables or measurement errors. In particular, migration is likely to be one of
the causes for people to go to school but at the same time the probability of migration
depends on the achievement of a given educational requirement, at least for adults; that
is migrants are not randomly selected from the population of native countries 20.
Can the enormous number of migrants leaving Italy in the early twentieth century
be viewed as exogenous with respect to the level of education attained? Williamson
(2006) compares literacy rates for five European countries (France, Britain, Italy, Spain
and Portugal) among adult immigrants to the United States between 1899 and 1909
to the literacy rates of the adults at home in 1901 (those who stayed). He finds that
literacy rates among immigrants were on average higher with respect to source population,
implying a positive selection.21 In this respect, Italy could be an exception. The observed
20Under perfect positive selection the most educated individuals will emigrate with probability one
(zero probability of leaving for the less able ones) and a brain gain would be impossible because, in this
case, all the people that invest in schooling will leave. Hence a necessary condition for a brain gain is
that the less educated persons have a positive (but lower than 1) probability of emigration (Docquier and
Rapoport, 2009; Beine et al., 2011). Williamson (2006) gives an interesting piece of evidence supporting
selective migration using Swedish clergymen evaluations of the intellectual abilities of their parishioners.
From reverends’ testimonies emerge that by comparing people who subsequently emigrated with those
who remained, the former “had a higher intellectual level, did better at school, and had a wider view of
the world”.
21Williamson (2006) argues that a positive selection was inevitable. Immigrant were younger than
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lower literacy rate among Italian emigrants relative to the Italian population reflects the
dominance of poor southern Italians in the immigrant inflow. Still, the selection process
must be evaluated on a strictly local basis: the emigrants from the South of Italy could be
not less educated than their ’neighbors’. Furthermore, the seemingly negative selection
among Italian emigrants, measured in terms of education and literacy, does not imply
the absence of a selection based on unobservable (best and brightest characteristics).
Gomellini and O´ Gra´da (2013) suggest that in the past the presence of selection bias
is clear: emigrants tended to be disproportionately young and healthy and the authors
give also some clues about positive selection showing two indicators that militate (non
conclusively) in favor of this thesis.
The other source of potential endogeneity that challenges our attempt of measuring
the casual relationship between migration and schooling may arise from unobserved
variables that affect both the independent variable and its covariates. The main candidate
is obviously income. In poor families, very often economic conditions forced the head of
household to leave in order to look for best opportunities abroad; at the same time this
could increase the school drop out rate because of child were required to work in place of
their fathers22.
In the next paragraphs we try to give an answer to this potential sources of endogeneity,
first by recurring to Instrumental Variables (IV) technique; second, by estimating a
multivariate model with a GMM technique.
4.2 IVs and multivariate Model
To deal with potential concerns about reverse causality, omitted variables and, po-
tentially, measurement error biases, we first make use of instrumental variable approach.
We resort to a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) strategy using the shipping lines’ trans-
portation costs. For each city i and for each year t we compute our instrument, Ci,t, as
described by equation 7:
Ci,t = tci,k + sck,t (7)
where tci,k is the average cost of a third class rail travel from city i to the nearest
embarkation port k and sck,t is the averaged steerage cost from port k to the destination
countries (Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.). Thus, Ci,t have a straightforward interpreta-
tion: it is the amount of money the potential migrant needed to reach America from the
municipality of residence.23
To construct the instrument we have collected data from several sources. First, from
the source adults population and, as there was a schooling revolution taking place in late nineteenth
century in Europe (Cipolla, 1969), literacy soared among the young movers compared with the old
stayers. Moreover he adds that while there was certainly some positive screening, it probably did not
translate into a big brain drains from Europe.
22This is the main mechanism that could affect the relationship between migration and schooling in a
negative way. Contrary, as argued by Cipolla (1969), literacy could be triggered off by poverty which
pushes individuals to emigrate to search for a job and simultaneously forces them to learn letters to keep
in touch with relatives or to take advantage from their knowledge as traveling teachers.
23Although it is very likely that the potential migrant reached the port of embarkation on foot, we are
assuming that she took the train. Ours is an attempt to quantify the cost of travelling to the ports.
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the Annuario Statistico Italiano we have obtained the cost of ticket to travel from each
city in our sample to the nearest port of embarkation; by law emigrants were limited to
departure from the ports of Genoa, Naples and Palermo.24 Second, we follow Cannon
(2010) to calculate the steerage rates. The Annuario Statistico della Migrazione Italiana
dal 1876 al 1925 lists the annual price of steerage fares for the period 1902-1925 for all
navigation lines to the U.S., Brazil and Argentina. We cross-checked the steerage data
with records from the Movimento della Navigazione nei Porti del Regno for the period
1902-1911. From the ports of Genoa, Naples and Palermo many European and American
shipping companies offered regular service to the U.S. (Boston, Philadelphia and New
York), Brazil and Argentina including the three major Italian lines: Lloyd Italiano, La
Veloce and Navigazione Generale Italiana. We averaged the annual steerage prices to
reach the destination countries for the years 1904,1906,1908 and 1911.
The validity of this instrument requires that it must be uncorrelated with the dependent
variable (school attendance rate in 1904-1911), other than through its relation with
the independent variable (i.e, city emigration at time t). Specifically, to solve the
identification problem, Ci,t must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be exogenous in
equation 5. We believe this assumption is likely to be met, since it is implausible that the
transportation costs could have affected intra-city schooling choices or these costs was
affected by unobserved factors at the city level. Second, it must be partially correlated
with emigration at time t, once the other exogenous variables have been netted out. The
literature on migration agrees that transportation costs were an important determinant
of emigration. At the turn of the XIX century there was a dramatic decline in freight
shipping which could have impacted migrant flows. During the peak period of Italian
emigration in the early XX century there is evidence of a significant (negative) correlation
between the fluctuations in steerage fares and the rate of emigration to America at least
until 1910 when the cartel agreement of 1909 between shipping companies began to take
effect. Deltas et al. (2008) show that shipping cartels tend to reduce passengers flows by
20 to 25 percent. Then, we use Ci,t as an exogenous variation to predict migration at the
city level.
Column (4) of Table 2 reports the IV estimate of the effect of abroad migration (and
returns) on schooling, where migration is instrumented in the way just described.25 The
positive effect of outflows (and of returns) on schooling is highly robust across the models.
The point estimates go from 0.020 in FE specification, to 0.027 in IV model. Column
(4) of Table 3 reports the IV estimate of the effect of abroad migration (and returns) on
evening school enrollment rates. Estimated coefficients double in IV specification (from
0.161 to 0.348) while the coefficients on returns remain steady around 0.3. Our results
present a number of common features. First, the instrument is very strong: the first
stage F-statistics is 41.2 in Table 2 and 23.9 in Table 3. According to the thresholds
24Only a tiny share of emigrants departed from Messina.
25In columns (4) we treat returns as exogenous, since the hypothesis of a two-way relationship between
return and schooling is it is quiet implausible. For example it is difficult to argue that the improvement
of the education system in Italy in the period 1904-1911 encouraged migrants to return; ministerial
inquiries about the condition of the Italian school system contradict this thesis. Likewise, the hypothesis
that the dynamics of the Italian income attracted migrants is quite questionable. For more details on
the causes of return migration see Cerase (1967).
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of Stock and Yogo (2005), we can assured that weak instruments issues do not apply.
Second, the IV estimate generates an upward correction in the coefficients with respect
to LS estimates. This possibly stems from measurement error bias and from the negative
relationship between migration and income (omitted variable) that produce downward
biased estimates.
As a further check on our choice to resort to an IV procedure to estimate the effect
of migration on education, the control function approach can help us to determine
whether or not migration suffers from endogeneity.26 This approach requires to take the
estimated residuals of the first stage regression and plug them into the equation 5 as an
explanatory variable. The inclusion of this error term ”controls” for the endogeneity of
mi,t. Specifically, if the coefficient on the residuals is not statistically significant, that
is the null-hypothesis is not rejected, then mi,t is exogenous in equation 5 and as a
consequence we do not need IV; if residuals enter significantly, there is evidence that
migration is endogenous and the IV method is inevitable.
The last rows in Table 2 and in Table 3 present the results of this exercise for the
attendance rate in the public primary schools and for the enrollment rate in the evening
classes respectively. In both cases the coefficient on the residuals is statistically different
from zero, suggesting endogeneity and then it is correct to run IV regressions as we did.
Last, we move to the multivariate version of the empirical model proposed in equation
1. The GMM estimation procedure is required to face the dynamic panel structure of
the model. Table 4 reports our results; each column shows the results of an alternative
specification for the estimation of equation 1. The third and the fourth columns are
our benchmark specifications. We estimate equation 1 by using the difference GMM
method (GMM-dif). Namely, we use both one-step and two-step GMM-dif estimators
(column headed GMM1 and GMM2 respectively).27 The instruments proliferation (over-
identification) and overfitting are the main drawbacks of GMM methods. S-test of
Sargan (1958, 1988) and J-test of Hansen (1958) provide guidance on possible excess of
instruments.28 We use this approach in the following analysis.
26See Wooldridge (2010) for further details on the control function approach to endogeneity.
27GMM-dif (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991) treats the model as a system of
equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only in their moment condition sets. The
predetermined and endogenous variables in first-difference are instrumented with suitable lags of their
own levels. Strictly exogenous regressors enter the instrument matrix in first differences, with one
column per instrument. Compared to GMM-dif, the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator (IV2SLS
in table 4) is consistent but it is not efficient because it does not exploit all the moment conditions
and its instrument matrix; it uses the second lag of the dependent variable as instrument for its first
differences. We have one and two-step variants with two-step estimates asymptotically more efficient,
although simulation studies suggest very modest efficiency gains from two-step, even in presence of
heteroskedasticity (Blundell et al., 2000). In two-step GMM estimator there is an extra variation because
the optimal weight matrix depends on estimated parameters. Asympototic standard errors do not take
into account of this extra variation in small sample; as a result inference in small sample is unreliable.
Thus the two-step asymptotic standard errors are too small and t-statistics too big; in other words there
is an overfitting bias in small sample (this extra variation is negligible in large sample). In this sense
the t-tests based on the one-step procedure are more accurate. Anyway, Windmeijer (2005) provides
corrected standard errors and t-tests that are reliable as those based on the one step GMM estimator.
28S-test of Sargan (1958, 1988) in the homoskedastic case and J-test of Hansen (1958) in the het-
eroskedastic case test the validity of the instruments set. The statistics is distributed as a chi-square
with degree of freedom equal to the number of moment conditions. Under the null over-identification
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In Table 4, abroad migration and returnees contributions are statistically significant
in most of the proposed specifications and the associated coefficients are in general robust.
An increase in the outflows has a positive impact on attendance in primary schools;
return migration effects match the qualitative literature claims. The magnitude of their
elasticities ranges from 0.023 to 0.032 for migration and from 0.046 to 0.050 for returnees;
similar results are found in other studies focused on present time (Beine et al., 2003;
Docquier and Rapoport, 2009; Fratesi and Percoco, 2009).
The positive and significant coefficients on council taxes (our proxy for income) catch
the relationship between education and income. In contrast, we fail to find any evidence
on the contribution of per capita municipal expenditure. This result fits with different
hypothesis: the ineffectiveness of expenditure, the lack of an adequate variable to proxy
public policy or the correlation with income.
Many scholars have emphasized the influence of remittances on alleviating the budget
constraint that prevents people to invest in education. We test this hypothesis in the last
row of Table 4. If we believe the coefficients in regressions (3) and (4), then a 10 percent
increase in the remittances is associated with a 0.48 and a 0.38 percent increase in the
attendance rate.
In columns (5) and (6), equation 1 is modeled by introducing the log of the lagged
abroad migration rate, while the columns (7) and (8) report the estimation of the model
obtained by simply excluding current migration as regressor but keeping up lagged
outflows. The lagged emigration rate is never significant even when we remove current
emigration. This may be due to two reasons. The first is that the time span, between
subsequent surveys in the panel we use, is large enough to allow the coefficient of mi,t
to pick up past shocks on migration; the second is that the influence on schooling we
have come to expect from lagged migration is gathered up by the yi,t−1 coefficient. The
latter hypothesis is plausible since in an unreported regression we estimate a model by
excluding the lagged attendance rate. The abroad migration and the lagged abroad
migration rate coefficients are both positive and significant.
In Table 5 we repeat the regressions of Table 4 for the enrollment rate in evening
schools, that are attended mainly, if note exclusively, by adults. We drop out the
variable exp since it only refers to public primary schools. Again, the connection between
migration and enrollment rate in evening schools is much bigger than the connection
between migration and the attendance rate in ordinary schools. A 10 percent increase in
outflows leads to a 3 percent higher entry in evening classes. Income has the expected
positive sign; in contrast the effect of remittances and the effect of returns are not
statistically signicant.
Some theoretical studies on migration (Mountford, 1997; Beine et al., 2001) predict
non linear effects of migration prospects on human capital formation and as a consequence
on education. More precisely, these models suggest that a greater positive brain gain
should be observed mostly in the poorest countries. The idea is that in such countries the
motivation to invest in schooling are extremely low unless substantial external options
are offered to potential migrants (Beine et al., 2001). As regards returns, historical
restrictions are valid. We fail to reject it (p-values are reported in the table 4) so our instruments set is
valid. Note also that in the command xtabond2, used to carry out the estimations in Stata, the R-squared
is not available. We compute it as the squared correlation coefficient between actual and fitted values.
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economic literature offers us a plausible explanation for additional effects. Del Boca and
Venturini (2003) argue that the various constraints to start-up new entreprises limited
the development of the local economies. Specifically only in the North-East a positive
influence ot returns seems to come out because return migration was encouraged and
supported. In the South returning migrants faced severe difficulties in finding a job and in
finding support for their investments. Cerase (1967) shows that people who returned were
unable to implement their plans partly because of the hostility of the local bureaucracy.
Coletti (1911) observes that in Friuli the savings accumulated abroad were used differently
from the South: they were used to establish small businesses; moreover he predicts that
if this practise had been possible in the Mezzogiorno, Italian migration would have been
more successful for the whole country.
To deal with this issues we modified the equation as follows 1:
yi,t = α + β1yi,t−1 + β2mi,t + β3reti,t + β4expi,t + β5taxi,t+
+ β6(mi,t ∗ South) + β7(reti,t ∗ South) + υi,t (8)
where South is a dummy variable which equals 1 if municipality belongs to the South
and equals 0 otherwise. Under specification 8 the interaction terms give the differential
effects at the South with respect to the North. According to the literature quoted above,
the coefficient of mi,t ∗ South should be positive and significant and the coefficient of
reti,t ∗ South should be negative and significant. We report the results obtained in
columns headed (1) in Table 6.
In contrast to Beine et al. (2001) and Coletti (1911) but accordingly to Beine et al.
(2003) and Docquier and Rapoport (2009) the interaction coefficients display the expected
signs but they are not statistically significant (Table 6, column 1). Therefore, conditionally
to our sample, estimation suggests no evidence of non-linear effects of outflow and inflows
on education: the South does not seem to get additional effects (this could be due to
the effectiveness of fixed effect in removing cities’ heterogeneity). The coefficients on
migration and returns remain significantly positive and their values are quite similar to
those on Table 4 in the columns (3) and (4); this confirms the robustness of the results
obtained in the linear specifications.
Historical documents emphasize the importance of private schools and evening classes
in educating adults especially in the largest cities (as those in our sample). Figures
related to public schools are obviously not able to catch these possible channels.29 In
Table 6 we check the presence of non linearities by estimating the equation 8 also using
the enrollment rate in evening schools as a dependent variable (column 2). As we already
found in column (1), the elasticities on the interaction terms are not statistically different
from zero. We take these results as a suggestion that, at least as far as the effects of
retunees on evening schools are concerned, more investigation is needed.
Finally we used the literacy rate as dependent variable rather schooling rates. Literacy
data, in the Annuario Statistico delle Citta` Italiane, derive from marriage registers. It is
the share of brides and grooms who were able to sign their marriage certificates. Although
29For instance in 1906 in Turin, Milan, Rome and Naples there were 8,000; 11,000; 10,000 and 15,000
people enrolled in private schools respectively. Unfortunately the dataset does not report their age.
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the magnitude of the Migration and Returns coefficients are quite similar to previous
estimations and have the expected signs, they are not statistically significant (column
3). We explain this result by considering that literacy is a more general concept than
dropout or attendance rates and it is a more comprehensive measure of accumulated
human capital rather than schooling (Becker and Woessmann, 2009); as a consequence, it
is very plausible that outflows and inflows are not able to catch up the whole phenomenon.
Furthermore, as argued by Cipolla (1969) and Vecchi (2011) higher levels of attendance
do not imply higher levels of literacy. In 1829, in Naples, out of 2,000 girls who regularly
attended the school only a fifth actually learned to read. In 1870, in the province of
Turin (the most developed in terms of literacy) education meant in being able to read
just a little and write incorrectly; in fact after a few years that students have completed
the school, many of these were no longer capable to understand what they read, nor to
write their own name correctly.
5 Back of the envelope
A useful way to interpret the effect of migration on education is to translate the
estimates we have got so far into numbers that express the magnitude of the incentive
mechanisms.
We start with some stilized facts about migration and school attendance which are
more likely to fit this kind of exercise. Overall, in our sample 72,015 people left in
the years 1904, 1906, 1908, 1911 (18,003 per annum on average); whereas in the same
time span 19,856 individuals returned (4,964 per annum). Therefore in our sample the
proportion of returnees is a bit less than one third of those who left in the same period.
As we have already noted, on average, the public primary school attendance rate is about
81 percent. Furthermore, in the years under analysis the number of students enrolled in
schools are, on average, 495,940; therefore the stock of people that did not drop out is
401,710. The average flow of the new students is instead 49,162 of which 39,821 did not
drop out.
What was the actual effect of the big surge of migrants on school attendance? In
particular, how many people stayed at school and did not left their classrooms, because
of migration? Next we will try to give a quantitative answers to these questions.
To this end we recall equation 1:
yi,t = α + β1yi,t−1 + β2mi,t + β3reti,t + β4expi,t + β5taxi,t + υi,t
From the equation above we can calculate the implied long run elasticities of abroad
emigration and return migration, i.e. the elasticities that would prevail in the long run,
computed, supposing that the model is in a steady state equilibrium. We interpret the
1904-1911 elasticities as percentage changes in the attendance rate that would follow a
permanent change in outflows and inflows so that yi,t = yi,t−1. Given the empirical model,
this long run abroad emigration and return migration elasticities are respectively:
β2
1− β1 (9)
30
β3
1− β1 (10)
while β2 and β3 are the impact multipliers.
In the case of public primary schools the estimated elasticity of the attendance rate to
migration ranges from 0.019 to 0.032 (Table 2 col. 1 and Table 4, col. 4). To this estimate
corresponds a long run elasticity that goes from 0.013 to 0.022.30 Similarly, the elasticity
with with respect to Returns ranges from 0.035 to 0.060 (Table 2 col. 2 and Table 4, col.
8); the steady state elasticity ranges from 0.024 to 0.040.
By translating these figures in the number of people, we have that each 100 people
who additionally left, kept at school a number of individuals going from 4 to 7 in the
short term and a number ranged from 3 to 5 in the long run. Following the same line of
reasoning, our results suggest that every 100 additional returnees, increased the number
of non-dropping out pupils in a range from 8 to 11 as impact, and a number from 5 to 9 in
the ”steady state”. For evening schools, the elasticity of the enrollment rate to Migration
ranges from 0.16 to 0.348 (Table 3, col.1 and Table 3, col. 4) as impact and from 0.30
to 0.38 in steady state. The coefficients of Returns are not different from zero in the
multivariate model: Table 5. Although elasticities are very high, we found ”‘reasonable”’
magnitudes since evening enrollments are very little. So, according to our calculations,
100 more migrants pushed into evening schools from 11 to 14 individuals both as impact
and in steady state. This is a reassuring upshot given that previous empirical studies
on the brain gain are almost in line with these figures (e.g. Docquier and Rapoport, 2009).
6 Conclusions
The idea of a brain gain has been investigated by many scholars and it is well
documented for Italy by historical qualitative evidences. This paper is a first attempt
of measuring the effects of migration on schooling in Italy in the age of mass migration.
More precisely, we investigated whether emigration, its prospects, and return migration
raised school attendance rates in Italy in the first decade of the XX century. Results are
obtained by using a unique dataset at the municipal level that allowed us to partially
overcome some of the problems deriving from the lack of suitable data. We tried to
detect causality going from migration to schooling, conditionally to our dataset and to
the period of inspection. To do so, we estimated the effects of migration and return
migration on the attendance rate controlling for fixed effects at the city level and using
an IV strategy based on a measure of shipping lines’ transportation costs as instrument
for migration. We also resorted to a GMM estimation in a multivariate framework and
tested its robusteness with respect to different aspects. Finally, we trasformed elasticities
into people, i.e., we calculated the amount of individuals motivated not to leave schools
because of migration .
The results empirically support the working of a brain gain fueled by outward migration
and returns. According to our estimates, every 100 people who additionally left kept at
30We choose β1= -0.48 deriving from col. 4 in Table 4.
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school from 4 to 7 individuals. Return migration seems to have a stronger impact on
primary schooling but does not seem to affect the education of the adults. We tested
the effects of remittances (proxied by the unexplained variation in consumption) and
we investigated possible residual heterogeneity at the macroarea level: no differences
emerged between the North and the South. Coherently with many other studies, we can
say that the traditional perception of the brain drain often labelled as a looting from
poorer countries to richer ones, met some countervailing forces in the case of Italy at the
beginning of Twentieth Century.
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